رویکرد کلان جان پوکینگ‌هورن در مواجهه با مسائل الهیاتی تأکید بر لزوم توجه و استفاده از علوم جدید است. او به تصور شخصی، متعالی و متمایز از خداوند به طور کلی ملتزم است و با این حال نقدهایی بر تصور رایج توماسی از خداوند وارد می‌سازد. محور اصلی نقدهای او مسئلۀ ارتباط فعالانۀ خداوند با جهان و مخلوقات خصوصاً انسان است. در این مقاله، پس از بیان نقدهای پوکینگ‌هورن بر تصور توماسی از خداوند و ارتباط او با جهان، الگوی جدیدی (...) که او معتقد است مشکلات پیشین را ندارد و همچنین برخاسته از ظرفیت‌های فیزیک نوین است معرفی خواهد شد. در پرتو ظرفیت‌های فیزیک جدید، به ویژه علّیت اطلاعاتی، پوکینگ‌هورن کوشیده است تبیینی از ارتباط خداوند با عالم هستی ارائه کند که علاوه بر نقش خالقیت ازلی برای ربوبیت و تأثیر ارادۀ خاص خداوند در عالم نیز جایی را باز می‌گذارد. در این مقاله، دیدگاه او را که دارای سه وجه علمی، دینی و فلسفی است از همین سه وجه مورد ارزیابی انتقادی قرار خواهیم داد. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe thought of Bernard Lonergan remains relatively unknown among those in the tradition of critical realism associated with Roy Bhaskar. In this paper, I argue that Lonergan’s approach to philosophical questions is both deeply consonant with the thought of Bhaskar and complementary to it. Following a brief overview of different approaches to critical realism, Lonergan’s epistemology is outlined, and parallels drawn with the thought of Bhaskar. The congruence of Lonergan’s philosophy with modern science and its openness to the transcendent are (...) then explored, along with the concept of emergent probability. Finally, the distinctive features of Lonergan’s approach are discussed. (shrink)

. The question of whether or not our universe is deterministic remains of interest to both scientists and theologians. In this essay I argue that this question can be solved only by metaphysical decision and that no scientific evidence for either determinism or indeterminism will ever be conclusive. No finite being, no matter how powerful its cognitive abilities, will ever be able to establish the deterministic nature of the universe. The only being that would be capable of doing so would (...) be one that is at once transcendent and immanent. Such a being is compatible with the God of the Christian tradition, which yields that a deterministic worldview is compatible with a deterministic worldview. A more important point is that because science is never able to establish the determinism of our universe, it can never definitely rule out divine action except on metaphysical grounds. (shrink)

It has been widely believed since the nineteenth century that modern science provides a serious challenge to religion, but less agreement as to the reason. One main complication is that whenever there has been broad consensus for a scientific theory that challenges traditional religious doctrines, one finds religious believers endorsing the theory or even formulating it. As a result, atheists who argue for the incompatibility of science and religion often go beyond the religious implications of individual scientific theories, arguing that (...) the sciences taken together provide a comprehensive challenge to religious belief. Scientific theories, on this view, can be integrated to form a general vision of humans and our place in nature, one that excludes the existence of supernatural phenomena to which many religious traditions refer. The most common name given to this general vision is the scientific worldview. The purpose of my paper is to argue that the relation of a worldview to science is more complex and ambiguous than this position allows, drawing upon recent work in the history and philosophy of science. While there are other ways to complicate the picture, this paper will focus on differing views that scientists and philosophers have on the proper scope and limits of scientific inquiry. I will identify two different types of science—Baconian and Cartesian—that have different ambitions with respect to scientific theories, and thus different answers about the possibility of a scientific worldview. The paper will conclude by showing how their differing intuitions about scientific inquiry are evident in contemporary debates about reductionism, drawing upon the work of two physicists, Steven Weinberg and John Polkinghorne. History is more complex than this simple schema allows, of course, but these types provide a useful first approximation into the ambiguities of modern science. (shrink)

. Stephen I Gould's notion of non‐overlapping magisteria is neither experientially supported nor rationally justifiable. Influence flows between science and religion, as when evolutionary thinking encouraged theology to adopt a kenotic view of the Creator's act of allowing creatures to be and to make themselves. Alleged simplistic dichotomies between science and religion, such as motivated belief contrasted with fideistic assertion, are seen to be false. Promising topics in the currently vigorous dialogue between science and religion include relational ontology, eschatological credibility, (...) and ethical issues relating to advances in human genetics. (shrink)

