Religious beliefs are often singled out for special treatment in secular liberal societies. Yet if a legal exemption is granted for a belief with a religious foundation, the question arises whether a similar, non‐religious moral belief must also be granted an exemption. I argue that common reasons for favoring religious over non‐religious beliefs fail to provide a convincing moral case for drawing a distinction of this nature. I focus on arguments concerning the role of religious beliefs in constituting an individual's (...) identity and the transcendental nature of religion, which lead me to consider in the final section the role of choice in religious belief. (shrink)

In this article, we compare Ricard Zappata-Barrero’s interculturalism with Tariq Modood’s multiculturalism. We will discuss the relation between distinct elements that compose both positions. We examine how recent discussions on interculturalism have the potential to contribute to theories of multiculturalism without undermining their core principles. Our position is close to that of Modood’s as he has already carefully tried to incorporate interculturalist insights into his own multiculturalism. Yet we provide a raise a few questions regarding Modood’s treatment of the relation (...) between multiculturalism and interculturalism. After summarizing each author’s potion (I), we will comment on the following set of relations between their basic elements: (II) The relation between intercultural contact and intercultural dialogue; (III) The relation between contact at the local level and the societal/state level; (IV) The relation between group-specific measures, intercultural contact and mainstreaming. (shrink)

According to the ‘fragmentation objection’ to multiculturalism, practices of cultural recognition undermine political stability, and this counts as a reason to be sceptical about the public recognition of minority cultures, as well as about multiculturalism construed more broadly as a public policy. Civic education programmes, designed to promote autonomy, toleration and patriotism, have been justified as a corrective to the fragmentary tendencies of multiculturalism. This paper distinguishes between two versions of the fragmentation objection, in order to evaluate this particular justification (...) of civic education. The cultural fragmentation version of the objection emphasises the importance of a common identity and a shared sense of belonging for political stability, whilst the value fragmentation version of the objection emphasises the importance of shared values for political stability. It is argued that neither version of the objection successfully demonstrates that multiculturalism is incompatible with political stability. However, narrow versions of each objection provide reasons to favour the promotion of toleration in public schooling, and reasons to be sceptical about the promotion of patriotism. Meanwhile, justifications of the cultivation of autonomy must appeal to values other than political stability. (shrink)

I would argue that toleration is one of the cornerstones for a just social order in any pluralistic society. Yet, the ideal of toleration is usually thought to originate from within, and most often justified from a European historical and philosophical context. It is thought to be a response to societal conflict and the Wars of Religion in the West, which is then exported to the rest of the world, by colonialism (ironically), or globalization. The West, once again, calls upon (...) itself to teach the rest of the world how to be more ethical. I think that this not only plays into the hands of cultural and ethical relativists, but that this picture is far from accurate; it ignores rich indigenous sources for toleration that already exist and have existed in India for millennia. In this chapter, I explore three central and predominant ideas in India as providing justification for distinctly Indian forms of toleration; as well, I explore Indian forms of secularism. I examine how toleration, and indeed, more strongly, respect for difference and pluralism, emerge through three influential Indian self-understandings: the theory of anekāntavāda or non-absolutism; the concept of ātman or self; and the idea of pratītyasamutapāda or interconnectedness. In contrast to various Euro-Western legal and political ideals that may have little resonance, I think indigenous sources offer a far more promising alternative ground upon which to build an overlapping convergence on basic human rights in India. As the eminent Indian philosopher and states person Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1955), Gadamer (Pantham 1992), and James Tully (1995) contend: the purpose of such convergence is not uniformity in diversity, but rather, unity in diversity. These sources provide an antidote not only to current forms of Hindutva in India, but may have something of value from which the West can learn -- given the European Caste System which is alive and continues to thrive today. (shrink)

Bu bölümde karşılaştırmalı siyaset teorisinin, siyaset teorisinin hem bir alt alanı, hem de bir yöntemi olarak ortaya çıkış sürecini ele alacağım. Bu bağlamda öncelikle ‘karşılaştırmalı siyaset teorisinin’ (KST) ne zaman ortaya çıktığı sorusuyla ilgileneceğim. Ardından, KST’nin neden ortaya çıktığı, ne olduğu ve nasıl yapılması gerektiği ile ilgili tartışmalara değineceğim. Bu tartışmayı, son otuz yılda literatürde öne çıkan bazı çalışmalar ve isimler ve onların tartıştığı konular, meseleler, sorular ve sorunlar üzerinden (karşılaştırmada özne/nesne ilişkisi ve güç problemi, soruların ya da sorunların evrenselliği (...) meselesi, Batı/Avrupa merkezciliğini yeniden üretme riski) ve eleştirel bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutarak yürüteceğim. Son olarak, başlangıçta Amerika odaklı bir tartışma/gelişme olarak ve siyaset teorisinin belli sorunlarını (Avrupamerkezcilik, yanlış evrensellik, dar görüşlülük) aşma hedefiyle ortaya çıkan KST’nin aradan geçen otuz yılın ardından bugünkü durumu ile ilgili bazı değerlendirmelerde bulunacağım. (shrink)

The question of how to arrive at a consensus on human rights norm in a diverse, pluralistic, and interconnected global environment is critical. This volume is a contribution to an intercultural understanding of human rights in the context of India and its relationship to the West. The legitimacy of the global legal, economic, and political order is increasingly premised on the discourse of international human rights. Yet the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights developed with little or no consultation from (...) non-Western nations such as India. In response, there has developed an extensive literature and cross-cultural analysis of human rights in the areas of African, East-Asian, and Islamic studies, yet there is a comparative dearth of conceptual research relating to India. As problematically, there is an lacuna in the previous literature; it simply stops short at analyzing how Western understandings of human rights may be supported from within various non-Western cultural self-understandings; yet, surely, there is more to this issue. The chapters in this collection pioneer a distinct approach that takes such deliberation to a further level by examining what it is that the West itself may have to learn from various Indian articulations of human rights as well. (shrink)

The article presents a model of performative agency in capitalist societies. The first section reconsiders the problem of third-dimensional power as developed by Steven Lukes, focusing on the relationships between universal human needs and social forms. The second section uses the concepts of the ‘self’, ‘I’ and ‘person’ to characterize the relationships between human nature, affect, individual alienation, social institutions and personal judgement. Alienation is argued to be inherent in human agency, rather than being solely created by capitalism. The next (...) section applies this analysis within an agonal theory of civil society that is driven by the individual’s performative participation in associations that compete within institutional settings. Finally the article considers the political ramifications of this model, rejecting contemporary constitutionalist approaches in favour of a revised form of pluralist associationalism. Throughout, the article warns of the dangerous marginalization of emotions (or ‘affect’) by excessively self-conscious, rationalist approaches such as Mead’s social theory, liberal universalism and even some performative theories. (shrink)

This article presents a new set of analytical tools for understanding competing conceptions of political membership. Controversies concerning nationality and citizenship are often seen as products of conflict between `civic' and `ethnic' visions. However, the conceptual roots of current discussions and disagreements about political membership are actually more complicated than this might suggest. After examining the dichotomy of civic and ethnic and its limitations, this article identifies five competing ways of understanding the meaning of belonging to, or being a citizen (...) of, a given polity. Political membership may be understood and discussed as a matter of descent from common biological ancestors, cultural attachment, or identification with particular political principles. Alternatively, it may also be imagined either as an exchange of rights for duties or as a benefit granted to those contributing materially to the community. Each of these conceptions figures significantly in current political and intellectual discussions of citizenship and nationality. The typology may also prove applicable to new kinds of debates about global citizenship. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhism and the Idea of Human Rights:Resonances and Dissonances1Perry Schmidt-LeukelIn 1991 L.P.N. Perera, Professor of Pāli and Buddhist Studies in Sri Lanka, published a Buddhist commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this commentary Perera tries to show that, in the Pāli canon, i.e. the canonical scripture of Theravāda Buddhism, for every single article of the Human Rights Declaration a substantial parallel or at least a statement (...) with a similar tendency can be found. Indeed, says Perera, Article 1, which affirms the dignity and rights of all humans, "is in complete accord with Buddhist thought, and may be said to be nothing new to Buddhism in conception" (Perera 1991:21). In contrast, the Buddhist Peter Junger, Professor of Law at the University of Cleveland, Ohio, judged in 1995 that... though followers of Buddhist traditions do value most, if not all, of the interests underlying the rhetoric of human rights, they may not have much use for the label itself, which is, after all, a product of the traditions of Western Europe and the parochial histories of that region.(Junger 1998: 56)Junger goes on to say that "the concept of human rights is not likely to be useful in...following the Buddha Dharma" (Junger 1998: 55).Thus Perera and Junger agree that the content of the various human rights is acceptable for Buddhists. However, they disagree strongly in their evaluation of the idea of human rights in itself. In this respect Damien Keown has rightly argued that the crucial question on 'Buddhism and Human Rights' is not so much whether Buddhism can accept any particular human right but rather whether the idea of human rights as such can find a philosophical justification within the "overall Buddhist vision of individual and social good" (Keown 1998: 24).It is this problem that I would like to pursue in this paper. In the first part I will sketch some basic characteristics of the idea of human rights. In the second part I will point out what resonances this idea finds in Buddhism or by which Buddhist concepts the human rights idea can be justified. And finally, in the third part, I will deal [End Page 33] with the question of potential dissonances between the idea of human rights and Buddhist concepts.On the Nature of Human RightsWith the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the various subsequent human rights conventions the rights of individuals were for the first time inscribed into international law, which had previously recognised only collectives as legal subjects. By formulating universal rights as valid for every individual human being regardless of race, colour, sex, religion, birth, etc. the Universal Declaration points to the most important feature of the idea of human rights: the protection of the individual or, to be more precise, the protection of the individual against powerful institutions of the state, society, religion or others. It is individual self-determination and free agency that are protected through human rights. Human rights define the minimum of what is necessary in order to guarantee the freedom of individual agency and the freedom of self-determination. By the definition of inalienable rights,2 the idea of human rights sets limits to those collectives and institutions in which we usually live, limits which for the sake of the basic liberty of the individual are not to be transgressed. Michael Ignatieff summarises this understanding of human rights with the words: "rights exist to protect individuals" (Ignatieff 2001: 67), and "they are worth having only if they can be enforced against institutions like the family, the state, and the church" (Ignatieff 2001: 66f.). Therefore "moral individualism" is "the core of the Universal Declaration" (Ignatieff 2001: 66).It is true that the further development of the human rights debate, particularly within the context of the United Nations, has led to an extension of the idea of human rights to collective rights and collective legal entities by including among human rights, for example, a nations' right to self-determination and the right to peace and the right to development. However, in my opinion it would be highly... (shrink)

Ethnic minority status and female gender convey a risk for suicidal behavior, yet research of suicidality of ethnic minority female immigrants is scarce. The authors of this article conducted qualitative interviews with 15 young women in the Netherlands, who either had attempted suicide or contemplated suicide, and analyzed these in a narrative psychology tradition. Suicidality was associated with despair and frustration over the violation of the women’s personal autonomy and self-integrity regarding strategic life choices. Autonomy restrictions and violations followed two (...) patterns, which are interconnected with four criteria regarding the capacity for autonomy. Findings are discussed with referral to Durkheim and feminist theories of autonomy. (shrink)

The case of the opposition to legalizing same-sex marriage in Canada is an example of the limits of what will and will not be tolerated in the name of multiculturalism. This case offers an interesting perspective on the topic of multiculturalism, because it deals with a conflict between those seeking to expand human rights and those seeking to prevent such expansion because of their adherence to a particular set of cultural and religious beliefs. Despite Canada’s commitment to recognizing and encouraging (...) diversity within its population, the demands of the opponents of same-sex marriage were not accommodated. Heeding the opponents of same-sex marriage would have amounted to violating the deeper commitment to individual rights and human rights as interpreted by the Charter. Multiculturalism in Canada is a concept that is situated within an underlying adherence to these core values. (shrink)

This volume - the joint effort of the research groups on practical philosophy and the history of political thought of the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences - brings together scholarly essays that attempt to face the challenges of the contemporary situation. The authors come from rather divergent disciplinary backgrounds, including philosophy, law, history, literature and the social sciences, from different cultural and political contexts, including Central, Eastern and Western Europe, (...) and belong to different generations. But they all share an interest to bravely answer the large topical issues concerning universal morality, here and now. (shrink)

In this article I investigate the extent to which Bhikhu Parekh believes that a person's cultural/religious background must be preserved and whether, by implication, religious schooling is justified by his theory. My discussion will explore—by inference and implication—whether Parekh's carefully crafted multiculturalism, enriched and illuminated by numerous practical insights, is socially tenable. I will also consider whether, by extension, it is justifiable, on his line of reasoning, to cultivate cultural and religious understandings among one's own children. Finally, I will contend (...) that Parekh, notwithstanding his cautious, even‐handed approach, commits several important errors, including conflating the culture of the parents with that of the children and insisting that cultural and religious persons ought to be allowed to defend their views in the public square on religious grounds. (shrink)

An education for cultural coherence tends to the child’s well-being through identity construction and maintenance. Critics charge that this sort of education will not bode well for the future autonomy of children. I will argue that culturally coherent education, provided there is no coercion, can lend itself to eventual autonomy and may assist minority children in countering the negative stereotypes and discrimination they face in the larger society. Further, I will argue that few individuals actually possess an entirely coherent identity; (...) rather, most of us possess hybrid identities that lend themselves to multiple, not necessarily conflicting allegiances. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to compare traditional multiculturalist political theory with a new paradigm in which the usual strategies for dealing with cultural diversities are replaced by the tools provided by inferential semantics as developed by Robert Brandom. The upshot is the transition from a landscape which is highly demanding with respect to the common assumptions among different views of the world to a dialogical context in which contrasting beliefs can come to light more freely.

A number of phenomena have lent a new complexity to the long-standing challenge of constructing a legitimate and stable political order. I contend that both legitimacy and integration under contemporary conditions ultimately hinge upon a form of public practical reasoning that departs considerably from the ones proposed by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and several deliberative democrats. I argue that the generalizability test that constitutes the cornerstone of most contemporary neo-Kantian theories of public reason should be abandoned as a rule of (...) public argumentation and be replaced by a norm of civic responsiveness towards minority claims. I not only suggest that a wider variety of reasons, motives and genres of speech needs to be admitted within the purview of public reason, but more fundamentally that generalizability cannot cogently be seen as anything more (or less) than a civic virtue. The underlying point of this article is that neo-Kantian theories of public reason work with a problematic conception of practical reason. I conclude by providing reasons, against some radical and agonistic democrats, why the language of public reasoning needs to be retained and renovated. Key Words: acknowledgement • agonistic democracy • deliberative democracy • generalizability • Habermas • pluralism • practical reason • public reason • Rawls • social integration. (shrink)

If we want to take firm the importance of universal principles in Bioethics, but at the same time we want to take seriously the importance of cultural diversity and pluralism, it is necessary to adopt a multifaceted approach. In the article I argue that a possible way out is a sort of hermeneutic approach, in order to reduce the ambivalence that stems from the dual recognition of cultural diversity and universal value of human rights. Through this approach conflicting principles and (...) traditions can be harmonized within a common framework, at least to some extent. Such an approach, in my perspective, can be implemented as a strategy of interpretation, which can hold together different conceptions and common principles. (shrink)

El artículo sostiene que la teoría liberal está tensionada por una pretensión de universalidad normativa y su implementación institucional en el contexto de los Estados nacionales. Esta tensión se expresa claramente en el caso de la inmigración con la demanda estatal de control discrecional de las fronteras. El artículo desarrolla cuatro argumentos a favor de la relevancia normativa de las fronteras, y sostiene que no son conclusivos. Correspondientemente, desde una perspectiva liberal se dispondría de menos argumentos para justificar el cierre (...) discrecional de las fronteras. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta algumas estratégias recorrentes para justificar os direitos culturais (tais como comunidade justificativa, o valor da diversidade, as teorias do reconhecimento da diferença cultural, o valor da autonomia, a justificação de igualdade) e as examina criticamente à luz de seus próprios méritos, a partir da perspectiva do liberalismo enquanto doutrina política. De acordo com o artigo, todas essas justificativas são fadadas ao fracasso.

