Søren Kierkegaard 's account of faith in Philosophical Fragments claims that the historical Incarnation is necessary for faith, but that historical evidence for the Incarnation is neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. It has been argued that the defence of these two claims gives rise to a faith /history problem for Kierkegaard and that it is incoherent to defend an account of faith which affirms both the necessity of the historical Incarnation and rejects the necessity and sufficiency of the historical (...) evidence for the Incarnation. I argue that this problem can be solved by applying Eleonore Stump's account of divine–human union. I argue that the Incarnation is necessary because it allows us to enjoy a kind of mutual empathy with Christ which is the basis of divine–human union and that the historical evidence is neither necessary nor sufficient since faith is grounded in a second-person experience of Christ. I claim that this solves the faith /history problem and offers a way of defending Kierkegaard 's account of faith as coherent. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo clarificar algunas nociones fundamentales de la reconstrucción del cristianismo de Søren Kierkegaard . En primer lugar, se hará una distinción entre creencia histórica y fe cristiana, que sirve de base para entender la relación existencial que el individuo puede desarrollar con la enseñanza de Cristo. Seguidamente, se hará alusión al concepto de espíritu que propone el pensador danés, demarcando con esto los estadios kierkegaardianos de la existencia. Y, por último, se conectarán ambos puntos anteriores con (...) lo que entiende Kierkegaard por verdad y libertad en el contexto religioso. (shrink)