Popper's theory of the attraction of closed societies conflicts with his theory of research: the former sees rational thought as contrary to man's nature, whereas the latter sees it as an innate psychological process. This conflict arose because Popper developed a theory of the movement from the closed society—Heimat—to civilized society, which sees civilized society as a burden, before he adapted Selz's view of directed thought processes as problem solving, which sees rationality as natural. Rejecting the earlier view and retaining (...) the latter one opens up possibilities for better explanations of closed societies and better means of combating them. Key Words: closed society • Popper • Selz • problems • institutions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhile there have been numerous critiques of the ideology of technology, it is useful to situate technology within both a liberal and a conspiratorial framework. The early work of Auguste Comte offers an ideal vehicle for this kind of analysis. Liberalism’s embrace of technology is developed in Comte to produce a theory of scientific and technical elites intent on reinventing society and the individual. This “technological conspiracy” reads very much like elements of a Silicon Valley manifesto describing the cyber-utopia of (...) a near tomorrow. For these reasons Comte is relevant to a discussion of conspiracy today. (shrink)

The scientific aim of the paper is to juxtapose the views on economic order developed by the leading representatives of two schools of liberal thinking – German ordoliberal Walter Eucken and the Austrian economist Friedrich August von Hayek. The first scholar opted for deliberately constructed competitive economic order, the second one advocates for allowing the social institutions to emerge and evolve spontaneously. The analysis proves the similarity of both theories in regard to the significance of principles of an economic order (...) and the importance of competition for maintaining individual freedom. On the other hand some differences in the areas of sources of rules, institutional change, and the role of the state, induce their complementarity. Developing an intellectual basis for economic policy requires an eclectic approach combining two analysed perspectives. (shrink)

I consider the problem of political pluralism for political liberalism: that not everybody agrees on fundamental political principles. I critically examine three defenses of liberal principles in situations of political pluralism—the realist defense, the pragmatic defense, and Gerald Gaus’ “justificatory liberalism”—all of which I find wanting. Instead, I propose a dialectical approach to justifying political liberalism. A dialectical approach is based on engaging contradictory positions through conceptual investigation of key concepts claimed by both sides. Through such dialectical engagement, I seek (...) a way to deal with contradictions between liberal and non-liberal philosophies as conceptual issues, rather than as antagonisms beyond reason. The ambition is to contribute to a more robust liberalism capable of defending itself in contexts of political pluralism. As an example, I apply this dialectical approach to the disagreement between political Islam and political liberalism on t... (shrink)

Este estudio reconstruye el juicio de Sócrates, especialmente, el caso levantado por los acusadores. La primera parte es una discusión sobre las fuentes que tenemos disponibles para reconstruir el juicio, especialmente el análisis de Jenofonte en Memorabilia. La segunda parte reconstruye el juicio basados en una nueva evaluación de las fuentes. La tercera parte discute los aspectos políticos del juicio, y argumenta que haber levantado acusaciones políticas contra Sócrates no era necesariamente una infracción a la amnistía del 403. Más aún, (...) un estudio prosopográfico del círculo social alrededor de Sócrates muestra que un alto número de sus “amigos” eran ciudadanos que se habían unido a la revolución oligárquica del 411 y del 404-403 y habían sido condenados por traición y/o impiedad. Finalmente, se presenta un diálogo pseudo-platónico entre Sócrates y Ánito en el que Sócrates tiene que admitir que la democracia es la mejor constitución posible. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Against Democracy, Jason Brennan argues that public ignorance undermines the legitimacy of democracy because, to the extent that ignorant voters make bad policy choices, they harm their own and one another’s interests. The solution, he thinks, is epistocracy, which would leave policy decisions largely in the hands of social-scientific experts or voters who pass tests of political knowledge. However, Brennan fails to explain why we should think that these putative experts are sufficiently knowledgeable to avoid making errors as damaging (...) as those made by voters. Given the strong link between political knowledge and ideological dogmatism, as well as the tendency of social scientists to disagree with one another, the case for epistocracy is deeply implausible, at best. Moreover, given that there are important non-instrumental justifications of democracy—justifications of which Brennan appears to be radically ignorant—the epistocratic alternative would be unnecessary even if it were viable. (shrink)

