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My purpose in this paper is to defend the legitimacy of different religious systems by showing that they arise naturally as a consequence of the fact that we are linguistic beings. I will show that we do not need to presume that such belief systems all have something in common, and that even if they did we would most probably be unaware of it. I shall argue, however, that this lack of a common core does not mean that understanding between (...) |
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En este trabajo trato de dar respuesta a la cuestión acerca de si los conceptos formales del Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Wittgenstein son o no categorías ontológicas. Mi respuesta es que no. Así, después de ofrecer una definición de ‘ontología’ y diferentes lecturas sobre las proposiciones iniciales del Tractatus, presento la noción de concepto formal o lógico, así como diferentes interpretaciones en relación con el papel de esos conceptos en el Tractatus. Después, y teniendo en consideración lo dicho en las secciones (...) No categories |
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This paper is more than a plea for Rhees’ reading of the work of Wittgenstein (particularly of On Certainty). My interest in Rhees’ interpretation lies on its resemblance with my own reading, on the one hand, and on its being (surprisingly) unmentioned by other interpreters, on the other. The two core aims of this paper focus on Rhees’ main ideas. First, I argue that although certain facts that are accepted beyond doubt belong to the method, which in turn is included (...) |
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Part II of this contribution makes available materials preserved of G. H. von Wright’s hitherto unknown edition of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s last writings from 1967–68. The edition was never published. The underlying MS material was, instead, published in four different edited volumes in 1969, 1977 and 1992. Part I, an introduction to the archival items, contextualizes von Wright’s edition historically, presents a reconstruction of its structure, compares it with the published volumes and discusses reasons for its abandonment. |
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En este escrito se analiza la significación y el uso filosófico que Wittgenstein dio en su pensamiento maduro al concepto de forma de vida. Así, aunque se señala que Wittgenstein sólo hizo uso de dicho concepto en el contexto de la justificación de la praxis lingüística como límite epistemológico, se enfatiza no obstante que en ese uso ya es posible vislumbrar una cierta concepción antropológica sobre los seres humanos como animales de conducta expresiva, intencional, simbólica, lingüística generadora de reglas y (...) |
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This paper presents the concept of ‘religious certainty’ I have developed by drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘certainty’. After describing the particular traits of religious certainty, this paper addresses two difficulties derived from this concept. On the one hand, it explains why religious certainty functions as such even though all its consequences are far from being absolutely clear; on the other hand, it clarifies why, unlike the rest of certainties, the loss of religious certainty does not result in the (...) |
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Wittgenstein scholars have tended to interpret the acquisition of certainties, and by extension, of a world-picture, as the achievement of a state in which these certainties are assimilated in a seemingly unconscious way as one masters language-games. However, it has not been stressed that the attainment of this state often involves facing a series of challenges or difficulties which must be overcome for the development of the world-picture and therefore the socialization process to be achieved. After showing, on the one (...) |
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Aunque Karl Jaspers afirmó en su Psicopatología general que la génesis de un delirio es incomprensible tanto empática como racionalmente, millones de espectadores de todo el mundo y multitud de críticos parecen haber comprendido de ambas maneras la génesis del caso de síndrome de Cotard que aparece al final de la película El sexto sentido (1999). Sin embargo, en el presente artículo mostraré que la posibilidad de comprender racional y empáticamente la génesis de este caso no es real, sino meramente (...) |
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Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty about the acquisition of child language have gone nearly unnoticed for the commentators of his work. In this paper, I analyze some of those remarks to shed light on the main questions posed in On the categorical distinction between knowledge and certainty; the nature of language-games; the refutation of skepticism and, above all, the challenges involved by learning to believe. |
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Many contributors of the debate about knowledge by testimony concentrate on the problem of justification. In my paper I will stress a different point – the concept of testimony itself. As a starting point I will use the definitional proposal of Jennifer Lackey. She holds that the concept of testimony should be regarded as entailing two aspects – one corresponding to the speaker, the other one to the hearer. I will adopt the assumption that we need to deal with both (...) |
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In the preface to On Certainty Anscombe and von Wright say that in 1949 Malcolm suggested to Wittgenstein to think again about Moore’s “Defense of Common Sense” (1925) and “Proof of an External World” (1939). Malcolm himself had written on the issue in “Defending Common Sense” (1949). In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein quotes Nestroy saying that there is usually very little progress in philosophy. But I think some progress has been made from Moore and Malcolm to Wittgenstein (...) |
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