Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not (...) forthcoming. (shrink)

This critical survey of recent work on Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates (of freedom, God, and immortality) assesses the implications of these doctrines for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations from the first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I argue that recent work on the role, content, "factual" nature, and epistemic status of the fact of reason does not support (...) an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics. In section 3, I argue that recent work on the derivation and epistemic and ontological status of the practical postulates does not support an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics. (shrink)

La intensa discusión que mantienen los constructivistas y realistas en torno a si Kant habría asumido una teoría de valor “proyeccionista” o “detectivista”, ha puesto al desnudo las insuficiencias del lenguaje y los términos empleados. Lo que podríamos llamar “lenguaje de Eutifrón”, no parece abrigar la suficiente sensibilidad como para capturar la singularidad de la ética kantiana. Ciertamente, Kant realiza afirmaciones proyeccionistas y detectivistas, y esto se debe a que su enfoque acerca de la normatividad posee componentes tanto constructivistas como (...) realistas. En virtud de ello, el presente trabajo defiende la tesis de que la ética kantiana asume una teoría “constitutivista” del valor, la cual, en pocas palabras, entiende que las fuentes de la normatividad y el valor son construcciones reflexivas del agente que implican, al mismo tiempo, y de forma performativa, la asunción realista de la libertad en cuanto que valor absoluto. (shrink)