Raphael Cohen-Almagor’s Just, Reasonable Multiculturalism offers a different way of approaching multiculturalism from the systematic theoretical treatments that anchor the literature. While strongly committed to liberal democratic values, it presents not so much a theory or moral argument justifying minority or majority cultural rights as a set of values and principles for adjudicating controversial cases and oft-heard arguments against multicultural accommodation. After noting distinctive features of the approach, I discuss three areas of tension in the analysis. First, between its appeals (...) to Rawlsian justice and state neutrality and its support of state multiculturalism. Second, between its stated theoretical principles and its adjudication of some cases. Third, regarding how we think about a state’s entanglement with culture and, specifically, whether that should be in terms of an incomplete liberal neutrality, liberal perfectionism, or liberal nationalism. I suggest that as helpful as Cohen-Almagor’s liberal-democratic guidelines are, there remain some contextual factors which are no less important in justly responding to the pointy end of multiculturalism. (shrink)

During the period of military-backed government, South Korea faced various political and economic challenges: poverty and inequality in society; human rights abuses by military governments; and confrontation with the communist North. This article examines Psalm 85: 10 in the light of the political context of South Korea and the way minjung theologians and artists understood and utilized the passage for their struggle with the governments and mega-companies. The article argues that the fight for justice for the poor and oppressed is (...) what has brought a sustainable peace in South Korea, and that although justice seeking and peace-building should be implemented simultaneously as the Scripture implies, if one has to prioritize between the two, justice-seeking has to take precedence. (shrink)

Does multiculturalism imply that certain cultural minorities – nomos groups, whose cultural conceptions extend in important ways into views about the law – should have forms of legal autonomy that go beyond normal multicultural accommodations such as exemptions and special protection? In other words: should we allow «minority jurisdictions» for multicultural reasons and give certain minorities powers of legislation and adjudication on certain issues? The paper sketches how one might arrive at such a conclusion given some standard multicultural reasoning, and (...) then proceeds by examining eight key rejoinders to such a proposal. None of these rejoinders provide by themselves knockdown arguments against extending multicultural rights to forms of legal autonomy, but together they do provide a basis for some skepticism about the cogency and desirability of at least more ambitious forms of legal autonomy for cultural minorities within a liberal framework. (shrink)

Many existing defenses of group rights seem to rely on the notion of group freedom. To date, however, no adequate analysis of this notion has been offered. Group freedom is best understood in terms of processes of social categorization that are embedded in social mechanisms. Such processes often give rise to group-specific constraints and enablements. On the proposed social mechanism account, group rights are demands for group freedom. Even so, group rights often serve to eradicate individual unfreedom. Furthermore, generic measures (...) sometimes provide the most appropriate solution to a problem of group unfreedom. (shrink)

In this article it is argued that social power can be created based upon either the reproduction of social order or coercively but that in complex societies the former is the more important. Building upon the ideas of a number of authors - including Arendt, Parsons, Barnes, Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes, Giddens, Foucault and Clegg - a typology of seven forms of power creation is developed in a manner which allows for diverse phenomena from previously divergent perspectives to be woven (...) together into a theoretical whole which renders them commensurable. At the foundational level, social order presupposes the recreation of shared meanings which enable actors to act in collaboration in a way which they could not otherwise do. This observation is used as the basic premise from which to re-examine the reproduction of social order and the relationship between power, structure and knowledge. Among other things, this allows the author to render Lukes' `false consciousness' argument commensurable with Foucault's power/knowledge hypothesis. (shrink)

Informal communication and interaction are integral components of the practice of science, including the doctoral process. This article argues that women are disadvantaged in the informal milieu of the higher education in science, and that this milieu is not uniform everywhere. It posits that to understand the position of women in science in South Asian countries like India, the inquiry has to be conceptualized in the specific social, historical, and institutional context. Through a questionnaire survey comparing male and female perceptions, (...) and qualitative interviews with women, an attempt has been made to understand the nature of Indian women's problems in the informal doctoral science environment. The findings indicate that though the nature of problems appears to be similar to those faced by the women in science in the West, the specific form of biases varies, and that the cultural context molds the specific forms of discrimination. This has implications for future research and policies. (shrink)

