This study in the philosophy of psychiatrydeals with the concept `psychosis'. Methodologicallyit follows Wittgenstein's proposal to `dissolve'philosophical problems by studying the actual use ofthe relevant concepts. Philosophical problemsconcerning both identification of psychosis and themeaning of this concept are pointed out. The logicaldependencies between `psychosis' and `understanding'and between `understanding' and the concept ofperson are demonstrated. Studying theinterdependence of these concepts in the light ofthe actual uses of `madness' shows how the use of`psychosis' implies a radical loss of understanding.The status and legitimacy (...) of `psychosis' as a psychiatric concept is then demonstrated. (shrink)

In this article we explore the underpinnings of what we view as a recent" backlash" in English law, a judicial reaction against considering children's and young people's expressions of their own feelings about treatment as their" true" wishes. We use this case law as a springboard to conceptual discussion, rooted in (a) empirical psychological work on child development and (b) three key philosophical ideas: rationality, autonomy and identity.

b is collection focuses on conceptual issues that arise within the theoretical dimension of psychiatry. In particular, the invited contributions centre on the nature of psychiatric classification and explanation by addressing important methodological issues. Two strategies are exemplified here. Either the authors directly contribute to foundational issues in psychiatry concerning the nature of psychiatric classification and explanation; or they provide a conceptual analysis that can play a role in developing adequate theories of specific psychiatric disorders.