La percepción clara y distinta es el elemento sobre el que se asienta la certeza metafísica de Descartes. Con todo, el planteamiento de los argumentos escépticos referidos a la duda metódica cartesiana ha evidenciado la necesidad de hallar una justificación al propio criterio de la percepción clara y distinta. Frente a los intentos basados en la indubitabilidad de la percepción o en la garantía surgida de la bondad divina, se defenderá una justificación alternativa pragmatista.

The dialogue Octavius by Minucius Felix is a point of reception in the legacy of Ciceronian skeptical fideism, and as such it deserves its place in the history of skeptical fideism. Drawing on his Ciceronian model, Minucius depicts a skeptical fideist—Caecilius—struggling to hold on to his religious traditions in the face of the challenges posed by the new religion of Christianity. But Minucius himself is a convert to the new religion and writes in its defense. And this authorial intent distorts (...) the skeptical fideism which Minucius found in Cicero’s De natura deorum by adding credulous and/or dogmatic elements that are ill-fitted to skeptical fideism but well-suited to his authorial intention of answering all available objections to Christianity in the hopes of winning converts. (shrink)

Récemment, dans The Problem of the Criterion, Roderick M. Chisholm distinguait deux stratégies visant à résoudre le problème du cercle vicieux, à savoir, celle des «particularistes» pour lesquels il faut d'abord établir ce qu'on sait, partant, formuler les criteres de la connaissance et celle des « méthodistes » qui entendent établir d'abord les critères de la connaissance, partant, son étendue. Voici done notre problème formulé, puisque Chisholm considère Descartes comme un exemple de stratégic «méthodiste» et Thomas Reid ainsi que G.E. (...) Moore comme des exemples de stratégie «particulariste», ces derniers illustrant d'ailleurs la stratégie «la plus raisonnable». Dans le cas de Reid cependant, on verra que même s'il se livre à une critique de la démarche cartésienne, la tentative de réponse au problème du cercle vicieux est chez lui aussi de type «méthodiste», dès lors, susceptible d'une circularité comparable à celle qu'il reproche à Descartes. (shrink)

For Richard Rorty the autonomy of philosophy and the idea of an ahistorical criterion of truth are ideas that stand or fall together. This article challenges that assumption. However, before proceeding to this criticism, it is necessary in this section of the article to provide some rudimentary exposition of Rorty's position.Richard Rorty wished to subjugate philosophy to history. He announced this position in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), and his opinion on this matter did not change substantially in (...) any subsequent work. He argued that although it might be interesting to read the great philosophical texts of the past as having something to say to us directly (as proposed by Ryle and Austin), or .. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper explicates a Constructivist Epistemology which underlies cybernetic models of perceiving and knowing. We focus on the recent work of W. T. Powers . Powers' model consists of hierarchially arranged negative feedback systems, is based on the claim that living organisms behave to control perceptions, and thus suggests that organisms construct their experiential world. We argue that this provides a basis for a modified scientific scepticism, a scepticism with a positive dimension gained by adding the notion of cognitive construction. (...) From this perspective, knowing and perceiving pertain to the construction of invariances in the living organism's experience.RésuméDans cet essai, nous exposons une épistémologie constructivistc qui sert de base pour des modèles cybernétiques de la perception et de la connaissancc. Nous nous référonts à l'œuvre de W. T. Powers qui a propose un modèle constitué par un arrangement hiérarchique de boucles rétroactives en partant de l'idée que tout comportement a pour but de contrôler les perceptions. Ce modèle suggère que le monde expérientiel est le produit d'une activité constructive. Nous défendons la thèse que cette orientation peut fournir le fondement d'un scepticisme scientifique qui acquiert un aspect positif par la notion de construction cognitive. De ce point de vue, connaissance et perception sont des activités qui construisent des invariances dans l'expérience d'un organisme.ZusammenfassungIn der vorliegenden Arbeit wird eine konstruktivistische Erkenntnistheorie entwickelt, die ihrerseits gewissen kybernetischen Modeller) der Wahrnehmurtg und Er‐kenntnis zugrundeliegt. Wir beziehen uns auf die Untersuchungen von W. T. Powers , dessen Modell aus hierarchisch angeordneten Rückkopplungssystemen besteht und auf der Annahme be‐ruht, dass das Verhalten von Lebewesen der Regelung von Wahrnehmungcn dicnt. Powers legt deshalb die Hypothese nahe, dass Organismen ihre Erlebenswelt konstru‐iren. Wir vertreten die Ansicht, dass diese die Grundlage für einen neuen wisscnschaftli‐chen Skeptizismus liefert, der auf Grund des Begriffes der kognitiven Konstruktion eine positive Dimension gewinnt. Von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus betrachtet betreffen Wissen und Wahrnehmung den aktiven Aufbau von Konstanten in der Erlebenswelt des Orga‐nismus. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt is only in the last 30 years that any appreciable work has been done on women philosophers of the past. This paper reflects on the progress that has been made in recovering early-modern...

