Constituent ontologies maintain that the properties of an object are either parts or something very much like parts of that object. Recently, such a view has been criticized as leading to a bizarre and problematic form of substance dualism and implying the existence of impossible objects. After briefly presenting constituent and relational ontologies, I respond to both objections, arguing that constituent ontology does not yield either of these two consequences and so is not shown to be an unacceptable ontological framework.

1. At least since W.F. Edwards’ pioneering articles on medieval and renaissance interpretations of the prologue to Galen's Art of Medicine,1 it has often been maintained that Latin scholastics inte...

Drawing the complex terrain of the theories of induction and of the various ways to ground inductive knowledge in the middle ages is the aim of this paper. There have already been two excellent attempts to draw this terrain. The first is by Julius R. Weinberg and the second by E. P. Bos. My attempt differs from theirs in two major respects. The first is that it is more detailed in the examination of the various theories and their relations. The (...) second is that I focus on the role of natural necessities in induction. In particular, I try to place the various conceptions of induction within a network of issues that relate to the problem of universals, natural necessities and a power-based approach to activity in nature. Here is the road map. Section 2 explains Aristotle’s views of induction, as this were mainly developed in Posterior Analytics Book II.19 and states what I take it to be the main dilemma of induction, as this was described by Sextus Empiricus: induction is either perfect and impossible or imperfect and unjustified. In section 3, I move to Thomas Aquinas and his own attempt to justify induction and the actuality of general and necessary principles based on experience by an appeal to the natural light of reason. In section 4 I discuss John Duns Scotus’s reliance on a self-evident maxim to bridge the gap between imperfect and perfect induction. Section 5 moves to William of Ockham ’s peculiar attempt to justify single-instance inductions. Then, section 6 offers a detailed account of Jean Buridan’s ground-breaking re-conceptualisation of induction and the role of intellect in it. Section 7 discusses the critique of induction by Nicolaus of Autrecourt. Finally, section 8 offers a brief account of Pseudo-Scotus’s move from knowledge to opinion. (shrink)

Reflection on the history of skepticism shows that philosophers have often conjoined as a single doctrine various theses that are best kept apart. Some of these theses are incredible – literally almost impossible to accept – whereas others seem quite plausible, and even verging on the platitudinous. Mixing them together, one arrives at a view – skepticism – that is as a whole indefensible. My aim is to pull these different elements apart, and to focus on one particular strand of (...) skepticism that deserves sustained and respectful attention. The strand I have in mind I will refer to as epistemic defeatism. Roughly, in its most global form, it is the view that, in the final analysis, we have no good evidence for the truth of any proposition. Working through various historical texts, I attempt to untangle epistemic defeatism from neighboring views, and in particular to establish its independence from questions about knowledge. Having thus established the view's autonomy, I turn to the options for self-consciously accepting defeat. One may despair or one may have faith. But I will ultimately propose that the most attractive option – the option that preserves the most of our epistemic integrity – is to have hope. (shrink)

There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it (...) has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism. (shrink)

Apart from the opposite semantic attitudes, the main difference between Late Medieval Realists and Nominalists lies in the antithetic evalutation of the nature and ontological status of essences. In the article a very interesting exemple of the medieval realist approach to the problem of essence, that of Walter Burley, is discussed. Because of Ockham's criticisms of the traditional realist conceptions, Burley's ontological convictions evolved over the years from a quite original version of the moderate realism inspired by Averroe's doctrine on (...) essence, to the radical (and somehow Platonic) form of realism proper to his final theories. (shrink)