The boundaries, openness and character of the future European society will crucially depend on the degree and scope of identity politics. Religion, culture and nationality remain strong reference frameworks for individuals in their inter-personal but also political relations and tend, in practice, to favour weak rather than strong forms of citizenship. Whether this is a viable model for large and diverse democratic societies is an old debate known primarily from the discussions and theory on multiculturalism. How this debate is played (...) out at European level and especially with respect to the role of religion is illustrated with reference to the ideas of Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Tariq Ramadan, two well-known public figures with a strong commitment to Europe and European identity, albeit from rather different perspectives and outlooks. At the substantive or philosophical level, it appears impossible to resolve the fundamental questions underlying the opposition between liberalism and communitarianism as represented by the two men. The usefulness of a middle-range pragmatic approach insofar as political solutions or societal compromises are concerned is scrutinized for its usefulness. (shrink)

Contemporary democratic political culture prioritizes the right over the good. The right is imagined as a non-controversial, universally acceptable and non-negotiable good. The liberal politics of the right assumes the substance ontology of the disengaged, rational, autonomous subject. The alternative ontology of the engaged, embodied, cultural and historical self, which inspires the liberal politics of identity, however, conceives recognition of identity as a substantive, complete, determinate and non-negotiable right. This paper argues that the non-substance ontology of the self can, in (...) fact, stimulate a politics of the non-substantial good, which is incomplete, indeterminate and imperfect. Such a conception of the good can powerfully evoke the moral sense undergirding the good, albeit negatively, when it is put into circulation in the common discursive space of politics. In polities of radical diversity like India, the negative politics of the good is especially pertinent. (shrink)

Resumen: En este ensayo desarrollo una crítica al modelo de justicia multicultural de Will Kymlicka, con el propósito de establecer las bases para el desarrollo de un multiculturalismo crítico. El argumento se ordena de la siguiente forma. En la primera sección analizo la teoría de los derechos especiales de Kymlicka e identifico el valor liberal central al que estos responden, la autonomía individual. En la segunda sección examino el fundamento igualitarista de la suerte de su teoría de los derechos especiales. (...) En la tercera sección elaboro una crítica general a la justicia multicultural liberal desarrollando un argumento para politizar los reclamos de los pueblos indígenas para el acceso a su cultura. Argumento que el trato justo de las minorías indígenas requiere reconocer su autodeterminación política.: In this essay I develop a critique of Will Kymlicka’s model of multicultural justice, with the purpose of laying down the foundations for a critical multiculturalism. The argument is ordered in the following way. In the first section I analyse Kymlicka’s theory of special rights and identify the central liberal value to which they respond: individual autonomy. In the second section I examine the luck egalitarian foundations of Kymlicka’s theory of special rights. In the third section, I elaborate a general critique to liberal multicultural justice, developing an argument to politicize the claims of indigenous peoples to access to their culture. Basically I argue that the just treatment of indigenous minorities requires recognizing their political self-determination. (shrink)

This article is a critical analysis of the pluralist legacy in modern political discourse. The article argues that this legacy imposes conceptual constraints on empirical and normative inquiry into current forms of human belonging and interaction, a predicament most evident today in the field of global political theory. It is argued that this is due to a lasting preoccupation in the pluralist legacy with the vexed question of unity in plurality. The article analyzes the pluralist legacy historically and conceptually, by (...) tracing influential varieties of group theory in modern political discourse, from early British pluralism to mid-century interest group theory, to theories of participatory democracy and group identity, to recent theories of global politics. This review hopes to show how the question of unity in plurality has informed theorizing within as well as across different contexts, and where this leaves us today. To conclude, the article offers some suggestions as to what might be needed in order to move beyond the pluralist legacy, arguing that this would involve a wholesale change of perspectives on the question of unity in plurality, for the benefit of empirical and normative inquiry into current conditions in world politics. (shrink)

Purpose of the work is to identify and justify the moral priorities in multicultural communication. Theoretical basis is the works of foreign and Ukrainian authors, revealing the main approaches to the problem of multiculturalism; studies on ethics and philosophical anthropology that define the problem field in the anthropo-logy of morality. The work uses: the conceptual provisions of phenomenology – for the disclosure of the semantic uncertainty of human existence as a prerequisite of moral search; existential philosophy – to substantiate the (...) essential relationship of a man and culture. Originality of the results obtained consists of 1) understanding multiculturalism as a "dialogue of people", in which the moral search of every person is actualized; 2) in justifying the demand for inter-individual communication of "negative" ethics : its requirement not to commit immoral acts stimulates a person to moral search, reveals the specifics of the existence of a "person navigator" ; 3) in the definition of intercultural communication as the creation of opportunities for the search for tolerant forms of existence. Conclusions : 1) multiculturalism is a contradictory phenomenon, producing conflicts and creating prerequisites for overcoming them; 2) the possibilities of non-conflict existence in a situation of multiculturalism arise in inter-individual communication, which is a situation of moral search for every person; 3) "ethics of opportunities" unites universal and situational moral norms in multicultural communication: people enable each other to remain people; 4) "ethics of opportunities" creates conditions for tolerant interaction between people and cultures. (shrink)

