This article takes as its provocation Marx's intriguing statement about the disjunction between the flowering of Greek art and the underdeveloped stage of social and economic development made as an epilogue to the Introduction to the Grundrisse in order to ask what are the relations between that which has been considered art and what Marx calls `production as such'. In the elaborated conditions of contemporary capitalist societies, we can ask: Is art still being made? To examine this question I juxtapose (...) what Bauman has called `thinking sociologically' with a proposition that art thinks aesthetically. So how can art historians deal with that challenge of thinking aesthetic practices both socially and historically? I track a genealogy of art historians (Clark, Antal, Shapiro) who have attempted to think socially about artistic practices. This leads into a section about the necessity for both sociological and aesthetic education if we are to avoid totalitarianism or free-market individualism (Bahro). Finally, thinking sociologically, by taking as a case study the work of Aby Warburg, I explore the technological conditions of art historical production itself particularly in relation to photography and the way this shapes our access to the image. Warburg represents the possibility of another model for art historical thinking about the image as Kulturwissenschaft, a parallel to Sozialwissenschaft in its ambition and relation to the great intellectual revolutions c.1905 (Freud, Bergson, Einstein, Hussserl). Like Marx, Warburg questioned the continuity of the imaginary space of art thinking in the age of technological industrialism. Where art is now, where art history is, are not just sociological questions to which Marx might offer a dismal answer. I conclude that what is necessary is a constructive conversation between thinking sociologically and thinking aesthetically, knowing synthetically and knowing for oneself — curricular issues made more intense by the shared conditions in which all intellectual production is being transformed in contemporary sites of intellectual practice, the university, by `production as such' leading thought to risk the same fate as art in contemporary society, as Marx hypothesized. As a final thought, I suggest that in contemporary art work that confronts trauma and catastrophe, often using new technologies as aesthetic processes, we may find a counter-argument. (shrink)

This paper brings a critical focus to difference and the creative arts in education with specific attention to art as a site of knowledge in New Zealand conditions. The 1990s and early 2000s are marked by a paucity of critically engaged literature on the arts in education and a conspicuous absence of discussions on the politics of difference. Alongside the global return to empirical research in education where quantifiable data‐based projects tend to attract attention ahead of fundamentally crucial questions of (...) philosophical and critical registers, there has been an apparent reinvention of liberal humanistic concepts of creative practice. These tendencies are coupled with strategic political alignments of creativity with industry. The outcome appears to be a withering of attention to the politics of difference on the vine of educational philosophy, policy and practice in art education. The paper suggests that if the creative arts are to hold or gain any purchase in the stakes of education in a global world this vine must be tended and revitalised through a rigorous application of critically framed questions so that discourses of difference can be recognised as a social and political responsibility in the art educational encounter. (shrink)

This article outlines the issues addressed by feminist philosophy of art, critically surveys major developments in the field, and concludes by considering directions in which the field is moving.

This article deals with questions concerning the nature of representation of the female body within the so-called `oriental' discourse in Serbian art: Who is the painter? For whom is the work painted? With whom is the work identified? With what other possibilities of identification does the work leave us? In the context of the historical codes, a stance towards a body is seen as a projection of the social, cultural and power impulses. In the first case studied, the artist was (...) a male commissioned by the Serbian court to paint a series of paintings for the indigenous population and foreigners. In the second case, the artist was also male, a Serb working in Vienna, who painted for the audience of the `real Europe' from the position of an identity alteration. The third case focuses on a female artist, Babett Bachmayer Vukanovic, who was born in Germany but after marrying a Serb moved to her husband's homeland. Visual constructions of female bodies are used as the starting point for the deconstruction of ignored gender-related questions in analysing époque. (shrink)

