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Facts and Values [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 20 (2):379-380 (1966)

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  1. Disagreeing in Context.Teresa Marques - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:1-12.
    This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and evaluative predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparently resilient disagreements are to be explained. The present proposal is complementary to others that have been made in the recent literature. Several authors, for instance (López de Sa, 2008; Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014; Marques, 2014a), have recently defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from the accusation that it faces the problem of lost (...)
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  • We Can't Have No Satisfaction.Teresa Marques - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3):308-314.
    Many authors agree that there is a dimension of conflict expressed through discourse that eludes purely semantic approaches. How and why do conative attitudes conflict? The latter question is the object of this paper. Conflicts of attitudes are typically modelled on one of two models. The first imposes a Subjective Rationality constraint on conflicting attitudes, and the second depends on the impossibility of Joint Satisfaction. This paper assesses whether either of the two conditions can account for conflicting attitudes. First, it (...)
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  • The Intelligibility of Moral Intransigence: A Dilemma for Cognitivism About Moral Judgment.Richard Rowland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):266-275.
    Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do (...)
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  • Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.
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  • Expression for Expressivists.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):86–116.
    Expressivism’s central idea is that normative sentences bear the same relation to non-cognitive attitudes that ordinary descriptive sentences bear to beliefs: the expression relation. Allan Gibbard teIls us that “that words express judgments will be accepted by almost everyone” - the distinctive contribution of expressivism, his claim goes, is only a view about what kind of judgments words express. But not every account of the expression relation is equally suitable for the expressivist’s purposes. In fact, what I argue in this (...)
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  • Semantic Blindness and Error Theorizing for the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):275-284.
    The ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is the view that ‘knows’ and its cognates have more than one propositional sense – i.e. more than one sense that can properly be used in ‘knows that’ etc. constructions. Given that most of us are ‘intuitive invariantists’ – i.e. most of us initially have the intuition that ‘knows’ is univocal – defenders of the ambiguity theory need to offer an explanation for the semantic blindness present if ‘knows’ is in fact ambiguous. This paper is (...)
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  • The Explanationist Argument for Moral Realism.Neil Sinclair - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not (...)
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  • Advice for Noncognitivists.Malte Willer - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):174–207.
    Metaethical noncognitivists have trouble arriving at a respectable semantic theory for moral language. The goal of this article is to make substantial progress toward demonstrating that these problems may be overcome. Replacing the predominant expressivist semantic agenda in metaethics with a dynamic perspective on meaning and communication allows noncognitivists to provide a satisfying analysis of negation and other constructions that have been argued to be problematic for metaethical noncognitivism, including disjunctions. The resulting proposal preserves some of the key insights from (...)
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  • Afterword: Whither Moral Philosophy?Jocelyne Couture & Kai Nielsen - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (sup1):273-337.
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  • Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?Bart Streumer - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):450-470.
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
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  • Evaluating Facts and Facting Evaluations: On the Fact-Value Relationship in HTA.Bjørn Hofmann, Ken Bond & Lars Sandman - 2018 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 24 (5):957-965.
    Health technology assessment is an evaluation of health technologies in terms of facts and evidence. However, the relationship between facts and values is still not clear in HTA. This is problematic in an era of fake facts and truth production. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to clarify the relationship between facts and values in HTA. We start with the perspectives of the traditional positivist account of evaluating facts and the social-constructivist account of facting values. Our analysis reveals diverse (...)
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  • A Metaethical Option for Theists.Kyle Swan - 2006 - Journal of Religious Ethics 34 (1):3-20.
    ABSTRACTJohn Hare has proposed “prescriptive realism” in an attempt to stake out a middle‐ground position in the twentieth century Anglo‐American debates concerning metaethics between substantive moral realists and antirealist‐expressivists. The account is supposed to preserve both the normativity and objectivity of moral judgments. Hare defends a version of divine command theory. The proposal succeeds in establishing the middle‐ground position Hare intended. However, I argue that prescriptive realism can be strengthened in an interesting way.
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  • A Metaethical Option for Theists.Kyle Swan - 2006 - In Journal of Religious Ethics. pp. 3-20.
    John Hare has proposed “prescriptive realism” in an attempt to stake out a middle-ground position in the twentieth century Anglo-American debates concerning metaethics between substantive moral realists and antirealist-expressivists. The account is supposed to preserve both the normativity and objectivity of moral judgments. Hare defends a version of divine command theory. The proposal succeeds in establishing the middle-ground position Hare intended. However, I argue that prescriptive realism can be strengthened in an interesting way.
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  • Normative Properties.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (s):141-157.
  • Reversibility or Disagreement.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):43-84.
