Plato’s Ion is primarily ethical rather than epistemological, investigating the implications of transgressing one’s own epistemic limits. The figures of Socrates and Ion are juxtaposed in the dialogue, Ion being a laughable, comic, ethically inferior character who cannot recognize his own epistemic limits, Socrates being an elevated, serious, ethically superior character who exhibits disciplined epistemic restraint. The point of the dialogue is to contrast Ion’s laughable state with the serious state of Socrates. In this sense, the dialogue’s central argument is (...) performative rather than demonstrative. (shrink)

This paper draws attention to the Symposium's concern with epideictic rhetoric. It argues that in the Symposium, as in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, a contrast is drawn between true and false rhetoric. The paper also discusses the dialogue's relationship to drama. Whereas both epideictic rhetoric and drama were directed to a mass audience, the speeches in the Symposium are delivered to a small, select group. The discussion focuses on the style of the speeches delivered by Aristophanes, Agathon, Socrates and (...) Alcibiades. Aristophanes speaks in the simple style of comedy, fable and folktale, also used by Protagoras in Plato's Protagoras. Agathon speaks in the high-flown style of Gorgias. Socrates' speech is a miniature Platonic dialogue, and both Alcibiades' speech and Socrates' speech may be compared to satyr play. The paper concludes with a suggestion that the claim at 223D, that the same person should be able to write both comedy and tragedy, refers to style as well as subject-matter. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce the concept of the mirror as a methodological tool, with which Plato discusses reflection and describes the mimetic phenomena. The notion of the mirror first presents Plato’s view on the metaphysical division of the world. It then accounts for Plato’s hostility towards the poets and reveals that the ideal polis is the product of a special kind of philosophical mimesis. I argue that Plato’s own mirror is the dialogues he writes, and the (...) perfection of his mimetic activity is juxtaposed to the hazardous imitations of the poets. (shrink)

Abstract: In the Philebus, Socrates constructs a dialectical argument in which he purports to explain to Protarchus why the pleasure that spectators feel when watching comedy is a mixture of pleasure and pain. To do this he brings in phthonos (malice or envy) as his prime example (47d-50e). I examine the argument and claim that Socrates implicitly challenges Protarchus’ beliefs about himself as moderate and self-knowing. I discuss two reasons to think that more is at stake in the argument than (...) the mixed pleasure and pain of comic malice. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues are set in fifth century Athens but they are performed for a fourth century audience. The context of his dialogues, then is wider perhaps than other philosophers and because of the difference in periods, it is clear that it is necessary for an audience member to possess knowledge of the events of the previous generation, viz., the fifth century BCE. When its cultural context is taken into account, the Theaetetus can not be read as an attempt by Plato (...) to establish an epistemology in the modern sense of the term. While the characters of the dialogue are searching for the 'essence' of knowledge, Plato is teaching the audience of the dialogue to consider the knowledge that different practices of paideia produce and to evaluate that knowledge in light of its implications on the individual and the polis. The answer that emerges is that philosophy is the paideia that will produce the best individual and the best polis, because it is only the practice of philosophy that teaches intellectual virtue. The Theaetetus is an account of the practice of philosophy and the practitioner of philosophy. (shrink)