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  1. Aristotle on Efficient and Final Causes in Plato.Daniel Vázquez - 2022 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 43 (1):29-54.
    In Metaphysics A 6, Aristotle claims that Plato only recognises formal and material causes. Yet, in various dialogues, Plato seems to use and distinguish efficient and final causes too. Consequently, Harold Cherniss accuses Aristotle of being an unfair, forgetful, or careless reader of Plato. Since then, scholars have tried to defend Aristotle’s exegetical skills. I offer textual evidence and arguments to show that their efforts still fall short of the desired goal. I argue, instead, that we can reject Cherniss’ assertation (...)
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  • The Parmenides: a dialetheic interpretation.Graham Priest - 2012 - Plato Journal 12.
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  • “ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς” (Platonis Parmenides, 132a 1 - 132b 2). Voir les Idées avec son âme et le “Troisième homme” de Platon.Leone Gazziero - 2014 - Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 32 (1):35-85.
    Few arguments from the past have stirred up as much interest as Aristotle’s “Third man” and not so many texts have received as much attention as its account in chapter 22 of the Sophistici elenchi. And yet, several issues about both remain highly controversial, starting from the very nature of the argument at stake and the exact signification of some of its features. The essay provides a close commentary of the text, dealing with its main difficulties and suggesting an overall (...)
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  • The Greatest Aporia in the Parmenides (133b-134e) and the Reciprocity of Pros Relations.Uygar Abaci - forthcoming - Dialogue:1-24.
    ABSTRACT The extant attempts in the literature to refute the greatest difficulty argument in the Parmenides have focused on denying the parallelism between the pros relations among Forms and those among particulars. However, these attempts are unsatisfactory, for the argument can reach its conclusion that we cannot know any Forms without relying on this parallelism. I argue that a more effective strategy is to deny the more essential premise that the knowledge-object relation is a pros relation. This premise is false (...)
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