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Philosophical Papers: Volume 3, Realism and Reason

New York: Cambridge University Press (1983)

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  1. The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology.Nicholas Shackel - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (3):295-320.
    Many of the philosophical doctrines purveyed by postmodernists have been roundly refuted, yet people continue to be taken in by the dishonest devices used in proselytizing for postmodernism. I exhibit, name, and analyse five favourite rhetorical manoeuvres: Troll's Truisms, Motte and Bailey Doctrines, Equivocating Fulcra, the Postmodernist Fox Trot, and Rankly Relativising Fields. Anyone familiar with postmodernist writing will recognise their pervasive hold on the dialectic of postmodernism and come to judge that dialectic as it ought to be judged.
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  • Realism, verificationism and underdetermination.John Wright - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):503-529.
  • Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):74-96.
    Is conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible with metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism is the view that there is a world of objects and properties that (...)
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  • Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):74-96.
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  • Beyond the internal realist's conceptual scheme.Louis Caruana - 1996 - Metaphilosophy 27 (3):296-301.
    This paper examines Hilary Putnam’s arguments against what he calls metaphysical realism and in favour of internal realism. A key notion is the one of conceptual scheme, whose role is to explain how we inevitably find ourselves adopting one viewpoint among possible others. To ensure the possibility of agreement between all inquirers for some basic issues, is Putnam committed to having just one conceptual scheme for all human inquirers? The paper argues that the answer is no, on condition that all (...)
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