Marxism was indeed vulgarized due to scientism in the 20th century, which even limits the development of Chinese social theories nowadays. This paper put forward the idea that it was serious misunderstanding to interpret Marx as prophet or inventor like empiricists who regard finding out eternal laws as the goal of science. In fact, Marx did not propose any so-called “natural laws of historical development”. He articulated that the only thing worth to do was to take note of what happened (...) before his eyes and to become its mouthpiece. Thus, to understand science in the face of social practice, to analyze everything historically and never to thrust “eternal” laws in any era should be taken as the core of Marx’s new science, which is very important to China today. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter contrasted his definition of democracy against what he called its “Classical Doctrine.” Received scholarly wisdom holds either that the classical doctrine had no real historical embodiments, or that it is a composite of historical arguments pieced together only so that Schumpeter could knock them down. Arguably, however, Schumpeter actually drew the classical doctrine from a very real source: Carl Schmitt.

In Bergsonism, Deleuze refers to Bergson's concept of an ‘open society’, which would be a ‘society of creators’ who gain access to the ‘open creative totality’ through acting and creating. Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy is oriented toward the goal of such an open society. This would be a democracy, but not in the sense of the rule of the actually existing people, but the rule of ‘the people to come,’ for in the actually existing situation, such a people is (...) ‘lacking’. When the people becomes a society of creators, the result is a society open to the future, creativity and the new. Their openness and creative freedom is the polar opposite of the conformism and ‘herd mentality’ condemned by Deleuze and Nietzsche, a mentality which is the basis of all narrow nationalisms. It is the freedom of creating and commanding, not the Kantian freedom to obey Reason and the State. This paper uses Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, and Deleuze and Guattari's Kafka: For a Minor Literature, A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy? to sketch Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the open society and of a democracy that remains ‘to come’. (shrink)

Gregory Landini offers a new and an illuminating reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea about his own innovation: it is the invention of a notation that removes the mystery from all theorems of logic and of mathematics as it renders their proofs part of their wordings. This makes all theorems in principle as boring as “all four-legged animals are animals.” This idea is Wittgenstein’s doctrine of showing. It is worthless; yet, as Landini shows, every time Wittgenstein offered an elaboration on it, (...) Russell checked it carefully and found it of no value. This, let me add, shows that Russell was in error in suggesting that intellectually there is no “advantage of theft over honest toil”: at times one may pay back and with high interest. Other cases may be due to misjudgment rather than to sloth. (shrink)

Mario Bunge offers here a political philosophy and a view of current politics as judged by his vision of an integrated democracy that is thoroughly green, quasi-communalist, participatory, and quasi-socialist; all enterprises there belong to their workers. He tempers his egalitarianism with some meritocracy. His vision is impracticable but deserves examination.

Fifty Key Sociologists: The Contemporary Theorists covers the life, work, ideas and impact of some of the most important thinkers in this discipline. Concentrating on figures writing predominantly in the second half of the twentieth century, such as Zygmunt Bauman, Pierre Bourdieu, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault and Claude Le;vi-Strauss, each entry includes: · full cross-referencing · a further reading section · biographical data · key works and ideas · critical assessment. Clearly presented in an easy-to-navigate A-Z format, this accessible reference (...) guide is ideal for undergraduate and postgraduate students of sociology, cultural studies and general studies, as well as other readers interested in this fascinating field. (shrink)

From the pre-Socratics to the present, one primary aim of philosophy has been to learn from arguments. Philosophers have debated whether we could indeed do this, but they have by and large agreed on how we would use arguments if learning from argument was at all possible. They have agreed that we could learn from arguments either by starting with true premises and validly deducing further statements which must also be true and therefore constitute new knowledge, or that we could (...) start from putative premises and validly deduce false consequences thereby showing that our premises were false. Our aim in this paper is to suggest a third alternative: we can learn from plausible arguments through criticism of such arguments which enable us to discover new problems. (shrink)