This special issue of HYPATIA: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy entitled "Women, Art, and Aesthetics" highlights the expanded range of topics at center stage in feminist philosophical inquiry to date (2003): recontextualizing women artists (essays by Patricia Locke, Eleanor Heartney, and Michelle Meagher), bodies and beauty (Ann J. Cahill, Sheila Lintott, Janell Hobson, Richard Shusterman, Joanna Frueh), art, ethics, politics, law (A. W. Eaton, Amy Mullin, L. Ryan Musgrave, Teresa Winterhalter), and review essays by Estella Lauter and Flo Leibowitz. Annotated (...) bibliography by Joshua Shaw. (shrink)

This study examines adults’ postings of photos of children on social media and offers a unique methodological approach to studying visual data. A major innovation of this study is first, to enact the concept and method of narrative inquiry to the digital photographs. Having applied this method, the study also offers findings about the diverse values that emerge across two specific digital parenting cultures organized via Instagram hashtags of #fashionkids and #letthekids. Values analysis of 500 photographs indicated that these hashtags (...) constitute cultures defined by distinct values of ideal childhoods. While #fashionkids photos emphasized children’s attendance to the photo making activity with stress to their possessions, #letthekids photos expressed mixed values of freedom and domestic happenings with a strong emphasis on unawareness of the photographing and togetherness. While the qualities of childhood images collected in the same period hint at meaningful patterns, the way those qualities interact with each other in distinct cultures suggest that there is not one ideal image that could represent childhood in the best possible way and the photographers’ values very much influence the visual sense-making of what’s being portrayed in children’s photographs. (shrink)

Titian's Rape of Europa is highly praised for its luminous colors and sensual textures. But the painting has an overlooked dark side, namely that it eroticizes rape. I argue that this is an ethical defect that diminishes the painting aesthetically. This argument-that an artwork can be worse off qua work of art precisely because it is somehow ethically problematic-demonstrates that feminist concerns about art can play a legitimate role in art criticism and aesthetic appreciation.

Attempting art: an essay on intention-dependenceIt is a truism among philosophers that art is intention-dependent—that is to say, art-making is an activity that depends in some way on the maker's intentions. Not much thought has been given to just what this entails, however. For instance, most philosophers of art assume that intention-dependence entails concept-dependence—i.e. possessing a concept of art is necessary for art-making, so that what prospective artists must intend is to make art. And yet, a mounting body of anthropological (...) and art-historical evidence and philosophical argument suggests that not only is such a criterion unsatisfied by most of the art-historical canon, but it also rests on a false premise: concepts of 'art' are not shared between cultures, nor even in the same culture across time. My dissertation aims to rectify this error by first exploring what our commitment to art's intention-dependence actually entails, and then showing that, properly understood, intention-dependence sets a number of important constraints on theories of art with respect to explanatory desiderata such as the success- and failure-conditions of art-attempts, the cross-cultural identification of art, and the reference of 'art' and art-kind terms. I begin by situating art's intention-dependence in the philosophical literature on intentional action, arguing that, properly conceived, intention-dependence is a weak criterion which can be satisfied either directly or indirectly. It therefore does not necessarily entail concept-dependence. I then use this distinction to motivate a new treatment of the success- and failure-conditions for art-attempts, arguing that the extant model's emphasis on compliance with 'the manner intended' is far too restrictive to capture actual artistic practices. I go on to show that Ruth Millikan's model of linguistic conventions supplies an independently plausible explanation of art's concept-independent origins in terms of the development of a system of indirectly intention-dependent conventions called an 'artworld'. I argue that this account of artworld development supplies us with the tools we need to distinguish art-kinds from other artifactual kinds. Finally, I turn my attention to methodological issues, arguing that even though 'art' is a social kind with its roots in arbitrary and historically-contingent networks of conventions, the philosophy of art is not merely an exercise in bare conceptual analysis. In fact, there is now a great deal of evidence to show that the ways we think about 'art' are inconsistent, incomplete, imperialistic, and largely unprincipled. Yet I argue that this does not mean that the artworld data have no bearing on theories of art. Instead, I argue that our best reflective understanding of our artworld practices sets the constraints on the reference of 'art' and art-kind terms. I argue that we have no privileged epistemic access to the ontology of social kinds; our only privilege lies in our ability to determine the proper subject of our inquiries. (shrink)