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  1. Substitution of Indifferent Options at Choice Nodes and Admissibility: A Reply to Rabinowicz.Teddy Seidenfeld - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (4):305-310.
    Tiebreak rules are necessary for revealing indifference in non- sequential decisions. I focus on a preference relation that satisfies Ordering and fails Independence in the following way. Lotteries a and b are indifferent but the compound lottery f, 0.5b> is strictly preferred to the compound lottery f, 0.5a>. Using tiebreak rules the following is shown here: In sequential decisions when backward induction is applied, a preference like the one just described must alter the preference relation between a and b at (...)
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  • Remarks on the Absent Minded Driver.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2001 - Studia Logica 73 (2):241-256.
    Piccione and Rubinstein present and analyse the sequential decision problem of an "absentminded driver". The driver's absentmindedness leads him to time-inconsistent strategy evaluations. His original evaluation gets replaced by a new one under impact of the information that the circumstances have changed, notwithstanding the fact that this change in circumstances has been expected by him all along. The time inconsistency in strategy evaluation suggests that such an agent might have reason to renege on his adopted strategy. As we shall see, (...)
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  • Preference Stability and Substitution of Indifferents: A Rejoinder to Seidenfeld.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (4):311-318.
    Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In reply to (...)
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  • From Outcomes to Acts: A Non-Standard Axiomatization of the Expected Utility Principle.Martin Peterson - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):361-378.
    This paper presents an axiomatization of the principle of maximizing expected utility that does not rely on the independence axiom or sure-thing principle. Perhaps more importantly the new axiomatization is based on an ex ante approach, instead of the standard ex post approach. An ex post approach utilizes the decision maker's preferences among risky acts for generating a utility and a probability function, whereas in the ex ante approach a set of preferences among potential outcomes are on the input side (...)
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  • An Argument for the Principle of Maximizing Expected Utility.Martin Peterson - 2002 - Theoria 68 (2):112-128.
  • Rationality, Preference Satisfaction and Anomalous Intentions: Why Rational Choice Theory is Not Self-Defeating.Roberto Fumagalli - 2021 - Theory and Decision 91 (3):337-356.
    The critics of rational choice theory frequently claim that RCT is self-defeating in the sense that agents who abide by RCT’s prescriptions are less successful in satisfying their preferences than they would be if they abided by some normative theory of choice other than RCT. In this paper, I combine insights from philosophy of action, philosophy of mind and the normative foundations of RCT to rebut this often-made criticism. I then explicate the implications of my thesis for the wider philosophical (...)
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