This paper defends Musical Stage Theory as a novel account of the ontology of musical works. Its main claim is that a musical work is a performance. The significance of this argument is twofold. First, it demonstrates the availability of an alternative, and ontologically tenable, view to well-established positions in the current debate on musical metaphysics. Second, it shows how the revisionary approach of Musical Stage Theory actually provides a better account of the ontological status of musical works.

The property theory of musical works says that each musical work is a property that is instantiated by its occurrences, that is, the work's performances and playings. The property theory provides ontological explanations very similar to those given by its popular cousin, the type/token theory of musical works, but it is both simpler and stronger. However, type/token theorists often dismiss the property theory. In this essay, I formulate a version of the property theory that identifies each type (thus, each musical (...) work) with a unique property. I then scrutinize the arguments offered for thinking that types, including musical works, are distinct from properties. I respond that no such argument is forceful and conclude that the property theory of musical works is superior to the type/token theory. (shrink)

Recently, Caterina Moruzzi has appealed to Ted Sider’s case for continuant exdurantism and the availability of a “parallel move” in musical ontology to promote a specific version of musical work exdurantism. In this article, I argue that her version of musical exdurantism undermines the prospects for making the parallel move, but I go on to sketch two alternatives that do not. In Section I, I outline apparent persistence-parallels between ordinary material objects and musical works. In Section II, I sketch a (...) transposable case for accepting continuant exdurantism. In Section III, I introduce Moruzzi’s exdurantism. In Section IV, I introduce her selected rivals—the type-token theory of Julian Dodd and an austere musical perdurantism due to Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson. In Section V, I argue that several of Moruzzi’s commitments undermine her motivation from the “parallel move.” In sections VI and VII, I sketch alternative versions of musical exdurantism that are better positioned to adopt the parallel move. (shrink)

Musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth Symphony. Ella Fitzgerald and many other artists have made it acceptable to sing the jazz standard “All the Things You Are” without its original verse. If we accept that musical works genuinely change in these ways, a puzzle arises: why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony? More generally, why are some individuals in a privileged position when it comes to changing musical works and other artifacts, such as novels, films, and games? I give (...) a view of musical works that helps to answer these questions. Musical works, on this view, are created abstract objects with no parts. The paradigmatic changes that musical works undergo are socially determined normative changes in how they should be performed. Due to contingent social practices, Bruckner, but not I, can change how his symphony should be performed. Were social practices radically different, I would be able to change his symphony. This view extends to abstract artifacts beyond music, including novels, films, words, games, and corporations. (shrink)

It has recently been suggested that the type/token theorist concerning musical works cannot come up with an adequate semantic theory of those sentences in which we purport to talk about such works. Specifically, it has been claimed that, since types are abstract entities, a type/token theorist can only account for the truth of sentences such as “The 1812 Overture is very loud” and “Bach's Two Part Invention in C has an F-sharp in its fourth measure” by adopting an untenable semantic (...) claim: namely, that the predicates in such sentences, once applied to musical works, undergo a systematic shift in their meanings. This article is a sustained explanation of why our talk about musical works in fact provides no problem for the type/token theorist. First, we demonstrate that the aforementioned “meaning shift” approach to the sentences’ predicates is well motivated and very credible. Second, we explain how the type/token theorist can adopt the best available version of an alternative, generic quantificational approach to such sentences. Third, we establish that other semantic theories, presented as undermining the type/token theory by giving us a reason for adopting eliminativism about types, are much less theoretically virtuous than the two theories that a type/token theorist can freely adopt. (shrink)

Intuitively speaking, a multiple artwork is one that admits of multiple ‘instances’ which are capable of playing a particular role in the appreciation of the work. The ‘explananda’ in the title of this article are things that have been proposed as requiring explanation by any adequate ontology of multiple artworks so conceived. This assumes that the ontology of art is in the business of explaining certain things, an assumption I defend. At least nine purported explananda have been proposed in the (...) relevant literature. I begin by offering a preliminary sketch of these explananda, identifying how they are grounded in our ordinary artistic practice and discourse, and how they have structured recent debates in the ontology of art. I next argue that the notion of ‘instance’ must be understood in a particular way if instance multiplicity is to capture the standard distinction between singular and multiple art forms. I then assess the relative significance and implications of the nine explananda for an adjudication of the debates in the ontology of art. I identify problems for the historically dominant ‘type’ theory of multiples, and propose an alternative account that speaks to all nine explananda. I conclude by reflecting on where this leaves us and how we should proceed. (shrink)