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  1. Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • The Psychologist's Fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.
  • Intentionality, Theoreticity and Innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
  • Three Questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.
  • Common Sense, Functional Theories and Knowledge of the Mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • Where's the Person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.
  • Why Alison Gopnik Should Be a Behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.
  • Categories, Categorisation and Development: Introspective Knowledge is No Threat to Functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.
  • The Developmental History of an Illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.
  • Knowing Children's Minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.
  • Special Access Lies Down with Theory-Theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.
  • Disenshrining the Cartesian Self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.
  • On Leaving Your Children Wrapped in Thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.
  • Qualities and Relations in Folk Theories of Mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.
  • Why Presume Analyses Are on-Line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.
  • Theories of Mind: Some Methodological/Conceptual Problems and an Alternative Approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.
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  • Empirical Criteria for Task Susceptibility to Introspective Awareness and Awareness Effects.Sam Rakover - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):451 – 467.
    A proposed empirical criterion for task susceptibility to introspective awareness distinguishes cognitive processes of which one cannot be aware from those of which one can be aware. The empirical criterion for task susceptibility to awareness effects proposes that there are tasks which cannot be affected by awareness of the rules constituting the tasks. These criteria were applied to research programmes in rule-learning in which past studies in the area of learning without awareness were included as well as current research in (...)
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  • Theory-Theory Theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.
  • Matching and Mental-State Ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.
  • Representational Development and Theory-of-Mind Computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
  • Limitations on First-Person Experience: Implications of the “Extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.
  • First-Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
  • A Plea for the Second Functionalist Model and the Insufficiency of Simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.
  • The Role of Concepts in Perception and Inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.
  • Developmental Evidence and Introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.
  • Mismatching Categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.
  • Heuristics and Counterfactual Self-Knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.
  • Knowledge of the Psychological States of Self and Others is Not Only Theory-Laden but Also Data-Driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
  • Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
  • The Fallibility of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.
  • Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
  • Three Inferential Temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.
  • Even a Theory-Theory Needs Information Processing: ToMM, an Alternative Theory-Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.
  • Self-Attributions Help Constitute Mental Types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.
  • Common Sense and Adult Theory of Communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.
  • “Good Developmental Sequence” and the Paradoxes of Children's Skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.
  • How Something Can Be Said About Telling More Than We Can Know: On Choice Blindness and Introspection.Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikström, Betty Tärning & Andreas Lind - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):673-692.
    The legacy of Nisbett and Wilson’s classic article, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes , is mixed. It is perhaps the most cited article in the recent history of consciousness studies, yet no empirical research program currently exists that continues the work presented in the article. To remedy this, we have introduced an experimental paradigm we call choice blindness [Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. . Failure to detect mismatches between intention and (...)
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  • Gopnik's Invention of Intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.
  • Qualia for Propositional Attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
  • Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.
  • Qualitative Characteristics, Type Materialism and the Circularity of Analytic Functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
  • Unraveling Introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.
  • First-Person Current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.
  • Know My Own Mind? I Should Be so Lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.
  • On Behalf of Phenomenological Parity for the Attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.
  • Scientific Psychology and Hermeneutical Psychology: Causal Explanation and the Meaning of Human Action. [REVIEW]John D. Greenwood - 1987 - Human Studies 10 (2):171 - 204.
  • Self-Ascription of Belief and Desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.
  • Theories and Illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.
  • Theories and Qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.
  • How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.