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  1. Russellian Acquaintance and Frege’s Puzzle.Donovan Wishon - 2016 - Mind 126 (502):321-370.
    In this paper, I argue that a number of recent Russell interpreters, including Evans, Davidson, Campbell, and Proops, mistakenly attribute to Russell what I call ‘the received view of acquaintance’: the view that acquaintance safeguards us from misidentifying the objects of our acquaintance. I contend that Russell’s discussions of phenomenal continua cases show that he does not accept the received view of acquaintance. I also show that the possibility of misidentifying the objects of acquaintance should be unsurprising given underappreciated aspects (...)
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  • The experience and knowledge of time, through Russell and Moore.Jack Shardlow - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (2):231-250.
    This paper develops the account of our experience and knowledge of time put forward by Russell in his Theory of Knowledge manuscript. While Russell ultimately abandons the project after it receives severe criticism from Wittgenstein (though several chapters derived from it appear as articles in The Monist), in producing this manuscript time, and particularly the notion of the present time, play a central role in Russell’s account of experience. In the present discussion, I propose to focus largely on Russell’s writing (...)
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  • Russell on Acquaintance.R. M. Sainsbury - 1986 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20:219-244.
    In Russell's Problems of Philosophy (PP), acquaintance is the basis of thought and also the basis of empirical knowledge. Thought is based on acquaintance, in that a thinker has to be acquainted with the basic constituents of his thoughts. Empirical knowledge is based on acquaintance, in that acquaintance is involved in perception, and perception is the ultimate source of all empirical knowledge.
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  • Russell on Acquaintance.R. M. Sainsbury - 1986 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20:219-244.
    In Russell's Problems of Philosophy (PP), acquaintance is the basis of thought and also the basis of empirical knowledge. Thought is based on acquaintance, in that a thinker has to be acquainted with the basic constituents of his thoughts. Empirical knowledge is based on acquaintance, in that acquaintance is involved in perception, and perception is the ultimate source of all empirical knowledge.
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  • Russell on the semantics and pragmatics of indexicals.Lawrence Roberts - 1984 - Philosophia 14 (1-2):111-127.
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  • The Role of Attention in Russell's Theory of Knowledge.Fatema Amijee - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1175-1193.
    In his Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the relationship between these two species of knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance of an object neither suffices for knowledge that one is acquainted with the object, nor puts a subject in a position to know that she is acquainted with the object. These conclusions emerge from a thorough examination of the central role played by attention (...)
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  • Russell on Acquaintance with Spatial Properties: The Significance of James.Alexander Klein - 2017 - In Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 229 – 264.
    The standard, foundationalist reading of Our Knowledge of the External World requires Russell to have a view of perceptual acquaintance that he demonstrably does not have. Russell’s actual purpose in “constructing” physical bodies out of sense-data is instead to show that psychology and physics are consistent. But how seriously engaged was Russell with actual psychology? I show that OKEW makes some non-trivial assumptions about the character of visual space, and I argue that he drew those assumptions from William James’s Principles. (...)
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