Switch to: References

Citations of:

Free Will, Love and Anger

Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):169-189 (2009)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Replies to Critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):476-491.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 205-224.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions—appraisal, communication, and sanction—that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • In Defense of Love Internalism.D. Justin Coates - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):233-255.
    In recent defenses of moral responsibility skepticism, which is the view that no human agents are morally responsible for their actions or character, a number of theorists have argued against Peter Strawson’s (and others’) claim that “the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other” would be undermined if we were not morally responsible agents. Among them, Derk Pereboom (2001, 2009) and Tamler Sommers (2007, 2012) most forcefully argue against this conception of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • In Defense of Non-Reactive Attitudes.Per-Erik Milam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):294-307.
    Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, then we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. Proponents suggest that reactive attitudes can be replaced in our emotional repertoire by non-reactive analogues. In this paper, I dispute and reject a common challenge to abolitionism according to which the reactive attitudes are necessary for protesting unfairness and maintaining social harmony. While other abolitionists dispute the empirical basis of this objection, I focus on its implications. I argue that even if non-reactive (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships.Per-Erik Milam - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):102-122.
    Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I dispute both claims and argue that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Replies to Critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):123-131.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Basic Desert, Conceptual Revision, and Moral Justification.Nadine Elzein - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-14.
    I examine Manuel Vargas's revisionist justification for continuing with our responsibility-characteristic practices in the absence of basic desert. I query his claim that this justification need not depend on how we settle questions about the content of morality, arguing that it requires us to reject the Kantian principle that prohibits treating anyone merely as a means. I maintain that any convincing argument against this principle would have to be driven by concerns that arise within the sphere of moral theory itself, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Reasonable Pluralism About Desert-Presupposing Moral Responsibility: A Conditional Defense.J. P. Messina - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (1):189-208.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness.A. Duggan - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):291-309.
    It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as merely an effect of being blamed, or as a reliable indicator of moral responsibility, but not itself an explanation of moral responsibility. In this paper, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
    Skepticism about moral responsibility, or what is more commonly referred to as moral responsibility skepticism, refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings are never morally responsible for their actions in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense is typically set apart by the notion of basic desert and is defined in terms of the control in action needed for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise. Some moral responsibility skeptics (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Virtuous and Vicious Anger.Bommarito Nicolas - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (3):1-28.
    I defend an account of when and why anger is morally virtuous or vicious. Anger often manifests what we care about; a sports fan gets angry when her favorite team loses because she cares about the team doing well. Anger, I argue, is made morally virtuous or vicious by the underlying care or concern. Anger is virtuous when it manifests moral concern and vicious when it manifests moral indifference or ill will. In defending this view, I reject two common views (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Luck’s Mischief and the Prescriptive Burden.Kelly McCormick - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (3):297-313.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The People Problem.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books. pp. 141.
    One reason that many philosophers are reluctant to seriously contemplate the possibility that we lack free will seems to be the view that we must believe we have free will if we are to regard each other as persons in the morally deep sense—the sense that involves deontological notions such as human rights. In the contemporary literature, this view is often informed by P.F. Strawson's view that to treat human beings as having free will is to respond to them with (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Is Moral Anger Justified? A Functionalist Defense Of Feeling And Expressing Moral Anger.Sahi Razia - unknown
    Derk Pereboom argues that since we are not ultimately morally responsible for our thoughts and actions, it is irrational and unfair to feel and express moral anger towards agents for their wrongdoings. Furthermore, he argues, moral anger is not practically beneficial, typically causing more harm than good. Thus, he proposes that we replace moral anger with moral sadness, or disappointment in response to agents’ wrongdoings. I offer a functional account of moral anger to argue that moral anger has important intrapersonal (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Libertarismo y error categorial.Carlos G. Patarroyo G. - 2009 - Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):141-168.
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Fischer’s Our Stories. [REVIEW]Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):523-528.
    On Fischer’s Our Stories Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9670-5 Authors Derk Pereboom, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Ithaca, NY 14850, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inadequate Agency and Appropriate Anger.Daphne Brandenburg - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):169-185.
    Communication and cultivation accounts of responsibility argue that blaming has an important communicative and agency-cultivating function when addressed at someone we consider to be deserving of blame. On these accounts, responsible agents are agents who can understand negative reactive attitudes and are sensitive to their moral-agency cultivating function. In this paper I examine our reproachful engagements with agents whose moral agency is underdeveloped or compromised. I discuss how these engagements compare to blaming on CC accounts and argue reproachful engagements can (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations