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  1. Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection.Ben Martin & Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-33.
    While anti-exceptionalism about logic is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there’s still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences. Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the rejection of certain traditional (...)
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  • Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic and the Burden of Explanation.Ben Martin - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):602-618.
    Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic, the thesis that logic is more similar to the sciences in important respects than traditionally thought. One of AEL’s prominent claims is that logic’s methodology is similar to that of the recognised sciences, with part of this proposal being that logics provide explanations in some sense. However, insufficient attention has been given to what this proposal amounts to, and the challenges that arise in providing an account of explanations in logic. (...)
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  • The Cost of Closure: Logical Realism, Anti-Exceptionalism, and Theoretical Equivalence.Michaela M. McSweeney - 2021 - Synthese 199:12795–12817.
    Philosophers of science often assume that logically equivalent theories are theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not a priori, that it is revisable, and that it is not special or set apart from other human inquiry) and logical realism (which says, roughly, that differences in logic reflect genuine metaphysical differences in the world), make trouble for both this commitment and the closely related commitment to theories being closed under logical consequence. (...)
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  • The Philosophy of Logical Practice.Ben Martin - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):267-283.
    Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 2-3, Page 267-283, April 2022.
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  • Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
    I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to (...)
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  • Scrutinizing Anti-Exceptionalism. Mansooreh - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue against present accounts of anti-exceptionalism about logic, while preserving some of their insights. I will do that by offering objections against the anti-exceptionalists’ claims that revisions happen in the same way in sciences and in logic, and that the methodology of logic involves abduction simpliciter. I propose a new account of theory divergence for logic with anti-exceptionalist aspects which also preserves exceptionalism on some level while considering the role of metalogic in the exceptionalist/anti-exceptionalist debate.
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  • Logical Predictivism.Ben Martin & Ole Hjortland - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (2):285-318.
    Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic, that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two (...)
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  • For Better and for Worse. Abstractionism, Good Company, and Pluralism.Andrea Sereni, Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani & Luca Zanetti - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-30.
    A thriving literature has developed over logical and mathematical pluralism – i.e. the views that several rival logical and mathematical theories can be equally correct. These have unfortunately grown separate; instead, they both could gain a great deal by a closer interaction. Our aim is thus to present some novel forms of abstractionist mathematical pluralism which can be modeled on parallel ways of substantiating logical pluralism. To do this, we start by discussing the Good Company Problem for neo-logicists recently raised (...)
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  • Against Logical Generalism.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4813-4830.
    The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism.
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