Numerous studies have produced contradictory findings about whether static or animated format is the better instructional tool. With a comparison between graphs and animations that has a genuine impact on learning and teaching, this review provides a comprehensive examination of the theoretical foundations of visualized learning, influencing factors, and prospective future studies.

The neural basis of phonological working memory was investigated through an examination of the effects of irrelevant speech distractors and disruptive neural stimulation from transcranial magnetic stimulation. Embedded processes models argue that the same regions involved in speech perception are used to support phonological WM whereas buffer models assume that a region separate from speech perception regions is used to support WM. Thus, according to the embedded processes approach but not the buffer approach, irrelevant speech and TMS to the speech (...) perception region should disrupt the decoding of phonological WM representations. According to the buffer account, decoding of WM items should be possible in the buffer region despite distraction and should be disrupted with TMS to this region. Experiment 1 used fMRI and representational similarity analyses with a delayed recognition memory paradigm using nonword stimuli. Results showed that decoding of memory items in the speech perception regions was possible in the absence of distractors. However, the decoding evidence in the left STG was susceptible to interference from distractors presented during the delay period whereas decoding in the proposed buffer region persisted. Experiment 2 examined the causal roles of the speech processing region and the buffer region in phonological WM performance using TMS. TMS to the SMG during the early delay period caused a disruption in recognition performance for the memory nonwords, whereas stimulations at the STG and an occipital control region did not affect WM performance. Taken together, results from the two experiments are consistent with predictions of a buffer model of phonological WM, pointing to a critical role of the left SMG in maintaining phonological representations. (shrink)

Koriat & Goldsmith's distinction between the correspondence and storehouse metaphors is valuable for both memory theory and methodology. It is questionable, however, whether this distinction underlies the heated debate about so called “everyday memory” research. The distinction between experimental and naturalistic methodologies better characterizes this debate. I compare these distinctions and discuss how the methodological distinction, between experimental and naturalistic designs, could give rise to different theoretical approaches.

Koriat & Goldsmith provide an excellent analysis of the flexibility of retrieval processes and how they are situationally dependent. I agree with their emphasis on functional considerations and argue that the traditional laboratory experiment motivates the subject to be accurate. However, I disagree with their strong claim that the quantity–accuracy distinction implies an essential discontinuity between traditional and naturalistic approaches to the study of memory.

The correspondence view is consistent with a theory of direct remembering that assumes continuity between perception and memory. Two implications of direct remembering for correspondence are suggested. It is assumed that forgetting is exponential, and that remembering at one time is independent of factors influencing remembering at another. Elaboration of the correspondence view in the same terms as perception offers a novel approach to the study of memory.

Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal (...) of the task, leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members and generic facts about entire kinds. Moreover, half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind, and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic. We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently for the facts about generalizable properties. In turn, these generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified-to-generic memory errors for the generalizable properties. The results of four experiments supported this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable-versus-idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cognitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background, requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias to draw generalizations about kinds. (shrink)

Classical antiquity provides not just the storehouse metaphor, which postdates Plato, but also parts of the correspondence metaphor. In the fifth century B.C., Thucydides (1.22) considered the role of gist and accuracy in writing history, and Aristotle (Poetics1451b, 1460b 8–11) offered an explanation. Finally, the Greek for truth (alêtheia) means “that which is not forgotten.”.

The correspondence metaphor is useful in developing functional models of memory. However, the storehouse metaphor is still useful in developing structural and process models of memory. Traditional research techniques explore the structure of memory; everyday techniques explore the function of memory. We illustrate this point with two examples: amnesia and metamemory. In each phenomenon, both metaphors are useful.

The well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson lead to the conclusion that we have no introspective access to our decision-making processes. Johansson et al. have recently developed an original protocol consisting in manipulating covertly the relationship between the subjects’ intended choice and the outcome they were presented with: in 79.6% of cases, they do not detect the manipulation and provide an explanation of the choice they did not make, confirming the findings of Nisbett and Wilson. We have reproduced this protocol, (...) while introducing for some choices an expert guidance to the description of this choice. The subjects who were assisted detected the manipulation in 80% of cases. Our experiment confirms Nisbett and Wilson’s findings that we are usually unaware of our decision processes, but goes further by showing that we can access them through specific mental acts. (shrink)

The research guided by the correspondence metaphor is lauded for its emphasis on functional analysis, but the term “correspondence” itself needs clarification. Of the two terms in the relationship, only one is well defined. It is suggested that behavior at acquisition needs to be analyzed and that molecular principles from the learning laboratory might be useful in doing so.

Classical symbolic computational models of cognition are at variance with the empirical findings in the cognitive psychology of memory and inference. Standard symbolic computers are well suited to remembering arbitrary lists of symbols and performing logical inferences. In contrast, human performance on such tasks is extremely limited. Standard models donot easily capture content addressable memory or context sensitive defeasible inference, which are natural and effortless for people. We argue that Connectionism provides a more natural framework in which to model this (...) behaviour. In addition to capturing the gross human performance profile, Connectionist systems seem well suited to accounting for the systematic patterns of errors observed in the human data. We take these arguments to counter Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) recent claim that Connectionism is, in principle, irrelevant to psychology. (shrink)