Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Token-identity, consciousness, and the connection principle.Jürgen Schröder - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):615-616.
    Searle's (1990) argument for the seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Searle's argument that intentional states are conscious states.Norton Nelkin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):614-615.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • The ontology of aspectual shape.Martin Kurthen & Detlef B. Linke - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):612-614.
    Searle (1990) argues that unconscious intrinsic intentional states must be accessible to consciousness because (1) all intrinsic intentional states have aspectual shape, the of which cannot be explained in a third-person (e.g., neurophysiological) vocabulary, and (2) ontologically, unconscious mental states are neurophysiological processes. This argument confuses three senses of namely, factuality, individuative properties, and phenomenological presence.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•