This paper is about the ways in which psychologists categorise themselves into collectivities. It reports a study of the use of the categories 'mechanist' and 'humanist' in the transcript of an international psychology conference. The analysis documents: (1) the flexibility of category definition with respect to the subject matter, research methods and metaphysical assumptions of the putative membership; (2) the involvement of categories in practical tasks of criticism and evaluation; (3) some of the procedures used to warrant these categories as (...) 'natural'features of psychologists' social worlds. Problems for traditional historical, philosophical and sociological accounts of the development and nature of psychology raised by these findings are discussed and some of the pragmatic motivations for category discourse are assessed. (shrink)

The present article explores problems of descriptive reporting, relativism, and the lack of systematic follow-up of qualitative research. Such issues are discussed in relation to components of phenomenologically based research reports, with emphasis on the articulation of the research approach, and steps to facilitate validation. The value of a descriptive science derived from phenomenological principles is discussed as forming a common ground for initial qualitative inquiry, while providing a critically reflective base upon which rational consensus can be developed. I suggest (...) that the values of follow-up, tentativeness, and humility in research reporting, and a rational framework of critical validation, constitute a common core of science. In addition, phenomenological tenets are discussed as providing a corrective to the uncritical search for absolutes, or the "anything counts" conception of relativistic movements. (shrink)

In their meta-scientific studies of psychology, psychologists often use what they take to be the views of Thomas Kuhn. Although a critical examination of psychology or aspects of psychology is laudatory, psychologists' also need to accurately understand and to assume a critical stance toward the meta-scientific views that they employ. In this paper the views of the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, are examined. The following questions are addressed: What were Kuhn's investigative methods? What are his views of science? What (...) exactly do Kuhn's conclusions about science mean? How does Kuhn rely on psychology? and, What does Kuhn have to say about psychology? The extent to which psychologists find Kuhn so attractive is puzzling given the significant ambiguities and inconsistencies in Kuhn's views, his informal and unsystematic use of psychology, and his disparaging comments about psychology. It is recommended that psychologists adopt a more critical stance toward Kuhn and that they consider other meta-scientific theories in their studies of psychology. (shrink)