Physics explores a universe of wonderful order, expressed in terms of beautiful mathematical equations. Mathematics itself is understood to be the exploration of a realm of noetic reality. Science describes matter in terms of concepts with mind-like qualities. The psychosomatic nature of human persons is best understood in terms of a dual-aspect monism, in which matter and mind are complementary aspects of a unitary being. The new science of complexity theory, with its dualities of parts/whole and energy/information, offers modest resources (...) for the speculative exploration of this idea. The intrinsic unpredictabilities present in nature afford the metaphysical opportunity to consider dissipative systems as exhibiting top–down causality. (shrink)

Discussion about the argument “God of the gaps”: The encounter of Christian theology, particularly the western theology, with natural science constitutes a record of centuries-old discussion. One of the consequences was to show a problem known as ‘God of the gaps’. This argument uses God as hypothesis explaining the course of natural phenomena on causation surface. Such way of argumentation opts for existing and God’s acting. It is both the chance and what history shows an enormous threat for the theology (...) status. This article is an attempt to systematize the discussed issue and demonstrate the current situation. The complexity and historical variation of the interaction between theology and natural sciences are the reason for the reflection which is limited to the most important and ‘model’ encounters between these two disciplines. The beginnings of this way of thinking can be noticed in the scientific reflection of the ancient Ionic philosophers and of the appropriate development in so-called XVII century physiotheology. The author is especially interested in the contemporary presentations of this argument. (shrink)

A common response to Richard Dawkins' assault on religious belief has been that he is attacking a straw man. The beliefs of religious believers, so the protest goes, are not as crude and simplistic as the ones which he attributes to them. Here is Terry Eagleton's comment to that effect: Imagine someone holding forth on biology whose only knowledge of the subject is the Book of British Birds , and you have a rough idea of what it feels like to (...) read Richard Dawkins on theology. Card-carrying rationalists like Dawkins…invariably come up with vulgar caricatures of religious faith that would make a first-year theology student wince. (shrink)

‘Critical realism’ is to some extent an equivocal term, although its ambiguity has rarely been noticed. The reason for this ambiguity is that the term has constantly been reinvented. Nevertheless, the identity of the label and many family resemblances between its uses allowed for a transfer of thought between these different, although similar concepts, bearing the same name. The purpose of this article is to highlight the similarities and differences between the Barbour family of critical realism in science and religion (...) and Roy Bhaskar's understanding of critical realism, and also to show the existing connections between both approaches. (shrink)

Many contemporary thinkers seeking to integrate theistic belief and scientific thought reject what they regard as two extremes. They disavow deism in which God is understood simply to uphold the existence of the physical universe, and they exclude any view of divine influence that suggests the performance of physical work through an immaterial cause. Deism is viewed as theologically inadequate, and acceptance of direct immaterial causation of physical events is viewed as scientifically illegitimate. This desire to avoid both deism and (...) any positing of God as directly intervening in the physical order has led to models of divine agency that seek to defend the reality of divine causal power yet affirm the causal closure of the physical. I argue, negatively, that such models are unsuccessful in their attempts to affirm both the reality of divine causal power acting in the created world and the causal closure of the physical and, positively, that the assumption that underlies these models, namely that any genuine integration of theistic and scientific belief must posit the causal closure of the physical on pain of violating well-established conservation principles, is mistaken. (shrink)

This article examines Huston Smith's critique of and remedy for modernity from the perspective of a college professor who adopted “Why Religion Matters” as required reading for undergraduates. Smith's heartfelt plea to consider, if not embrace, the common wisdom of traditional religious worldviews deserves a hearing. But Smith's approach is also in need of qualification, supplementation, and critique. This article, ironically, finds the needed qualification, supplementation, and critique in Huston Smith's much earlier publication, The Purposes of Higher Education . This (...) article provides the dialogue. (shrink)

Since early modernity, it has often been assumed that miracles are incompatible with the existence of the natural laws utilized in the sciences. This paper argues that this assumption is largely an artifact of empiricist accounts of laws that should be rejected for reasons internal to philosophy of science, and that no such incompatibility arises on the most important alternative interpretations, which treat laws as expressions of forces, dispositions, or causal powers.

On the basis of his acquaintance with theoretical elementary particle physics, and following the lead of Thomas Torrance, John Polkinghorne maintains that the data upon which a science is based, and the method by which it treats those data, must respect the idiosyncratic nature of the object with which the science is concerned. Polkinghorne calls this the "accommodation" (or "conformity") of a discipline to its object. The question then arises: What should we expect religious experience and theological method to be (...) like if they are accommodated to the idiosyncratic nature of God? Polkinghorne's methodological program is typical of postcritical positions in the theology-science dialogue in holding that the fiduciary element in theological method is simply a species of the fiduciary element that is a de facto part of all knowing—in other words, theological method does not differ in fundamental kind from the methods of the natural sciences. But this program may contain the seeds of an alienation of theological method from the transcendence of God similar to the double self-alienation of theology described by Michael Buckley in At the Origins of Modern Atheism. I contend that something like Bernard Lonergan's position on how the method of faith seeking understanding is related to the methods of the natural sciences is exactly the sort of thing that one should expect on the supposition of Polkinghorne's principle of accommodation, at least if the God who is the object of theological science is transcendent. The way in which the divine differs from all other objects ought to be disclosed or reflected in religious experience and theological method. Polkinghorne charts the course for an accommodated theology, but it seems to be Lonergan who is more intent on following it. (shrink)