This article reconsiders the historical–philosophical significance of the monk and abbot of Corbie Abbey (est. 657), Paschasius Radbertus (c. 790–860). Radbert is contextualised within the cultural and academic setting of the Carolingian period of the eighth and ninth centuries while taking into account the diverse scholarly accomplishments of his contemporaries such as Alcuin of York (c. 740–804), Rabanus Maurus (c. 780–856), Walafrid Strabo (c. 809–849) and John Scottus Eriugena (815–877). The characteristic absence of contributions regarding Radbert in otherwise comprehensive introductions (...) and editorial works in medieval philosophy is subsequently surveyed. It is shown that only a few introductory works of note contain references to Radbert, while the current specialised research is also relatively limited. Reconsidering depictions of Radbert in several older commentaries, notably Martin Grabmann’s (1875–1949) Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode I ( 1957 ), it is suggested that Radbert’s philosophical importance could be traced to Vorscholastik or the earliest development of scholasticism, as presented in his extensive commentary Expositio in Matheo Libri XII – without diminishing the ecclesiastical weight of his dispute with Ratramnus (d.c. 868) regarding their interpretation of the Eucharist in their similarly titled but disparate treatises De corpore et sanguine Domini, for which Radbert is generally better known and accordingly reflected in studies of early medieval intellectual history. Contribution: This article contributes to scholarship in early medieval philosophy by reassessing the philosophical influence of Paschasius Radbertus, based on the most recent specialised analyses and older modern receptions of his texts De corpore et sanguine Domini and Expositio in Matheo Libri XII. (shrink)

Julian of Norwich (1342–ca.1416) as a post-scholastic theologian. This article positions the ‘first female English writer from the Middle Ages’, Julian of Norwich (1342–ca.1416), within the context of ‘post-scholasticism’, the very last period in late Medieval Philosophy, of which one feature was the final separation of theology and philosophy in the late Medieval index. Julian should in terms of this placing be engaged as a theologian proper, distinguished from the six other prominent female thinkers from the Medieval Latin West (Héloïse, (...) Hildegard, Mechtild, Hadewijch, Marguerite and Catherine), who were all philosopher-theologians. However, Julian’s epistemology and metaphysics were intertwined with her theology, as presented in her Book of Showings, to such an extent that it is impossible to isolate it from her theological output. She is within the socio-historical context of the third wave of the Black Plague in Norwich in 1369 henceforth profiled as a ‘post-scholastic theologian’ and presented on the basis of prominent theological features in Showings, including its immanent-mystical character (being a presentation of convent theology rather than scholastic theology), its vernacular (Middle English) originality and profound pastoral appeal, its maternal-Christological imagery (Moder Jhesu), its Trinitarian orientation (for the trinitie is god, god is the trinitie) and its deeply eschatological, open-ended engagement with a world devastated by the Plague (alle shalle be wele). Contribution: As a millennium-long discourse, Medieval philosophy functions in a Venn diagrammatical relationship with Medieval history, Church history, patristics and philosophy of religion. Whenever ‘mainstream’ or ‘canonised’ Medieval philosophy is impacted from specialist research, it may well have implications that these closely related disciplines could take note of. Such is the case in this reappraisal of Julian of Norwich’ theological and pastoral legacy from its original context of the Black Plague in the 14th century – and indeed within the context of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. (shrink)

Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349) was an English philosopher, logician, and theologian of some note; but though recent scholarship has revived an interest in much of his work, little attention has been paid to an early treatise he wrote on the topic of future contingents, entitled De futuris contingentibus. In this thesis I aim to address this deficit, arguing in particular that the treatise makes original use of the divine power distinction to resolve the apparent conflict between God’s foreknowledge on the (...) one hand, and human free will on the other. Bradwardine argues that God’s foreknowledge operates in accord with God’s ordained power, and so relative to God’s ordained power, our actions are indeed compelled; however, because of Bradwardine’s appeal to the distinction in power, he is able to maintain that our actions remain free relative to God’s absolute power, and are thus free, absolutely speaking. This solution is, I argue, unique to Bradwardine, although it seems to be abandoned in his later writing. Bradwardine’s approach to the problem is heavily influenced by three figures in particular — Boethius, Anselm of Canterbury, and John Duns Scotus — each of whose solutions I discuss in some detail. Furthermore, Bradwardine explicitly places his own solution in opposition to that of William Ockham, and so I give substantial attention to examining Ockham’s position. But while I agree with Bradwardine’s assessment that Ockham’s position undermines God’s foreknowledge in ways that should be untenable to someone of 14th-century Christian commitments, I argue that Bradwardine’s solution amounts to an equally untenable determinism. An appendix contains excerpts from my own English translation of the De futuris contingentibus (the first into any modern language), in parallel with the original Latin. (shrink)