Hilbert’s program was an ambitious and wide-ranging project in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In order to “dispose of the foundational questions in mathematics once and for all,” Hilbert proposed a two-pronged approach in 1921: first, classical mathematics should be formalized in axiomatic systems; second, using only restricted, “finitary” means, one should give proofs of the consistency of these axiomatic systems. Although Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that the program as originally conceived cannot be carried out, it had many partial (...) successes, and generated important advances in logical theory and metatheory, both at the time and since. The article discusses the historical background and development of Hilbert’s program, its philosophical underpinnings and consequences, and its subsequent development and influences since the 1930s. (shrink)

We give a self-contained and streamlined version of the classification of the provably computable functions of PA. The emphasis is put on illuminating as well as seems possible the intrinsic computational character of the standard cut elimination process. The article is intended to be suitable for teaching purposes and just requires basic familiarity with PA and the ordinals below ε0. (Familiarity with a cut elimination theorem for a Gentzen or Tait calculus is helpful but not presupposed).

The technique of using infinitary rules in an ordinal analysis has been one of the most productive developments in ordinal analysis. Unfortunately, one of the most advanced variants, the Buchholz Ωμ rule, does not apply to systems much stronger than -comprehension. In this paper, we propose a new extension of the Ω rule using game-theoretic quantifiers. We apply this to a system of inductive definitions with at least the strength of a recursively inaccessible ordinal.

A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.

The paper investigates the strength of the Anti-Foundation Axiom, AFA, on the basis of Kripke-Platek set theory without Foundation. It is shown that the addition of AFA considerably increases the proof theoretic strength.

We propose two admissible closures $${\mathbb{A}({\sf PTCA})}$$ and $${\mathbb{A}({\sf PHCA})}$$ of Ferreira’s system PTCA of polynomial time computable arithmetic and of full bounded arithmetic (or polynomial hierarchy computable arithmetic) PHCA. The main results obtained are: (i) $${\mathbb{A}({\sf PTCA})}$$ is conservative over PTCA with respect to $${\forall\exists\Sigma^b_1}$$ sentences, and (ii) $${\mathbb{A}({\sf PHCA})}$$ is conservative over full bounded arithmetic PHCA for $${\forall\exists\Sigma^b_{\infty}}$$ sentences. This yields that (i) the $${\Sigma^b_1}$$ definable functions of $${\mathbb{A}({\sf PTCA})}$$ are the polytime functions, and (ii) the $${\Sigma^b_{\infty}}$$ definable (...) functions of $${\mathbb{A}({\sf PHCA})}$$ are the functions in the polynomial time hierarchy. (shrink)

Exploiting the fact that -definable non-monotone inductive definitions have the same closure ordinal as arbitrary arithmetically definable monotone inductive definitions, we show that the proof theoretic ordinal of an axiomatization of -definable non-monotone inductive definitions coincides with the proof theoretic ordinal of the theory of arithmetically definable monotone inductive definitions.

We give a survey on truth theories for applicative theories. It comprises Frege structures, universes for Frege structures, and a theory of supervaluation. We present the proof-theoretic results for these theories and show their syntactical expressive power. In particular, we present as a novelty a syntactical interpretation of ID1 in a applicative truth theory based on supervaluation.

We give an overview of recent results in ordinal analysis. Therefore, we discuss the different frameworks used in mathematical proof-theory, namely "subsystem of analysis" including "reverse mathematics", "Kripke-Platek set theory", "explicit mathematics", "theories of inductive definitions", "constructive set theory", and "Martin-Löf's type theory".

This article studies three most basic systems of truth as well as their subsystems over set theory ZF possibly with AC or the axiom of global choice GC, and then correlates them with subsystems of Morse–Kelley class theory MK. The article aims at making an initial step towards the axiomatic study of truth in set theory in connection with class theory. Some new results on the side of class theory, such as conservativity, forcing and some forms of the reflection principle, (...) are also presented. The equivalence results among systems of truth and classes obtained in this article are summarized in Theorem 104 , Theorem 107 and Theorem 108. (shrink)

The goals of reduction andreductionism in the natural sciences are mainly explanatoryin character, while those inmathematics are primarily foundational.In contrast to global reductionistprograms which aim to reduce all ofmathematics to one supposedly ``universal'' system or foundational scheme, reductive proof theory pursues local reductions of one formal system to another which is more justified in some sense. In this direction, two specific rationales have been proposed as aims for reductive proof theory, the constructive consistency-proof rationale and the foundational reduction rationale. However, (...) recent advances in proof theory force one to consider the viability of these rationales. Despite the genuine problems of foundational significance raised by that work, the paper concludes with a defense of reductive proof theory at a minimum as one of the principal means to lay out what rests on what in mathematics. In an extensive appendix to the paper,various reduction relations betweensystems are explained and compared, and arguments against proof-theoretic reduction as a ``good'' reducibilityrelation are taken up and rebutted. (shrink)

