ABSTRACT Recent discussions of Geach sentences by Braun and Salmon are reprised. It is shown that the intractability of providing semantics for Geach sentences is due to the assumption that quantifiers are ontologically committing. Representing the content of these statements is easy using neutral quantifiers. An important concern is consistent identity conditions for nonreferring terms. It may be thought that Meinongian-object approaches handle this better than Azzouni's no-objects-in-any-sense-at-all approach. This is shown to be false. How our truth-inducing practices determine truth (...) values for empty-term statements is indicated—in particular, it is argued that our identification and distinguishing practices with “fictional entities” are parasitic on our practices with entities we take to be real. Examples from Austin—white dots on the horizon and specks—are among the test cases for the views developed here. (shrink)