Kagawa Tyohiko, who was a well known Christian leader and social reformer, is re-evaluated from the perspective of a public philosophy, and as an example of the possibilities for collaboration and conflict between science and the religious humanities in East Asia. His last book, Cosmic Purpose, which appears to be a kind of natural theology, is analyzed from the perspective of the hidden topic of human evil. By considering Kagawa's deep religious sensibility and conscience, the book can be interpreted to (...) reflect on the wrong directionality selected by modern Japan's leaders that resulted in the tragic war. (shrink)

The challenge to the journal Zygon as suggested here is to respond to three different reference groups: public intellectuals, academia, and religious communities. An extended discussion follows of what I term the situation of irony in which religion-and-science finds itself. I argue that this situation of irony actually constitutes the domain in which our greatest contributions can be offered.

This paper is an extended discussion of Robert Ulanowicz’s critique of mechanistic and reductionistic metaphysics of science. He proposes “process ecology” as an alternative. In this paper I discuss four sets of question coming out of Ulanowicz’s proposal. First, I argue that universality remains one of the hallmarks of the scientific enterprise even with his new process metaphysics. I then discuss the Second Law of Thermodynamics in the interpretation of the history of the universe. I question Ulanowicz’s use of the (...) terms “random” and “chance” in his definition of process. Finally, I discuss what difference a relational and process metaphysics might make in addressing the political and practical problems in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

This paper questions and criticizes the employment of critical realism in the field of ‘science and religion’. Referring to the texts of four main actors in this field, I demonstrate how the choice of critical realism is justified by a (disguised) apologetic interest in defending the epistemic privilege of the theological enterprise against that of the natural sciences. I argue that this is possible thanks to the reactivation of ‘theological potential’ latent in some under-examined assumptions and conceptual structures still at (...) work within philosophy of science and scientific epistemology. (shrink)

After a few general observations on scientific activity, the author briefly comments on different versions of naturalism. Subsequently, he suggests that the birth of evolutionary biology and its successive developments may show how the natural world comes to be differently conceived as scientific advancements are accomplished. Then the main thesis is outlined by introducing the principles of a heuristic science-based naturalism not conclusively defining the real and the knowable. From the epistemological perspective, heuristic naturalism is meant to be framed in (...) critical realism, whereas from the ontological standpoint it may be framed in emergent monism, given that the latter can also underpin recent trends in investigation addressing human specificity. Finally, attention is turned to some implications of heuristically guided scientific activity with regard to the issues of divine action and of imago Dei. (shrink)

Recent summaries of psychologist James H. Leuba's pioneering studies on the religious beliefs of American scientists have misrepresented his findings and ignored important aspects of his analyses, including predictions regarding the future of religion. Much of the recent interest in Leuba was sparked by Edward J. Larson and Larry Witham's commentary in Nature , “Scientists Are Still Keeping the Faith.” Larson and Witham compared the results of their 1996 survey of one thousand randomly selected American scientists regarding their religious beliefs (...) with a similar survey published eighty years earlier by Leuba. Leuba's original studies are themselves problematical. Nonetheless, his notion that different fields of science have different impacts on the religion‐science relationship remains valid. Especially significant is his appreciation of religion as a dynamic, compelling force in human life: any waning of traditional beliefs does not mean a decrease in religious commitment but calls for a new spirituality in harmony with modern scientific teachings. Leuba's studies, placed in proper context, offer a broad historical perspective from which to interpret data about religious beliefs of scientists and the impact of science and scientists on public beliefs, and opportunity to develop new insight into the religion‐science relationship. (shrink)

This thesis offers a naturalist revision of Alain Badiou’s philosophy. This goal is pursued through an encounter of Badiou’s mathematical ontology and theory of truth with contemporary trends in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. I take issue with Badiou’s inability to elucidate the link between the empirical and the ontological, and his residual reliance on a Heideggerian project of fundamental ontology, which undermines his own immanentist principles. I will argue for both a bottom-up naturalisation of Badiou’s philosophical approach (...) to mathematics and a top-down naturalisation. Articulating my particular understanding of what realism and naturalism should commit us to, I propose a creative fusion of Badiou’s attention to metamathematical results with a structural-informational metaphysics, proposing a ‘matherialism’ uniting the more daring speculative insights of the former with the naturalist and empiricist commitments motivating the latter. (shrink)