    The phenomenon of disagreement has recently been brought into focus by the debate between contextualists and relativist invariantists about epistemic expressions such as ‘might’, ‘probably’, indicative conditionals, and the deontic ‘ought’. Against the orthodox contextualist view, it has been argued that an invariantist account can better explain apparent disagreements across contexts by appeal to the incompatibility of the propositions expressed in those contexts. This paper introduces an important and underappreciated phenomenon associated with epistemic expressions — a phenomenon that we call (...)
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  • What is the Frege-Geach Problem?Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.
    In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of the (...)
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  • Subjective Disagreement.Beddor Bob - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):819-851.
  • Quine, Davidson, and the Naturalization of Metaethics.Robert Feleppa - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (2):145-166.
    Quine's ethical views typify what might seem to be natural sympathies between empiricism and ethical noncognitivism. LikeAyer, he sees a case for noncognitivism rooted in an epistemic discontinuity between ethics and science. Quine argues that the absence of genuine moral observation sentences, and thus the absence of empirical checkpoints for the resolution of theoretical disputes, renders ethics, as he terms it, “methodologically infirm” However, recent papers in this journal make clear that Quine appears to be voicing mutually incompatible commitments to (...)
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  • Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Synthese:1-33.
    This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis (...)
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  • Kindliche »Unschuld« ist kein Ideal: Tugendethik und Kind-Erwachsenen-Sex.Thomas O’Carroll - 2018 - Gäufelden, Germany: Thomas Leske.
    Malón (Arch Sexual Behav 44(4):1071–1083, 2015) kam zu dem Schluss, dass die üblichen Argumente gegen sexuelle Beziehungen zwischen Erwachsenen und Kindern vor der Pubertät nicht ausreichen, um deren moralische Zulässigkeit unter allen Umständen auszuschließen. Diese postulierte Lücke versuchte Malón (Sex Cult 21(1):247–269, 2017) mit Tugendethik zu füllen. Diesen Tugendethikansatz im zweiten von Malóns Fachartikeln fechtet der vorliegende Aufsatz an, indem er (1) die Ansicht in Frage stellt, dass Sex ein außergewöhnlicher Teilaspekt der Moral ist, der eines Tugendansatzes bedarf, (2) die (...)
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  • Essentially Practical Questions.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):1-26.
    Questions are known to play a crucial role in helping to structure linguistic communication. I argue that paying attention to questions is also necessary for understanding disagreement, and in particular for distinguishing between genuine and merely verbal disagreements. I argue, moreover, that some of the questions that play this role are essentially practical questions, questions about what to do. Such questions can remain open even after questions about what is the case have been settled. Essentially practical questions help structure discourse (...)
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  • Separated at Birth, Signs of Rapprochement: Environmental Ethics and Space Exploration.Erin Moore Daly & Robert Frodeman - 2008 - Ethics and the Environment 13 (1):135 - 151.
    Although environmental philosophy and the human exploration of space share common beginnings, scholars from either field have not given adequate attention to the possible connections between them. In this essay, we seek to spur the rapprochement and cross-fertilization of philosophy and space policy by highlighting the philosophic dimensions of space exploration, pulling together issues and authors that have had insufficient contact with one another. We do so by offering an account of three topics: planetary exploration, planetary protection and the search (...)
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  • Relativism of Distance - a Step in the Naturalization of Meta-Ethics.Antonio Gaitán & Hugo Viciana - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):311-327.
    Bernard Williams proposed his relativism of distance based on the recognition “that others are at varying distances from us”. Recent work in moral psychology and experimental philosophy highlights the prevalence of folk relativism in relation to spatial and temporal distance. However, Williams’ relativism of distance as well as recent empirical findings which seem to support some of Williams’ main ideas on this issue have received scant attention. In this article, we would like to focus on the phenomenon of moral relativism (...)
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  • Philosophy, Theory and Science of Politics.Giovanni Sartori - 1974 - Political Theory 2 (2):133-162.
  • Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action.Quentin Skinner - 1974 - Political Theory 2 (3):277-303.
  • Nothing New in Ecumenia? Hare, Hybrid Expressivism and de Dicto Beliefs.Daniel Eggers - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):831-847.
    One important trend in the debate over expressivism and cognitivism is the emergence of ‘hybrid’ or ‘ecumenical’ theories. According to such theories, moral sentences express both beliefs, as cognitivism has it, and desire-like states, as expressivism has it. One may wonder, though, whether the hybrid move is as novel as its advocates seem to take it to be—or whether it simply leads us back to the conceptions of early expressivists, such as Charles Stevenson or Richard Hare. Michael Ridge has recently (...)
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  • III. Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action.Quentin Skinner - 1974 - Political Theory 2 (3):277-303.