Globally, mortality and fertility rates generally fall as resource abundance increases. This pattern represents an evolutionary paradox insofar as resource-rich ecological contexts can support higher numbers of offspring, a component of biological fitness. This paradox has not been resolved, in part because the relationships between fertility, life history strategies, reproductive behavior, and socioeconomic conditions are complex and cultural-historically contingent. We aim to understand how we might make sense of this paradox in the specific context of late-twentieth-century, mid–demographic transition Chile. We (...) use distribution-specific generalized linear models to analyze associations between fertility-related life-history traits—number of offspring, ages at first and last reproduction, average interbirth interval, and average number of live births per reproductive span year—and socioeconomic position (SEP) using data from a cohort of 6,802 Chilean women born between 1961 and 1970. We show that Chilean women of higher SEP have shorter average interbirth intervals, more births per reproductive span year, later age at first reproduction, earlier ages at last reproduction, and, ultimately, fewer children than women of lower SEP. Chilean women of higher SEP consolidate childbearing over a relatively short time span in the middle of their reproductive careers, whereas women of lower SEP tend to reproduce over the entirety of their reproductive lifespans. These patterns may indicate that different SEP groups follow different pathways toward declining fertility during the demographic transition, reflecting different life-history trade-offs in the process. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic is a global threat that affects a large part of the population, but the risks associated with it are higher for some people compared with others. Previous studies show that lower socioeconomic status is associated with more chronic stress and less marital satisfaction. Thus, the uncertainty caused by the pandemic might greatly affect those who were already vulnerable. This longitudinal study explores the extent to which stress originated outside and inside the relationship is associated with marital satisfaction (...) during the Covid-19 pandemic and whether the associations are different based on the socioeconomic status of the participants. The study was conducted at two points in time with a sample of 144 married Romanian couples. We used the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model with Mediation and multi-group SEM analysis. Higher levels of external stress were associated with subsequent lower marital satisfaction for women with higher SES. For the couples with lower SES, men's level of internal stress during the first assessment mediated the relationship between their higher level of external stress at the first time point and their partner's lower marital satisfaction during the second assessment. Our results show that men and women respond differently during a crisis and that couples with lower SES are more prone to greater stress and lower levels of marital satisfaction. We finally suggest that the therapists, health professionals, policy makers, and researchers should take into account the existing vulnerabilities of a couple when offering psychological and health services during the Covid-19 pandemic. (shrink)

Variation in the durations of exclusive breastfeeding (exBF) and any breastfeeding (anyBF) is associated with socioecological factors. This plasticity in breastfeeding behavior appears adaptive, but the mechanisms involved are unclear. With this concept in mind, we investigated whether durations of exBF and anyBF in a rural Maya population covary with markers of a form of socioecological change—market integration—and whether individual factors (individual learning, physiological plasticity) and/or learning from others in the community (social learning, norm adherence) mediate these changes. Using data (...) from 419 mother-child pairs from two Guatemalan Maya villages, we fit a bivariate linear mixed model. The model compared exBF and anyBF among children from households of varying degrees of market integration whose mothers follow what we inferred to be local infant-feeding norms. It controlled for other factors expected to affect breastfeeding durations. We found evidence that exBF is associated with whether mothers follow their population’s infant feeding norms, but no evidence that exBF is associated with the household’s level of market integration. Conversely, anyBF is significantly associated with the household’s market integration, but not with the villages’ inferred norms. Because deviations from exBF norms are likely to result in infant mortality and reduced fitness, we hypothesize that the incentive to conform is relatively strong. Relatively greater individual plasticity in anyBF allows mother-child pairs to tailor it to socioecological conditions. Deviations from anyBF norms may be tolerated because they may provide later-life health/fitness payoffs, while posing few risks to infant survival. (shrink)

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based “purity” concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of (...) moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind. (shrink)

Narrative fictions have surely become the single most widespread source of entertainment in the world. In their free time, humans read novels and comics, watch movies and TV series, and play video games: they consume stories that they know to be false. Such behaviors are expanding at lightning speed in modern societies. Yet, the question of the origin of fictions has been an evolutionary puzzle for decades: Are fictions biological adaptations, or the by-products of cognitive mechanisms that evolved for another (...) purpose? The absence of any consensus in cognitive science has made it difficult to explain how narrative fictions evolve culturally. We argue that current conflicting hypotheses are partly wrong, and partly right: narrative fictions areby-productsof the human mind, because they obviously co-opt some pre-existing cognitive preferences and mechanisms, such as our interest for social information, and our abilities to do mindreading and to imagine counterfactuals. But humans reap some fitness benefits from producing and consuming such appealing cultural items, making fictionsadaptive. To reconcile these two views, we put forward the hypothesis that narrative fictions are best seen asentertainment technologiesthat is, as items crafted by some people for the proximate goal to grab the attention of other people, and with the ultimate goal to fulfill other evolutionary-relevant functions that become easier once other people’s attention is caught. This hypothesis explains why fictions are filled with exaggerated and entertaining stimuli, why they fit so well the changing preferences of the audience they target, and why producers constantly make their fictions more attractive as time goes by, in a cumulative manner. (shrink)

