Might God have a body? The overwhelming answer from within Christian orthodoxy is a resounding “No”. A concept of God adequate for sophisticated theism must, it is held, involve the notion of incorporeality: any being which had a body would, on that ground alone, be disqualified as a contender for the title “God” irrespective of other considerations.Part of the reason forth is insistence on God's incorporeality is that God is held to be the being who is supremely worthy of worship. (...) Now, if God were embodied in the manner that the Greek gods were conceived to be, it is alleged that such a “Zeus-like” deity would not be worthy of worship. Therefore either we must dismiss all thought of an embodied God, it is urged, or else we must cease to worship him, thus in effect dismissing Christianity. And there is an additional ingredient: if we choose the former course, and declare the doctrine of the incorporeality of God, then although we preserve the concept of a God who is worthy of worship, we preserve it at a very great cost. (shrink)

This paper outlines a possible state of affairs in which human moral autonomy and a divine command ethical theory coexist. the theory of human moral autonomy agrees with the divine command theory that moral laws are created by an act of legislation. they disagree on who is the legitimate legislator. the paper argues that a rational agent faced with equally acceptable but incompatible solutions to moral problems or faced with disagreement among agents who insist on exercising their moral autonomy is (...) justified in accepting unconditionally the legitimacy of divine commands legislated by a just, merciful and loving god. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the greatest fear about divine commands – that God may command something evil – focusing on a modernized version of Genesis 22, in which Abraham finds it difficult to reject any of the following jointly incompatible beliefs: whatever God commands is not morally wrong to do, God commands me to kill my son as a sacrifice, such human sacrifice is morally wrong. It argues that divine command theorists should not reject but that in any cultural and religious (...) context in which the dilemma can be taken seriously, is the belief to reject. (shrink)