RESUMEN Tal como el siglo XX fue aquel de la fenomenología, el siglo XXI se caracteriza por el auge de los realismos. Se podría pensar que este cambio marca un giro radical en la filosofía. No obstante, es de recordar que en 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre quiso construir, desde la fenomenología, un neorrealismo absoluto que pueda conservar cierto realismo dentro de la fenomenología. Mediante una lectura de El ser y la nada se propone mostrar que el neorrealismo absoluto impone superar la (...) dicotomía entre idealismo y realismo gracias a la transfenomenicidad de dos seres; y, además, desplazar la tarea descriptiva y constitutiva de la fenomenología hacia un trabajo de revelación. ABSTRACT If the twentieth century was that of phenomenology, the twenty-first is characterized by the rise of multiple realisms. Although one might think that this is a radical turn in contemporary philosophy, it should be remembered that, in 1943, Jean-Paul Sartre tried to establish an absolute neorealism which wanted to preserve a certain realism within phenomenology. Through a reading of Being and nothingness, the author shows that absolute neorealism enables the dichotomy between idealism and realism to be surpassed, thanks to the transphenomenality of two beings and, in addition, imposes a displacement of the descriptive and constitutive task of phenomenology towards a work of revelation. (shrink)

In this article I critically assess Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics of modes. I argue that the conception of modal essence that Deleuze attributes to Spinoza is untenable in terms of Spinoza’s metaphysics. I further show that the idea that modal essences are eternally static degrees of power is incompatible with Spinoza’s ethics, wherein modes strive to increase their power by means of positive interactions with others. I suggest that Deleuze’s interpretation of this crucial aspect of Spinozism runs the risk (...) of reinstating Platonic idealist and moralistic themes, of the kind that both Spinoza and Deleuze are committed to overcoming. (shrink)

In his groundbreaking work of 1969, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation, Edwin Curley attacked the traditional understanding of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza, according to which modes inhere in substance. Curley argued that such an interpretation generates insurmountable problems, as had already been claimed by Pierre Bayle in his famous Dictionary entry on Spinoza. Instead of having modes inhere in substance Curley suggested that the modes’ dependence upon substance should be interpreted in terms of (efficient) causation, i.e., as committing (...) Spinoza to nothing over and above the claim that substance is the (efficient) cause of the modes. These bold and fascinating claims generated one of the most important scholarly controversies in Spinoza scholarship of the past thirty-five years. In this paper I argue against Curley’s interpretation and attempt to reestablish the traditional understanding of Spinozistic modes as inhering in God and as predicated of God. I also criticize Curley’s philosophical motivation for suggesting this interpretation. In order to show that, for Spinoza, modes are predicated of - and inhere in - substance, I will proceed in the following manner. First, I will summarize Curley’s arguments against substance-mode inherence and present his alternative interpretation of the substance-mode relation. I will then present what I consider to be the most compelling arguments against Curley’s interpretation. Some of these arguments have already been suggested in the literature of the past thirty years (and by Bayle); however, as far as I know, most of the arguments I will be making are new. In the subsequent section I will respond to objections that Curley and Bayle advance against Spinoza’s view of God as the substratum in which all things inhere. Finally, I will address whether Spinozistic modes are predicated of (and not only inhere in) substance, and whether Spinoza considered modes to be particular properties (or “tropes,” in the jargon of contemporary metaphysics). Since Bayle’s claims will be used both in support of and against Curley’s interpretation, it would be appropriate to say a few introductory words on Bayle’s stance. In his Spinoza entry, Bayle criticizes Spinoza’s claim that all things are modes of God, claiming that it “is the most monstrous hypothesis that could be imagined, the most absurd, and the most diametrically opposed to the most evident notions of our mind.” Bayle, however, has no doubt that when Spinoza claims that all things are modes of God, Spinoza means that all things inhere in God. Curley embraces Bayle’s arguments against Spinoza, but uses them in order to claim that we should not ascribe to Spinoza a view which is allegedly shown by Bayle to be absurd. What we should do, Curley argues, is to reinterpret the substance-mode relation as a relation of causal dependence, which would set Spinoza free from Bayle’s hook. Interestingly, as we shall soon see, Bayle himself discusses and rejects a very similar revisionary interpretation of the substance-mode relation. (shrink)

What I plan to do in this paper is to provide a survey of the ways in which Spinoza’s philosophy has been deployed in relation to early modern thought, in the history of ideas and in a number of different domains of contemporary philosophy, and to offer an account of how some of this research has developed. The past decade of research in Spinoza studies has been characterized by a number of tendencies; however, it is possible to identify four main (...) domains that characterize these different lines of research: studies of Spinoza’s individual works, of its problematic concepts, from the point of view of the history of ideas, and comparative studies of Spinoza’s ideas. (shrink)

Object of intense discussion among Spinoza’s interpreters, the unfinished chapter XI of the Political Treatise presents what seems to be the reasons of the exclusion of women in democracy. Opposed to this interpretation, we aim to show the presence of the “counterdiscourse” in the concerned passage. At the end, we stress that this problem allows todiscerne how the notions of myth and history are linked in Spinoza.

Although Deleuze’s work on Spinoza is widely known, it remains poorly understood. In particular, Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza’s immanentism has not been treated sufficient care; that is, with an eye to the context of its elaboration and the way in which it gradually takes on different characteristics. With this paper, I offer a synoptic analysis of Deleuze’s views on immanence in Spinoza and examine how these change over the course of Deleuze’s career. There are three ascending stages here: a first (...) one, where Deleuze’s attention is drawn to more recognizable issues in understanding Spinoza’s views on the deep metaphysical structure of reality; a second, more experimental one, where Deleuze questions what it means to be a reader of Spinoza in light of Spinoza’s theory of the body and affects; and a third, particularly iconoclastic stage, where Deleuze develops the theory of “the plane of immanence” as a way of articulating a meta-philosophical story about the place of non-philosophy at the heart of all philosophy. I trace each of these accounts, tie them together to tell a coherent and comprehensive narrative, and show what may be learned from this Spinoza that Deleuze portrays as drunk on immanence. (shrink)