The COVID-19 crisis has served not just to instil fear in the populace but to highlight the importance of fear as a motivating dynamic in politics. The gradual emergence of political-philosophical approaches calling for concern for ‘positive’ emotions may have made sense under non-pandemic conditions. Now, however, describing fear in the face of a deadly pandemic as ‘irrational’ or born of ‘ignorance’ seems ‘irrational’ and ‘ignorant’. In this article, we draw upon the work of John Gray and behavioural science to (...) present a defence of fear. We show how the pandemic has highlighted deficits in the work of four thinkers highly critical of fear: Martha Nussbaum, Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt and Sara Ahmed. We argue that, if such approaches are to be of value in anything other than optimal conditions, then they have to acknowledge the fundamental role of fear in helping human beings to pursue fundamental interests. (shrink)

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom dominating the social sciences and philosophy regarding temporal discounting, the practice of discounting the value of future utility when making decisions. Although there are sharp disagreements about temporal discounting, a kind of standard model has arisen, one that begins with a normative standard about how we should make intertemporal comparisons of utility. This standard demands that in so far as one is rational one discounts utilities at future times with an exponential discount function. Tracing (...) the justification for this standard through economics, philosophy and psychology, I’ll make what I believe is the best case one can for it, showing how a non-arbitrariness assumption and a dominance argument together imply that discounting ought to be exponential. Ultimately, however, I don’t find the case compelling. Non-exponential temporal discounting is often rational. If this is correct, Instead of trying to ‘fix’ non-exponential discounting because it is irrational and associated with negative life outcomes, we might instead focus attention on why the conditions obtain that make such discounting rational. (shrink)

In this response, I focus on clarifying my arguments, highlighting consensus, and addressing competing views about the utility of polygenic scores (PGSs) for social science. I also discuss an assortment of expansions to my arguments and suggest alternative approaches. I conclude by reiterating the need for caution and appropriate scientific skepticism.

Entrepreneurial agency—the individual power to change environments—is central to entrepreneurship research. Yet, from a social inequality perspective, beliefs in an entrepreneurial agency might differ based on the social class environments individuals are born into. Drawing on social cognitive theories, our findings across three data sets among students from Germany and entrepreneurs from the United States indicate that social class origins are associated with entrepreneurial self-efficacy (ESE) beliefs in adulthood. Exploring the underlying mechanisms, we find that students’ early entrepreneurial experiences in (...) education and practice are indicative of reproducing the class gap in ESE. When individuals collect mastery experiences such as social mobility or entrepreneurial success, their lower social class origins turn out to be associated with enhanced entrepreneurial agency beliefs. We discuss the implications for further research on social class, inequality, and entrepreneurship. (shrink)

Since the Industrial Revolution, human societies have experienced high and sustained rates of economic growth. Recent explanations of this sudden and massive change in economic history have held that modern growth results from an acceleration of innovation. But it is unclear why the rate of innovation drastically accelerated in England in the eighteenth century. An important factor might be the alteration of individual preferences with regard to innovation resulting from the unprecedented living standards of the English during that period, for (...) two reasons. First, recent developments in economic history challenge the standard Malthusian view according to which living standards were stagnant until the Industrial Revolution. Pre-industrial England enjoyed a level of affluence that was unprecedented in history. Second, behavioral sciences have demonstrated that the human brain is designed to respond adaptively to variations in resources in the local environment. In particular, Life History Theory, a branch of evolutionary biology, suggests that a more favorable environment should trigger the expression of future-oriented preferences. In this paper, I argue that some of these psychological traits – a lower level of time discounting, a higher level of optimism, decreased materialistic orientation, and a higher level of trust in others – are likely to increase the rate of innovation. I review the evidence regarding the impact of affluence on preferences in contemporary as well as past populations, and conclude that the impact of affluence on neurocognitive systems may partly explain the modern acceleration of technological innovations and the associated economic growth. (shrink)

Exponential discounted utility theory provides the normative standard for future discounting as it is employed throughout the social sciences. Tracing the justification for this standard through economics, philosophy and psychology, I’ll make what I believe is the best case one can for it, showing how a non-arbitrariness assumption and a dominance argument together imply that discounting ought to be exponential. Ultimately, however, I don’t find the case compelling, as I believe it is deeply flawed. Non-exponential temporal discounting is often rational–indeed, (...) the paragon of rationality. If this is correct, it’s an important point when considering policy interventions. Instead of trying to “fix” non-exponetial discounting because it is irrational and associated with negative life outcomes, we might instead focus attention on why the conditions obtain that make such discounting rational. (shrink)