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  1. The Contest Paradox.Yuval Eylon - forthcoming - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy:1-16.
    The paper introduces the “Contest Paradox”: on the one hand, rational competitors employ the most effective means to achieve the constitutive end of games - winning; On the other hand, apparently rational competitors often employ means that are sub-optimal for winning, e.g., playing beautifully or fairly. Nevertheless, the actions of such competitors are viewed as rational. Are such competitors rational? I reject the possibility of resolving the paradox by appealing to additional ends or norms to winning, such as playing sportingly. (...)
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  • Treating Broome Fairly.Christian Piller - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (2):214-238.
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  • The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge.Julien Dutant - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):141-162.
    ABSTRACT: Meno’s Thesis—the idea that knowing something is better than merely having a true belief about it—is incompatible with the joint claims that believing the truth is the sole source of the value of knowledge and true belief and knowledge are equally successful in believing the truth. Recent answers to that so-called “swamping” problem reject either or. This paper rejects Meno’s Thesis instead, as relying on a confusion between expected value and value proper. The proposed solution relies on an externalist (...)
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  • In Defence of Swamping.Julien Dutant - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):357-366.
    The Swamping Problem shows that two claims are incompatible: the claim that knowledge has more epistemic value than mere true belief and a strict variant of the claim that all epistemic value is truth or instrumental on truth. Most current solutions reject. Carter and Jarvis and Carter, Jarvis and Rubin object instead to a principle that underlies the problem. This paper argues that their objections fail and the problem stands. It also outlines a novel solution which rejects. By carefully distinguishing (...)
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  • The value and normative role of knowledge.Julien Dutant - 2014 - Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
    Why does knowledge matter? Two answers have been influential in the recent literature. One is that it has value: knowledge is one of the goods. Another is that it plays a significant normative role: knowledge is the norm of action, belief, assertion, or the like. This paper discusses whether one can derive one of the claims from the other. That is, whether assuming the idea that knowledge has value — and some defensible general hypotheses about norms and values —, we (...)
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  • Knowledge as Achievement -- Greco's Double Mistake. Piller - 2012 - In C. Jaeger & W. Loeffler (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values Disagreement.
    John Greco claims that knowledge is a kind of achievement. The value achievements have (as such) shows, according to Greco, why knowledge is better than mere true belief. I argue that, for a variety of reasons, it is not always good to know. Furthermore, it is wrong to think that achievements are always good – think of achieving what is bad. Greco is mistaken twice; this leaves the idea that knowledge is a kind of achievement intact.
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