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  1. Particularity as Paradigm: A Wittgensteinian Reading of Hegel’s Subjective Logic.Jakub Mácha - 2019 - In Jakub Mácha & Alexander Berg (eds.), Wittgenstein and Hegel: Reevaluation of Difference. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 379-400.
    I provide a distinctively Wittgensteinian interpretation of Hegel’s Subjective Logic, including the parts on the concept, the judgement and the syllogism. I argue that Wittgenstein implicitly recognised the moments of universality, particularity and individuality; moreover, he was sensitive to Hegel’s crucial distinction between abstract and concrete universals. More specifically, for Wittgenstein the moment of particularity has the status of a paradigmatic sample which mediates between a universal concept and its individual instances. Thus, a concrete universal is a universal that includes (...)
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  • Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the Logic_ and _Encyclopaedia.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (2):333-369.
    Dans laScience de la logiqueet dans l’Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques,Hegel reconstruit la philosophie critique de Kant en développant i) une logique transcendantale dans laScience de la logiqueet dans laPhilosophie de la nature; ii) une conception pragmatique de l’a priori; et iii) une caractéristique-clé de l’usage du verbe «réaliser» en relation avec les concepts et les principes. Chacun de ces trois éléments constitue un aspect central de la sémantique spécifiquement cognitive de Hegel, que celui-ci développe, en partant de la thèse kantienne (...)
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  • Hegel's Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant's System of Principles in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Hegel Bulletin 36 (2):159-183.
    Peirce's study of Kant, and later of Hegel, and Dewey's (1930) retention of much of Hegel's social philosophy are recognised idealist sources of pragmatism. Here I argue that the transition from idealism to pragmatic realism was already achieved by Hegel. Hegel's ‘Objective Logic’ corresponds in part to Kant's ‘Transcendental Logic’ (WdL,GW21:47.1-3). Hegel faults Kant for relegating concepts of reflection to an Appendix to his Transcendental Logic (WdL,GW12:19.34-38), and for treating reason as ‘only dialectical’ and as ‘merely regulative’ (WdL,GW12:23.12,.16-17). I present (...)
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  • Rethinking Sellars’ Myth of the Given: From the Epistemological to the Modal Relevance of Givenness in Kant and Hegel.Paul Redding - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (3):379-398.
    ABSTRACTHere, I pursue consequences, for the interpretation of Sellars’ critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’, of separating the modal significance that Kant attributed to empirical intuition from th...
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  • Findlay’s Hegel: Idealism as Modal Actualism.Paul Redding - 2017 - Critical Horizons 18 (4):359-377.
    Here, I suggest a hitherto relatively unexplored way beyond the opposed Aristotelian realist and Kantian idealist approaches that divide recent interpretations of the categories or “thought determinations” of Hegel’s Logic, by locating his idealism within the terrain of recent debates in modal metaphysics. In particular, I return to the outlook of the first philosopher to attempt to bring Hegel into the analytic conversation, John Niemeyer Findlay, and consider Hegel’s idealism as instantiating the metaphysical position that, following the work of Findlay’s (...)
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  • Actualist versus Naturalist and Conceptual Realist Interpretations of Hegel's Metaphysics.Paul Redding - 2021 - Hegel Bulletin 42 (1):19-38.
    The understanding of Hegel's metaphysics that is here argued for—that it is a metaphysics of the actual world—may sound trivial or empty. To counter this, in part one the actualist reading of Hegel's idealism is opposed to two other currently popular interpretations, those of the naturalist and the conceptual realist respectively. While actualism shares motivations with each of these positions, it is argued that it is better equipped to capture what both aim to bring out in Hegel's metaphysics, but also (...)
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  • An Hegelian Solution to a Tangle of Problems Facing Brandom'S Analytic Pragmatism.Paul Redding - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (4):657-680.
    In his program of analytic pragmatism, Robert Brandom has presented a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of the place of analytic philosophy in the history of philosophy by linking his own non-representational ‘inferentialist’ approach to semantics to the rationalist – idealist tradition, and in particular, to Hegel. Brandom, however, has not been without his critics in regard to both his approach to semantics and his interpretation of Hegel. Here I single out four interlinked problematic areas facing Brandom's inferentialist semantics – his approach of (...)
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  • Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel's Logic of the Concept.Jakub Mácha - 2022 - Hegel Bulletin 43 (1):93-120.
    Understanding Hegel's account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida's analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) (...)
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