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  1. Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues.Frederic Peters - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.
    Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality , transparency , subjectivity or reflexivity . However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible (...)
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  • The Body Social: An Enactive Approach to the Self.Kyselo Miriam - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-16.
    This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between (...)
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  • Arithmetical and specular self-reference.Damjan Bojadžiev - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):55-63.
    Arithmetical self-reference through diagonalization is compared with self-recognition in a mirror, in a series of diagrams that show the structure and main stages of construction of self-referential sentences. A Gödel code is compared with a mirror, Gödel numbers with mirror images, numerical reference to arithmetical formulas with using a mirror to see things indirectly, self-reference with looking at one’s own image, and arithmetical provability of self-reference with recognition of the mirror image. The comparison turns arithmetical self-reference into an idealized model (...)
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  • What puts the “meta” in metacognition?Michael L. Anderson & Don Perlis - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):138-139.
    This commentary suggests an alternate definition for metacognition, as well as an alternate basis for the relation in representation. These together open the way for an understanding of mindreading that is significantly different from the one advocated by Carruthers.
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  • The roots of self-awareness.Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):297-333.
    In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account.
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  • Perlis on strong and weak self-reference--a mirror reversal.Damjan Bojadziev - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):60-66.
    The kind of self-reference which Perlis characterizes as strong, as opposed to formal self-reference which he characterizes as weak, is actually already present in standard forms of formal self-reference. Even if formal self-reference is weak because it is delegated, there is no specific delegation of reference for self-referential sentences, and their ‘self’ part is strong enough. In particular, the structure of self-reference in Godel's sentence, with its application of a self-referential process to itself, provides a model of Perlis’ characterization of (...)
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  • Artificial intelligence and consciousness.Drew McDermott - 2007 - In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--150.
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  • Robots With Internal Models A Route to Machine Consciousness?Owen Holland & Rod Goodman - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):4-5.
    We are engineers, and our view of consciousness is shaped by an engineering ambition: we would like to build a conscious machine. We begin by acknowledging that we may be a little disadvantaged, in that consciousness studies do not form part of the engineering curriculum, and so we may be starting from a position of considerable ignorance as regards the study of consciousness itself. In practice, however, this may not set us back very far; almost a decade ago, Crick wrote: (...)
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  • The social embedding of intelligence.Bruce Edmonds - manuscript
    I claim that in order to pass the Turing Test over any period of extended time, it will necessary to embed the entity into society. This chapter discusses why this is, and how it might be brought about. I start by arguing that intelligence is better characterised by tests of social interaction, especially in open-ended and extended situations. I then argue that learning is an essential component of intelligence and hence that a universal intelligence is impossible. These two arguments support (...)
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