In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze effectively argues that two types of relation between events govern their ‘evental’ or ‘ideal play’, and ultimately underlie determined substances, that is, worldly individuals and persons. Leibniz calls these relations ‘compossibility’ and ‘incompossibility’. Deleuze calls them ‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’. This paper explores how Deleuze appropriates and extends a number of Leibnizian concepts in order to ground the idea that events have ontological priority over substances ‘all the way down’.

The `problem of time' is a cluster of interpretational and formal issues in the foundations of general relativity relating to both the representation of time in the classical canonical formalism, and to the quantization of the theory. The purpose of this short chapter is to provide an accessible introduction to the problem.

In the early twentieth century, a rare strain of British idealism emerged which took Leibniz's Monadology as its starting point. This paper discusses a variant of that strain, offered by Hilda Oakeley. I set Oakeley's monadology in its philosophical context and discuss a key point of conflict between Oakeley and her fellow monadologists: the unreality of time. Oakeley argues that time is fundamentally real, a thesis arguably denied by Leibniz and subsequent monadologists, and by all other British idealists. This paper (...) discusses Oakeley's argument for the reality of time, and Oakeley's attack on the most famous account of the unreality of time offered in her day: that of J. M. E. McTaggart. I show that Oakeley's critique of McTaggart can be extended to challenge all monadologists, including that of the great monad, Leibniz himself. (shrink)

Leibniz has almost universally been represented as denying that created substances, including human minds and the souls of animals, can causally interact either with one another or with bodies. Yet he frequently claims that such substances are capable of interacting in the special sense of what he calls 'ideal' interaction. In order to reconcile these claims with their favored interpretation, proponents of the traditional reading often suppose that ideal action is not in fact a genuine form of causation but instead (...) a merely apparent influence which serves to 'save the appearances.' I argue that this traditional reading distorts Leibniz's thought and that he actually considers ideal action a genuine (though non-standard) form of causation. (shrink)

This essay offers an account of the relationship between extended Leibnizian bodies and unextended Leibnizian monads, an account that shows why Leibniz was right to see intimate, explanatory connections between his studies in physics and his mature metaphysics. The first section sets the stage by introducing a case study from Leibniz's technical work on the strength of extended, rigid beams. The second section draws on that case study to introduce a model for understanding Leibniz's views on the relationship between derivative (...) and primitive forces. The third section draws on Leibniz's understanding of the relationship between derivative and primitive forces in order to shed light, in turn, on his understanding of the relationship between extended, material bodies and unextended, immaterial monads. The fourth section responds to a likely objection by arguing that Leibniz's monads may, in a perfectly reasonable sense, be spatially located. (shrink)

It is widely believed that relationism cannot make room for the possibility of intervals of time during which no changes occur. Benovsky has recently challenged this belief, arguing that relationists can account for the possibility of changeless time in much the same way as substantivalists do, thereby concluding that the two views are interchangeable for all theoretical purposes. This paper intends to defend the meaningfulness of the traditional dispute between substantivalists and relationists, by contending that the particular form of relationism (...) on which Benovsky has based his criticism is in fact alien to that debate. (shrink)

According Leibniz's thesis of universal expression, each substance expresses the whole world, i.e. all other substances, or, as Leibniz frequently states, from any given complete individual notion (which includes, in internal terms, everything truly attributable to a substance) one can "deduce" or "infer" all truths about the whole world. On the other hand, in Leibniz's view each (created) substance is internally individuated, self-sufficient and independent of other (created) substances. What may be called Leibniz's expression problem is, how to reconcile these (...) views with each other, that is, how a substance that expresses the whole world, even in the sense that the whole world can be "inferred" from its complete individual notion, can be self-sufficient and internally individuated. The purpose of this paper is to give an exact account of this tricky problem of universal expression, an account that retains substances' self-sufficiency under the constraint that all truths about the whole world are to be obtained from complete individual notions. It will also be shown how the explication of universal expression to be given accounts for Leibniz's thesis of universal change, i.e. the view that any change in any substance is reflected as a real, internal change in each and every other substance. (shrink)

This paper characterizes various responses to the question, 'Why does our universe exist?' Some responses- that the question is senseless, that the existence of our universe is logically necessary- are implausible. Adjudication between more plausible responses requires us to evaluate the argument from the 'fine-tuning' of the universe, a refurbished version of the argument from design that appeals to cosmology rather than biology. The evidence of fine-tuning should lead us to adopt, albeit provisionally, cosmological fecundity, the hypothesis that there exist (...) many universes of varying characters. The existence of our universe is thereby rendered less surprising. This is to be preferred both to the theistic hypothesis and to the view that the existence of our universe requires no explanation. (shrink)

In his early text, The Limits of State Action, Wilhelm von Humboldt raises the Kantian question of the permissibility and legitimate extent of political and juridical coercion, as his contribution to a debate amongst Kantians launched by the publication in 1785 of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In arguing for a minimal state, concerned exclusively with internal and external security of its members but not at all with their felicity, Humboldt inflects Kantian political thought in the direction of (...) a liberal laissez-faire state, in marked contrast to the strong interventionism that his fellow-Kantian Fichte derived from similar Kantian grounds. The article argues that the underlying conception of the individual retained by Humboldt has markedly Leibnizian traits, namely the notion of freedom as the spontaneous unfolding of a highly personal, monadic developmental trajectory toward perfection, which ought not to be impeded or homogenized by unnecessary state intervention. Humboldt thus represents not only a ‘rightist’ libertarian reading of Kant, but a particular appropriation of significant Leibnizian themes. His combination of these sources is compared with that of other contemporary theorists like Hufeland and Fichte. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo principal de este artículo es analizar la distinción leibniziana entre apercepción sensible y consáentia a la luz de su ontología monadológica, con la intención de esclarecer las diferencias constitutivas entre los tres tipos de mónadas que Leibniz postula, esto es, entre las mónadas simples, las meras almas y los espíritus. Con esto, además de argumentar en contra de la concepción estándar de la apercepción, la cual termina por confinarla al caso específico de los espíritus, sitúo la propuesta (...) del hannoveriano entre dos lecturas contemporáneas: por un lado, aquella que comprende la apercepción como un acto de orden superior reflexivo, esto es, una percepción de la percepción; y, por otro lado, aquella que, al distinguir entre apercepción sensible y consáentia, privilegia una teoría de primer orden para hablar de la primera, reservando los actos reflexivos para la segunda. Aunque la evidencia textual es más afín con la segunda, hay elementos de la primera que permiten matizarla.The main aim of this article is to analyze Leibniz’s distinction between sensitive apperception and ‘conscientia’ through his monadological ontology, with the intention of lighten the constitutive differences between the three types of monads that Leibniz state, that is, between bare monads, souls and spirits. By proving this, my approach not only argues against the standard conceptions of Leibniz's notion of apperception, which ends attributing apperception only to the specify case of spirits, but it abo places the Hanoverian proposal between two contemporary lectures: on one side, an approach that understand apperception as a high order reflexive act, that is, a perception of a perception; on the other side, an approach that distinguishes sensible apperception from ‘conscientia’ in order to privilege a first order theory for the first one, reserving the reflective acts only for the second. Even when the textual evidence is closer to the last one, there are some elements of the first approach that allow us to improve it. (shrink)

Leibniz’s modal philosophy, 1675-1676, displays a complex relationship to Spinoza. Commentators have tried to determine the extent to which these drafts foreshadow Leibniz’s later opposition to the necessitarianism with which Spinoza is reproached. The status of non-realized possibles is central to this debate. I here defend the thesis of a strong kind of necessitarianism that Leibniz attempted to make compatible with divine personality. Other possibilities are taken into account by Leibniz only because he wanted to guarantee that the best be (...) necessarily chosen, a choice without options conceivable from God’s action on Himself. (shrink)

In this thesis I offer an interpretation of Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimism. I argue against interpreting Schopenhauer’s pessimism as if it were merely a matter of temperament, and I resist the urge to find a single standard argument for pessimism in Schopenhauer’s work. Instead, I treat Schopenhauer’s pessimism as inherently variegated, composed of several distinct but interrelated pessimistic positions, each of which is supported by its own argument. I begin by examining Schopenhauer’s famous argument that willing necessitates suffering, which I defend (...) against the misrepresentative interpretation advocated by Ivan Soll. I also offer a metaphysical reading of Schopenhauer’s claim that no amount happiness can compensate for the mere fact of suffering, based upon his negative conception of happiness. I proceed by analysing Schopenhauer’s criticisms of two prominent optimists, Leibniz and Rousseau. I attempt to salvage something of Schopenhauer’s counterargument against Leibniz that this is the worse of all possible worlds, and I also examine Schopenhauer’s claim that the optimistic metaphysics of a priori rationalistic philosophy cannot cope with the evidence of meaningless suffering. In the case of Rousseau, I interpret Schopenhauer’s brief objection to Rousseau’s assumption of original goodness, by means of an examination of Schopenhauer’s conception of the contrary doctrine, original sin. Next I consider the metaphysics of Schopenhauer’s account of eternal justice. After defending it against a number of objections, I argue that the nature of his version of eternal justice, which he admits constitutes a justification for suffering, does not conflict with the fact that he so strongly condemns Leibniz’s and Rousseau’s optimistic justifications for suffering. Finally I assess whether and to what extent Schopenhauer’s ethics of salvation are either pessimistic or optimistic. I conclude that the mere fact that salvation is possible is not necessarily a cause for optimism, but that Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation is made partly optimistic by the higher form of cognition that he describes as part of it. I also argue that Schopenhauer’s views on the essentially mystical nature of the state of salvation ultimately commit him to being neither positively optimistic nor positively pessimistic about salvation. I conclude overall with some brief remarks about the meaning of Schopenhauer’s pessimism, and how in spite of its diverse nature, it is able to lay down a singular challenge to all future philosophers concerned with the question of suffering. (shrink)

I argue that Leibniz’s doctrine of sensory representation is intended in part to close an explanatory gap in his philosophical system. Unlike the twentieth century explanatory gap, which stretches between neural states on one side and phenomenal character on the other, Leibniz’s gap lies between experiences of secondary qualities like color and taste and the objects that cause them. The problem is that the precise arrangement and distribution of such experiences can never be given a full explanation. In response, Leibniz (...) appeals to representation. I argue that the sense in which Leibnizian sensations are representations is too weak to close his explanatory gap. In the end, he must appeal to the doctrine of the best possible world. (shrink)

I argue for three main claims about Leibniz. (1) He views representation as a kind of structural correspondence between the representing thing and its target. (2) The primary sense in which he considers a perception or representation distinct, as opposed to confused, concerns the degree to which its structure is explicit or consciously accessible. (3) This is also the sense in which he takes concepts or ideas to be distinct.