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  1. Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation.Barry Ward - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):360-377.
    Simple random sampling resolutions of the raven paradox relevantly diverge from scientific practice. We develop a stratified random sampling model, yielding a better fit and apparently rehabilitating simple random sampling as a legitimate idealization. However, neither accommodates a second concern, the objection from potential bias. We develop a third model that crucially invokes causal considerations, yielding a novel resolution that handles both concerns. This approach resembles Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and relates the generalization’s confirmation to confirmation of an (...)
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  • Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2017 - Synthese:1-17.
    According to a widespread but implicit thesis in Bayesian confirmation theory, two confirmation measures are considered equivalent if they are ordinally equivalent—call this the “ordinal equivalence thesis”. I argue that adopting OET has significant costs. First, adopting OET renders one incapable of determining whether a piece of evidence substantially favors one hypothesis over another. Second, OET must be rejected if merely ordinal conclusions are to be drawn from the expected value of a confirmation measure. Furthermore, several arguments and applications of (...)
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  • Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis.Olav B. Vassend - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1079-1095.
    According to a widespread but implicit thesis in Bayesian confirmation theory, two confirmation measures are considered equivalent if they are ordinally equivalent—call this the “ordinal equivalence thesis” (OET). I argue that adopting OET has significant costs. First, adopting OET renders one incapable of determining whether a piece of evidence substantially favors one hypothesis over another. Second, OET must be rejected if merely ordinal conclusions are to be drawn from the expected value of a confirmation measure. Furthermore, several arguments and applications (...)
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  • Bayesian confirmation, connexivism and an unkindness of ravens.Elisangela Ramirez - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):449-475.
    Bayesian confirmation theories might be the best standing theories of confirmation to date, but they are certainly not paradox-free. Here I recognize that BCTs’ appeal mainly comes from the fact that they capture some of our intuitions about confirmation better than those the- ories that came before them and that the superiority of BCTs is suffi- ciently justified by those advantages. Instead, I will focus on Sylvan and Nola’s claim that it is desirable that our best theory of confirmation be (...)
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  • The Ravens Paradox and Negative Existential Judgments about Evidence.David Plunkett - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):237-247.
    In this paper, I provide a new argument in support of a concessive response to the Ravens Paradox. The argument I offer stems from Mark Schroeder's Gricean explanation for why existential judgments about normative reasons for action are unreliable. In short, I argue that Schroeder's work suggests that, in the case of the Ravens Paradox, people are running together the issue of what's assertible about evidence with what's true about evidence. Once these issues are pulled apart, we have reason to (...)
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  • A Conciliatory Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens.William Peden - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):45-64.
    In the Paradox of the Ravens, a set of otherwise intuitive claims about evidence seems to be inconsistent. Most attempts at answering the paradox involve rejecting a member of the set, which seems to require a conflict either with commonsense intuitions or with some of our best confirmation theories. In contrast, I argue that the appearance of an inconsistency is misleading: ‘confirms’ and cognate terms feature a significant ambiguity when applied to universal generalisations. In particular, the claim that some evidence (...)
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