Are actions that are morally good, morally goosd because God makes them so? Or does God urge humans to do them because they are morally good anyway? What is, in general, the relationship between divine commands and ethical duties? It is not an uncommon belief among theists that morality depends entirely on the will or commands of God: all moral facts consist exclusively in facts about his will or commands. Thus, not only is an action right because it is commanded (...) by God, but its conformity to his commands is what alone makes it right. An action is right solely because he commands it, and solely in virtue of his doing so. This view has come to be known as the „divine command theory of morality". This paper is devoted to a brief reconstruction of claims and controversies surrounding the theory, beginning with Plato's Euthyphro, which is the historical initiator of the debate and to a reconstruction of the various lines of argument that have been set forth to defend the theory. (shrink)

In this article, I look at recent developments in the field of the Philosophy of the relationship between morality, understood in a realist manner, and the primary object of religious belief in the monotheistic religions, God. Some contemporary solutions to the Euthyphro dilemma and versions of moral arguments for the existence of God are discussed.

Discussions on hypothetical gods virtually always focus on the latter’s existence or nonexistence. However, this is only the secondary question. Heroical apatheism distinguishes these questions from the primary question, which pertains to the importance of these gods. It is a deeply ingrained assumption that if the gods have created the universe and humankind, then this implicitly entails the obligations that these gods must be worshipped and obeyed. These relations between existence and acts and worship and obedience to the gods are (...) so commonplace that virtually no one questions their existence. The rights of these gods are simply assumed at face value. However, the issues pertaining to these necessary relations are not trivial in any respect. This paper highlights these relations by first formulating two cosmological models for the initial condition of the universe and, thereafter, applying these in the analyses of the claims regarding these relations. By doing so, it shows that the justifications for the aforementioned obligations always result in a Münchhausen bootstrapping circularity or are ad hoc. Any necessary relations between existence and worship and between acts of creation and obedience cannot be demonstrated. Furthermore, these assumptions are based on the frequently overlooked reasoning that arguing for or against the obligations to the gods implicitly assumes that these gods have a right to such obligations to begin with. However, all that can be shown is the power to enforce obedience. Thus, heroical apatheism is founded on neither doubt nor disobedience because disobedience implies that an authority exists and an authority’s right presupposes that there is such a right. However, there is no such right, and we do not equate might with right. (shrink)