I claim that Heisenberg’s notion of a closed theory and its analysis by Erhard Scheibe fit well with the philosophy of later Wittgenstein or its generalization. The notion of a closed theory corresponds to the notions of a form of life and rule/concept. I suggest the possibility of reconciling the views of Heisenberg, Dirac, and Bohr about inter-theoretical relations within a rational naturalistic pragmatism à la Wittgenstein and Robert Brandom’s analytic interpretation of Kantian synthetic unity of apperception. In particular, I (...) explain why a “closed theory” is “closed”, “accurate” (and even “perfect”), and “final” (as Heisenberg claims), and why it is also “open” and “approximate” in Dirac’s sense. That being said, unlike Alisa Bokulich (2004, 2006, 2008), I rather favour Heisenberg’s philosophical position. (shrink)

I observe that, as the physics side of the OPERA-anomaly story is apparently unfolding, there can still be motivation for philosophy of science to analyze the six months of madness physicists spent chasing the dream of a new fundamental-physics revolution. I here mainly report data on studies of the OPERA anomaly that could be relevant for analyses from the perspective of phenomenology of philosophy of science. Most of what I report is an insider's perspective on the debate that evolved from (...) the original announcement by the OPERA collaboration of evidence of superluminal neutrinos. I also sketch out, from a broader perspective, some of the objectives I view as achievable for the phenomenology of philosophy of science. (shrink)