Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism

Oxford University Press (2010)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Disciplining Skepticism Through Kant's Critique, Fichte's Idealism, and Hegel's Negations.Meghant Sudan - 2021 - In Vicente Raga Rosaleny (ed.), Doubt and Disbelief in Modern European Thought. Springer. pp. 247-272.
    This chapter considers the encounter of skepticism with the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical enterprise and focuses on the intriguing feature whereby it is assimilated into this enterprise. In this period, skepticism becomes interchangeable with its other, which helps understand the proliferation of many kinds of views under its name and which forms the background for transforming skepticism into an anonymous, routine practice of raising objections and counter-objections to one’s own view. German philosophers of this era counterpose skepticism to dogmatism and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism.Filip Grgić - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):653-673.
    Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan scepticism as both investigative and suspensive is not possible. The main obstacle to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (2):177-187.
    It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes “to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Sceptical Rationality.Jan Willem Wieland - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):222-238.
    It is widely assumed that it is rational to suspend one’s belief regarding a certain proposition only if one’s evidence is neutral regarding that proposition. In this paper I broaden this condition, and defend, on the basis of an improved ancient argument, that it is rational to suspend one’s belief even if the available evidence is not neutral – or even close to neutral.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Can the Skeptic Search for Truth?Diego E. Machuca - 2021 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 42 (2):321–349.
    Sextus Empiricus associates the skeptical stance with the activity of inquiry or investigation. My purpose in this paper is to examine the Pyrrhonist's involvement in that activity because getting an accurate understanding of the nature and purpose of skeptical inquiry makes it possible to delineate some of the distinctive traits of Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy. I defend the minority view among specialists according to which (i) Sextus describes both the prospective Pyrrhonist and the full-fledged Pyrrhonist as inquirers into (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity.Byeong D. Lee - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):413-432.
    Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Sobre a Maneira Neopirrônica de Agir E Pensar.Plínio Junqueira Smith - 2020 - Discurso 50 (2):251-279.
    O texto busca apresentar a atualização das atitudes céticas, como a suspensão do juízo, e sua incidência no campo da atitude nas ciências e na vida. Com o intuito de descrever em linhas gerais como é, ou pode ser, uma vida neopirrônica, para que o leitor julgue isso por si mesmo.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Philosophy and Ataraxia in Sextus Empiricus.Pascal Massie - 2013 - Peitho 4 (1):211-234.
    This essay is concerned with two interrelated questions. First, a broad question: in what sense is Skepticism a philosophy− or in what sense is it “philosophy” (as we will see, these are not identical questions)? Second, a narrow one: how should we understand the process whereby ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) emerges out of epochē (suspension of judgment)? The first question arises because Skepticism is often portrayed as anti-philosophy. This depiction, I contend, surreptitiously turns a Skeptical method into a so-called Skeptical (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:23-39.
    This paper argues for the following three claims. First, the Agrippan mode from disagreement does not play a secondary role in inducing suspension of judgment. Second, the Pyrrhonist is not committed to the criteria of justification underlying the Five Modes of Agrippa, which nonetheless does not prevent him from non-doxastically assenting to them. And third, some recent objections to Agrippan Pyrrhonism raised by analytic epistemologists and experimental philosophers fail to appreciate the Pyrrhonist's ad hominem style of argumentation and the real (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing About Disagreement Argument.Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1663-1680.
    An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement known as the Equal Weight View is that it is self-defeating, self-undermining, or self-refuting. The proponent of that view claims that equal weight should be given to all the parties to a peer dispute. Hence, if one of his epistemic peers defends the opposite view, he is required to give equal weight to the two rival views, thereby undermining his confidence in the correctness (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • From Skepticism to Paralysis: The Apraxia Argument in Cicero’s Academica.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2012 - Ancient Philosophy 32 (2):369-392.
    This paper analyzes the apraxia argument in Cicero’s Academica. It proposes that the argument assumes two modes: the evidential mode maintains that skepticism is false, while the pragmatic claims that it is disadvantageous. The paper then develops a tension between the two modes, and concludes by exploring some differences between ancient and contemporary skepticism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Is Justification Dialectical?Jan Willem Wieland - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3):182-201.
    Much of present-day epistemology is divided between internalists and externalists. Different as these views are, they have in common that they strip justification from its dialectical component in order to block the skeptic’s argument from disagreement. That is, they allow that one may have justified beliefs even if one is not able to defend it against challenges and resolve the disagreements about them. Lammenranta (2008, 2011a) recently argued that neither internalism nor externalism convinces if we consider the argument in its (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Stoic Caricature in Lucian’s De Astrologia: Verisimilitude As Comedy.Charles McNamara - 2013 - Peitho 4 (1):235-253.
    The inclusion of De astrologia in the Lucianic corpus has been disputed for centuries since it appears to defend astrological practices that Lucian elsewhere undercuts. This paper argues for Lucian’s authorship by illustrating its masterful subversion of a captatio benevolentiae and subtle rejection of Stoic astrological practices. The narrator begins the text by blaming phony astrologers and their erroneous predictions for inciting others to “denounce the stars and hate astrology” (ἄστρων τε κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ αὐτὴν ἀστρολογίην μισέουσιν, 2). The narrator assures (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory.John Turri - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):83-98.
    This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The Agrippan Problem, Then and Now.Michael Williams - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2):80-106.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Sextus on Ataraxia Revisited.Diego E. Machuca - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy 40 (2):435-452.
    My purpose in this article is to revisit an issue concerning the state of undisturbedness or tranquility (ἀταραξία) in ancient Pyrrhonism as this skeptical stance is depicted in Sextus Empiricus’s extant works. The issue in question is whether both the pursuit and the attainment of undisturbedness in matters of opinion should be regarded as defining features of Pyrrhonism not merely from a systematic standpoint that examines Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy, but mainly according to Sextus’s own account of that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Can the Pyrrhonian Sceptic Suspend Belief Regarding Scientific Definitions?Benjamin Wilck - 2020 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (1):253-288.
    In this article, I tackle a heretofore unnoticed difficulty with the application of Pyrrhonian scepticism to science. Sceptics can suspend belief regarding a dogmatic proposition only by setting up opposing arguments for and against that proposition. Since Sextus provides arguments exclusively against particular geometrical definitions in Adversus Mathematicos III, commentators have argued that Sextus’ method is not scepticism, but negative dogmatism. However, commentators have overlooked the fact that arguments in favour of particular geometrical definitions were absent in ancient geometry, and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Experimental Evidence Against Pyrrhonism: Attacking a Straw Man.Diego E. Machuca - forthcoming - Dialogue.
    In a recent article, Mario Attie-Picker maintains that a number of experimental studies provide evidence against Sextus Empiricus’s empirical claims about both the connection between belief and anxiety and the connection between suspension of judgement and undisturbedness. In this article, I argue that Sextus escapes unharmed from the challenge raised by the studies in question for the simple reason that he does not make the claims ascribed to him. In other words, I argue that Attie-Picker is attacking a straw man.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ataraxía E Investigação Em Sexto Empírico.Luiz Antonio Alves Eva - 2020 - Discurso 50 (2):295-320.
    Neste artigo examino a noção de ataraxía tal como presente no ceticismo pirrônico de Sexto Empírico. Meu propósito é mostrar que, a despeito de conservar aspectos que parecem estar a ela associados desde a filosofia de Pirro, o sentido da noção de ataraxía muda substancialmente e passa a possuir, ao menos nas Hipotiposes, um aspecto fundamental de ordem “intelectual” associado à supressão de um tipo específico de perturbação filosófica. Pretendo igualmente mostrar que tal peculiaridade permitiria compreender como ele se relacionaria (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can Pyrrhonists Act Normally?Jan Willem Wieland - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):277-289.
    Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Skepticism, Suspension of Judgment, and Norms for Belief.Casey Perin - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2):107-125.