Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Faith and Hinge Epistemology in Calvin’s Institutes.Nicholas Smith - forthcoming - Philosophia Reformata:1-26.
    In mainstream analytic epistemology, Reformed theology has made its presence prominently felt in Reformed epistemology, the view of religious belief according to which religious beliefs can be properly basic and warranted when formed by the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis, an inborn capacity or faculty for belief in God that can be prompted to generate certain religious beliefs when presented with things (e.g., certain majestic aspects of creation). A major competitor to Reformed epistemology is Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism, a position drawn (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Wittgenstein, Quasi-Fideism, and Scepticism.Robert Vinten - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1-12.
    In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Introduction: Groundless Grounds and Hinges. Wittgenstein's On Certainty within the Philosophical Tradition.Begoña Ramón Cámara & Jesús Vega Encabo - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):931-937.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Quasi-fideism and epistemic relativism.Duncan Pritchard - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Quasi-fideism accounts for the rationality of religious belief by embracing the idea that a subject’s most fundamental religious commitments are essentially arational. It departs from standard forms of fideism, however, by contending that this feature of religious commitment does not set it apart from belief in general. Indeed, the quasi-fideist maintains, in keeping with the Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology that underlies the view, that it is in the nature of belief in general (i.e. religious or otherwise) that it presupposes essentially arational (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Quasi-Fideism and Sceptical Fideism.Duncan Pritchard - 2021 - Manuscrito 44 (4):3-30.
    My interest is in the relationship between the contemporary account of the epistemology of religious belief, known as quasi-fideism, and the sceptical fideism that has been so important, historically, in motivating fideistic ideas. I argue that we can profitably construe quasi-fideism along sceptical fideist lines, in that it is a proposal that is naturally understood as both arising within the context of a sceptical investigation and as exhibiting core features that it shares with Pyrrhonian scepticism. Moreover, I suggest that sceptical (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Book Symposium: Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard, Michael Veber, Nicola Claudio Salvatore & Rodrigo Borges - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):115-165.
    ABSTRACT This book symposium features three critical pieces dealing with Duncan Pritchard's book, 'Epistemic Angst'; the symposium also contains Pritchard's replies to his critics.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Doubting Pritchard’s account of hinge propositions.Jonathan Nebel - 2019 - Synthese (6):1-13.
    In On Certainty, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forth a unique defense against skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, “we just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.” These hinges provide the necessary framework for epistemic evaluation. The question is how to understand Wittgenstein’s language here. Duncan Pritchard puts forward a non-belief reading whereby one has a non-belief propositional attitude towards hinge propositions. In this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The evolutionary argument against naturalism: a Wittgensteinian response.Michael DeVito & Tyler McNabb - 2022 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 92 (2):91-98.
    In this essay, we put forth a novel solution to Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, utilizing recent work done by Duncan Pritchard on radical skepticism. Key to the success of Plantinga’s argument is the doubting of the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties. We argue (viz. Pritchard and Wittgenstein) that the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties constitutes a hinge commitment, thus is exempt from rational evaluation. In turn, the naturalist who endorses hinge epistemology can deny the key premise in Plantinga’s argument (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Religious Hinges: Some Historical Precursors.Anna Boncompagni - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):955-965.
    Recently, hinge epistemologists have applied Wittgenstein’s metaphor of hinges to religious belief. The most prominent proposal in this context is Pritchard’s “quasi-fideism”. This paper examines some historical precursors of the notion of religious hinges, with the aim of shedding more light on it. After outlining the framework of hinge epistemology and its application to religious belief, I briefly examine the views of Thomas Reid and John Henry Newman as acknowledged forerunners of this framework (or cognate views). Next, I turn to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Newman and Quasi‐Fideism : A Reply to Duncan Pritchard.Frederick D. Aquino & Logan Paul Gage - 2023 - Heythrop Journal 64 (5):695-706.
    In recent years, Duncan Pritchard has developed a position in religious epistemology called quasi‐fideism that he claims traces back to John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality of religious belief. In this paper, we give three reasons to think that Pritchard's reading of Newman as a quasi‐fideist is mistaken. First, Newman's parity argument does not claim that religious and non‐religious beliefs are on a par because both are groundless; instead, for Newman, they are on a par because both often stem (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•