In spite of vigorous opposition by a number of historians it has now become a commonplace that the rapid development of the ‘new philosophy’ sprang from the ideology of Puritanism. What began its career as the ‘Merton thesis’ has now been refined, developed, and so often repeated that it seems to be almost unassailable. However, the two foremost historians in the entrenchment of this new orthodoxy are willing, in principle, to concede that ‘in reality things were very mixed up’, and (...) that non-Puritan natural philosophers at the time were operating ‘in a precisely similar manner’ to their Puritan contemporaries. Indeed, it would be impossible not to concede this in the face of the many critiques launched against the Merton thesis. (shrink)

I. Ian Hacking asks an intriguing question, and answers it in an interesting way. Why, he asks, does language matter to philosophy? It is a simple question. But his answer is not quite so simple, though its main feature is simple: Language matters to philosophy today for the same reason that ideas were important to philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Each in its time has been the “interface” between the knower and the known. There is much truth to (...) this answer of his, though we may note that it is somewhat incomplete: we would still like to know how ideas then and language now have come to occupy this position. (shrink)

The recent scholarly promotion of Pierre Gassendi to a key position in the formative modern period raises doubts about the portrayal of Descartes as “the father” of the post-Scholastic philosophical conceptualization. I defend the Cartesio-centric account against Thomas M. Lennon’s elliptical alternative. The defense necessitates a reassessment of the root nature of Descartes’s contribution—specifically of the interplay between philosophy and science, the latter being the crucial extraphilosophical component of the new practico-cognitive ensemble. This raises questions about the “philosophically” of Descartes’s (...) activity, and with that questions about the quality of modernity. By way of explaining Gassendis nonoriginative position, his attitude toward the post-Scholastic Humanist thought that Descartes simply repudiated is examined. (shrink)

This paper is a survey of Father Mersenne’s views about the classification of sciences, its reasons and its practical consequences. Some emphasis is put on the interconnection between Mersenne’s two majors ideas about the practice of science : scientific research is an activity mostly devoted to religious apology and to the edification of the people. This religious concern allows him to resist two of the most influential philosophical streams of his time, scepticism and alchemy, which provide some favorite opponents to (...) his works. We also show how an analogical kinship based on theological considerations and on the classification of sciences gives ground to the same kind of arguments shaping his views about arithmetic, language, and music. Finally, we focus on the connection between Mersenne’s theses, especially about the nature and virtue of language and sound, and a more general discussion of the scientific status of music and language in the context of the blooming of academies. (shrink)

Hegel’s Science of Logic is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest works of European philosophy. However, its contribution to arguably the most important philosophical problem, Pyrrhonian scepticism, has never been examined in any detail. Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel's Theory of Judgement fills a great lacuna in Hegel scholarship by convincingly proving that the dialectic of the judgement in Hegel’s Science of Logic successfully refutes this kind of scepticism. Although Ioannis Trisokkas has written the book primarily for those students of (...) philosophy who already have an interest in Hegel’s epistemology and philosophy of language and/or his Science of Logic, it will also appeal to those who investigate the problem of scepticism independently of the Hegel corpus. (shrink)

Francisco Sanches (1551–1623) was an important figure in the history of philosophical scepticism, and most specifically in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Sanches gained notoriety through his controversial text, That Nothing is Known. His skeptical ideas concerning what could be known of the phenomenal world, influenced the work of other philosophers like René Descartes. In fact, in the last twenty-five to thirty years, his work has at last been acknowledged as having served as a background source of Descartes’ (...) refutation of scepticism. Sanches was not only a philosopher; he was also a physician, and a professor of medicine – a fact that doubtlessly tempered his scepticism. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Sanches, as he has come to be seen as a significant philosopher in the history of scepticism, along with Montaigne, Descartes, and Hume. Some contemporary thinkers have gone as far as comparing his notion of language and metaphysics to that of someone like Wittgenstein. (shrink)