For some modal fixed point logics, there are deductive systems that enjoy syntactic cut-elimination. An early example is the system in Pliuskevicius [15] for LTL. More recent examples are the systems by the authors of this paper for the logic of common knowledge [5] and by Hill and Poggiolesi for PDL[8], which are based on a form of deep inference. These logics can be seen as fragments of the modal mu-calculus. Here we are interested in how far this approach can (...) be pushed in general. To this end, we introduce a nested sequent system with syntactic cut-elimination which is incomplete for the modal mu-calculus, but complete with respect to a restricted language that allows only fixed points of a certain form. This restricted language includes the logic of common knowledge and PDL. There is also a traditional sequent system for the modal mu-calculus by Jäger et al. [9], without a syntactic cut-elimination procedure. We embed that system into ours and vice versa, thus establishing cut-elimination also for the shallow system, when only the restricted language is considered. (shrink)

We first look at an existing infinitary sequent system for common knowledge for which there is no known syntactic cut-elimination procedure and also no known non-trivial bound on the proof-depth. We then present another infinitary sequent system based on nested sequents that are essentially trees and with inference rules that apply deeply inside these trees. Thus we call this system “deep” while we call the former system “shallow”. In contrast to the shallow system, the deep system allows one to give (...) a straightforward syntactic cut-elimination procedure. Since both systems can be embedded into each other, this also yields a syntactic cut-elimination procedure for the shallow system. For both systems we thus obtain an upper bound of φ20 on the depth of proofs, where φ is the Veblen function. (shrink)

We suggest an algebraic approach to proof-theoretic analysis based on the notion of graded provability algebra, that is, Lindenbaum boolean algebra of a theory enriched by additional operators which allow for the structure to capture proof-theoretic information. We use this method to analyze Peano arithmetic and show how an ordinal notation system up to 0 can be recovered from the corresponding algebra in a canonical way. This method also establishes links between proof-theoretic ordinal analysis and the work which has been (...) done in the last two decades on provability logic and reflection principles. Because of its abstract algebraic nature, we hope that it will also be of interest for non-prooftheorists. (shrink)

The notion of a function from ℕ to ℕ defined by recursion on ordinal notations is fundamental in proof theory. Here this notion is generalized to functions on the universe of sets, using notations for well orderings longer than the class of ordinals. The generalization is used to bound the rate of growth of any function on the universe of sets that is Σ1-definable in Kripke–Platek admissible set theory with an axiom of infinity. Formalizing the argument provides an ordinal analysis.

This paper deals with a proof theory for a theory T22 of recursively Mahlo ordinals in the form of Π2-reflecting on Π2-reflecting ordinals using a subsystem Od of the system O of ordinal diagrams in Arai 353). This paper is the first published one in which a proof-theoretic analysis à la Gentzen–Takeuti of recursively large ordinals is expounded.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, mathematics exhibited a style of argumentation that was more explicitly computational than is common today. Over the course of the century, the introduction of abstract algebraic methods helped unify developments in analysis, number theory, geometry, and the theory of equations; and work by mathematicians like Dedekind, Cantor, and Hilbert towards the end of the century introduced set-theoretic language and infinitary methods that served to downplay or suppress computational content. This shift in emphasis away (...) from calculation gave rise to concerns as to whether such methods were meaningful, or appropriate to mathematics. The discovery of paradoxes stemming from overly naive use of set-theoretic language and methods led to even more pressing concerns as to whether the modern methods were even consistent. This led to heated debates in the early twentieth century and what is sometimes called the “crisis of foundations.” In lectures presented in 1922, David Hilbert launched his Beweistheorie, or Proof Theory, which aimed to justify the use of modern methods and settle the problem of foundations once and for all. This, Hilbert argued, could be achieved as follows. (shrink)

The point of departure for this panel is a somewhat controversial paper that I published in the American Mathematical Monthly under the title “Does mathematics need new axioms?” [4]. The paper itself was based on a lecture that I gave in 1997 to a joint session of the American Mathematical Society and the Mathematical Association of America, and it was thus written for a general mathematical audience. Basically, it was intended as an assessment of Gödel’s program for new axioms that (...) he had advanced most prominently in his 1947 paper for the Monthly, entitled “What is Cantor’s continuum problem?” [7]. My paper aimed to be an assessment of that program in the light of research in mathematical logic in the intervening years, beginning in the 1960s, but especially in more recent years. (shrink)