The hypothesis of this paper is that language is one more Eigenform, the “external” description of which is impossible. It follows that the application of second-order cybernetics to Eigenform might be adequate. In this article, I would like to concentrate on one relatively small aspect of the idea of Eigenform suggested by Foerster, Kauffman and Spenser-Brawn. I will use Foerster`s recursive approach namely that neither observer nor the thing observed can precede each other, but instead mutually assume each other. In (...) my research, language would stand in the place of the observer, and in the place of the thing – the world itself. To specify further, I focus on the problem of noting, and in particular, on how signs correspond to things. Therefore, I will try to show that the sign and the object do not precede one another and do not exist isolated from each other, but on the contrary, condition each other. Thus, language creates the world of objects, but in turn, it is created by the world. Thus it is a model of self-referentiality, which arranges the form of language as Eigenform as the idea of “mutual referentiality,” as we see it in the relation between language and the world. (shrink)