Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The individualism-holism debate on intertheoretic reduction and the argument from multiple realization.Julie Zahle - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):77-99.
    The argument from multiple realization is currently considered the argument against intertheoretic reduction. Both Little and Kincaid have applied the argument to the individualism-holism debate in support of the antireductionist holist position. The author shows that the tenability of the argument, as applied to the individualism-holism debate, hinges on the descriptive constraints imposed on the individualist position. On a plausible formulation of the individualist position, the argument does not establish that the intertheoretic reduction of social theories is highly unlikely. Nonetheless, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • The Group Knobe Effect revisited: epistemic and doxastic side-effect effects in intuitive judgments concerning group agents.Maciej Tarnowski, Adrian Ziółkowski & Mieszko Tałasiewicz - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-34.
    In this paper, we investigate the effect described in the literature as the Group Knobe Effect, which is an asymmetry in ascription of intentionality of negative and positive side-effects of an action performed by a group agent. We successfully replicate two studies originally conducted by Michael and Szigeti, who observed this effect and provide empirical evidence of the existence of two related effects—Group Epistemic and Doxastic Knobe Effects—which show analogous asymmetry with respect to knowledge and belief ascriptions. We explain how (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Reputation and Group Dispositions.Andrés Páez - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):469-484.
    In many contexts, such as business, science and law, it is essential to determine whether a company, a product or a person in fact has the reputation attributed to it, regardless of whether that reputation has been rightly earned. In this paper I offer two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the attribution of a reputation to a subject within a social group. The first one concerns the way in which reputational information is spread among the members of the relevant (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Group knowledge: a real-world approach.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):813-839.
    In spite of the booming interest in social epistemology, explicit analyses of group knowledge remain rare. Most existing accounts are based on theories of joint intentionality. I argue that this approach, though not without merit or useful applications, is inadequate both when it comes to accounting for actual group knowledge attributions and for purposes of meliorative social epistemology. As an alternative, I outline a liberal, de-intellectualized account, which allows for the complex distribution of epistemic states typical of most real-world collectives, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Modelling in Normative Ethics.Joe Roussos - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (5):1-25.
    This is a paper about the methodology of normative ethics. I claim that much work in normative ethics can be interpreted as modelling, the form of inquiry familiar from science, involving idealised representations. I begin with the anti-theory debate in ethics, and note that the debate utilises the vocabulary of scientific theories without recognising the role models play in science. I characterise modelling, and show that work with these characteristics is common in ethics. This establishes the plausibility of my interpretation. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Reasoning with moral conflicts.John F. Horty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):557–605.
    Let us say that a normative conflict is a situation in which an agent ought to perform an action A, and also ought to perform an action B, but in which it is impossible for the agent to perform both A and B. Not all normative conflicts are moral conflicts, of course. It may be that the agent ought to perform the action A for reasons of personal generosity, but ought to perform the action B for reasons of prudence: perhaps (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Modelling collective belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
    What is it for a group to believe something? A summative account assumes that for a group to believe that p most members of the group must believe that p. Accounts of this type are commonly proposed in interpretation of everyday ascriptions of beliefs to groups. I argue that a nonsummative account corresponds better to our unexamined understanding of such ascriptions. In particular I propose what I refer to as the joint acceptance model of group belief. I argue that group (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   205 citations  
  • In search of sociality.Margaret Gilbert - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (3):233 – 241.
    This paper reviews some of the growing body of work in the analytic philosophy of social phenomena, with special reference to the question whether adequate accounts of particular social phenomena can be given in terms that are individualistic in a sense that is specified. The discussion focusses on accounts of what have come to be known as shared intention and action. There is also some consideration of accounts of social convention and collective belief. Particular attention is paid to the need (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Analyzing social knowledge.J. Angelo Corlett - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):231 – 247.
    In the tradition of justified true belief theory, I provide an epistemic responsibility-based philosophical analysis of collective knowledge which is both coherentist and reliabilist.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations