This essay intends to argue for the affinity between the Gorgias and the Republic concerning issues of moral psychology. To this end I will divide my argument into two halves. The first half will show how the Calliclean moral psychology outlined at 491e-492a implies the possibility of conflict within the soul, especially regarding the relationship between epithumiai and shame. It will then argue that Socrates recognizes the appetitive element of the soul in his reply to Callicles but does not explore (...) its consequences in any depth. The second half will contend that thumos – in the form of shame – is represented dramatically, and to some extent theoretically by Plato as one source of human motivation independent from reason, and recognized as such by the Calliclean position. My ultimate goal is to show how Plato raises questions in the Gorgias that hint at the theory of the tripartite soul expounded in book IV of the Republic, even though the answers here remain insufficient. The Gorgias therefore invites its readers to reflect critically on so-called Socratic intellectualism pointing to a more complex conception of human motivation that will be developed in the Republic. (shrink)