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  1. Two Kinds of Process or Two Kinds of Processing? Disambiguating Dual-Process Theories.Rafael Augusto - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (1):277-298.
    Dual-Process Theories (D-PTs) claim there are two qualitatively different types of processes in the human brain-mind. Despite forming the basis for several areas of cognitive science, they are still shrouded in ambiguity: critics erroneously attack D-PTs as a whole (e.g., Evans and Stanovich Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 2013), the qualitative/quantitative distinction is not clear enough (De Neys Perspectives on Psychological Science 16 (6): 1412–1427, 2021; Dewey 2022) and, given this criterion, deciding between qualitative or quantitative differences may even be (...)
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  • Robust intuition? Exploring the difference in the strength of intuitions from perspective of attentional bias.Yunhong Wang, Wei Bao, Edward J. N. Stupple & Junlong Luo - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):169-194.
    The logical intuition hypothesis proposes a difference in the strength between logical and heuristic intuitions. The labels of logical and heuristic intuitions are exclusive to conventional reasoning research. This paper reports the result of testing intuition strength using the dot-probe methodology in a novel multiplication paradigm. Here, “logical intuition” and “heuristic intuition” were relabeled as “weaker intuition” (-1 × 5 = 5) and “stronger intuition” (1 × 5 = 5), respectively, to assess the assumptions about the difference in the strength (...)
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  • Decision-making: from neuroscience to neuroeconomics—an overview.Daniel Serra - 2021 - Theory and Decision 91 (1):1-80.
    By the late 1990s, several converging trends in economics, psychology, and neuroscience had set the stage for the birth of a new scientific field known as “neuroeconomics”. Without the availability of an extensive variety of experimental designs for dealing with individual and social decision-making provided by experimental economics and psychology, many neuroeconomics studies could not have been developed. At the same time, without the significant progress made in neuroscience for grasping and understanding brain functioning, neuroeconomics would have never seen the (...)
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  • Differences between decisions made using verbal or numerical quantifiers.Dawn Liu, Marie Juanchich, Miroslav Sirota & Sheina Orbell - 2020 - Thinking and Reasoning 27 (1):69-96.
    Past research suggests that people process verbal quantifiers differently from numerical ones, but this suggestion has yet to be formally tested. Drawing from traditional correlates of dual-process...
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  • Overconfidently underthinking: narcissism negatively predicts cognitive reflection.Shane Littrell, Jonathan Fugelsang & Evan F. Risko - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 26 (3):352-380.
    There exists a large body of work examining individual differences in the propensity to engage in reflective thinking processes. However, there is a distinct lack of empirical research examining th...
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  • Reflections on reflection: the nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (4):383-415.
    I present a critical discussion of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making with particular attention to the nature and role of Type 2 processes. The original theory proposed...
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  • Metacognitive control in single- vs. dual-process theory.Aliya R. Dewey - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (2):177-212.
    Recent work in cognitive modelling has found that most of the data that has been cited as evidence for the dual-process theory (DPT) of reasoning is best explained by non-linear, “monotonic” one-process models (Stephens et al., 2018, 2019). In this paper, I consider an important caveat of this research: it uses models that are committed to unrealistic assumptions about how effectively task conditions can isolate Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning. To avoid this caveat, I develop a coordinated theoretical, experimental, and modelling (...)
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  • What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments.Nick Byrd - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-29.
    The received view of implicit bias holds that it is associative and unreflective. Recently, the received view has been challenged. Some argue that implicit bias is not predicated on “any” associative process, but it is unreflective. These arguments rely, in part, on debiasing experiments. They proceed as follows. If implicit bias is associative and unreflective, then certain experimental manipulations cannot change implicitly biased behavior. However, these manipulations can change such behavior. So, implicit bias is not associative and unreflective. This paper (...)
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  • Advancing the specification of dual process models of higher cognition: a critical test of the hybrid model view.Bence Bago & Wim De Neys - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 26 (1):1-30.
    Dual process models of higher cognition have become very influential in the cognitive sciences. The popular Default-Interventionist model has long favoured a serial view on the interaction between...
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