This article stages a dialogue between cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism in order to think through what is at stake in demands that universities should produce graduates who are sensitive to social diversity and attuned to the contemporary realities of globalisation. The argument is that, although ‘graduate attributes’ are no doubt an effective management tool in a massified higher education system, they can also be used to focus attention on what dispositions it is reasonable and desirable to expect graduates to develop. The (...) arguments about cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron and Martha Nussbaum are considered. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This paper aims at providing a general assessment of Habermas’s recent positions on the place of religion in the public sphere. After reviewing and contrasting Rawls’s and Habermas’s respective positions on the issue, it argues that Habermas’s contribution raises some difficulties both theoretical and practical. At the theoretical level, it is shown that Habermas’s contribution poses a problem of coherence with respect to his more general conception of deliberative democracy. At the practical level, the soundness of Habermas’s view of (...) the respective roles expected of religious and secular citizens in the public sphere is brought into question. (shrink)

With the current pandemic, many scholars have contended that clinical criteria offer the best way to implement triage. Further, they dismiss the criteria of social value as a good one for triage. In this paper, I respond to refute this perspective. In particular, I present two sets of arguments. Firstly, I argue that the objections to the social value criteria they present apply to the clinical criteria they favor. Secondly, they exaggerate the negative aspects of the social value criteria, while (...) I suggest it is reasonable to use this. I end the article by recommending how operative public values can be a good way to make triaging decisions. (shrink)

Liberal approaches to multiculturalism and cultural nationalism have met with severe criticism in recent years. This article makes the case for an alternative, Aristotelian approach developed in the work of the ‘founding father’ of culture, J. G. Herder. According to Herder, culture is worthy of political recognition because it contributes to the realization of our common but contradictory human telos. Only a plurality of cultures, each realizing a unique balance of our contradictory needs, can bring wholeness to our common nature. (...) In conclusion, I argue for the merits of this Aristotelian approach in resolving some recurring problems of multiculturalism. (shrink)

The social sciences often explain behavioral differences by appealing to membership in distinct cultural groups. This work uses the concepts of “cultures” and “cultural groups” like any other demographic category (e.g. “gender”, “socioeconomic status”). I call these joint conceptualizations of “cultures” and “cultural groups” _demographic cultures_. Such demographic cultures have long been subject to scrutiny. Here I isolate and respond to a set of arguments I call _demographic skepticism_. This skeptical position denies that the demographic cultures concept can support metaphysically (...) plausible and empirically principled research. I argue against the skeptic, showing that their position relies on a questionable alignment between the demographic cultures concept and what I call the _folk anthropological model_. While the commitments of that model are problematic—they are not necessary for comparative work in the social sciences. In addition to clarifying skeptical arguments, then, I provide four recommendations for the comparative social scientist that allow them to avoid demographic skepticism. (shrink)

The future of philosophy is moving towards “global philosophy.” The idea of global philosophy is the view that different philosophical approaches may engage more substantially with each other to solve philosophical problems. Most solutions attempt to use only those available resources located within one philosophical tradition. A more promising approach might be to expand the range of available resources to better assist our ability to offer more compelling solutions. This search for new horizons in order to improve our clarity about (...) philosophical issues is at the heart of global philosophy. The idea of global philosophy encourages us to look beyond our traditions to improve our philosophical problem-solving by our own lights. Global philosophy is a new approach whose time is coming. This essay offers the first account of this approach and an assessment of its future promise. (shrink)

In the summer of 2001 there were violent disturbances on the streets of towns and cities in the north of England. These disturbances, popularly described in the British media as ‘race riots’, principally involved young British Asian men, young White British men, and the police. In November 2002 the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act was granted Royal Assent, and passed into British law, introducing legislation which required spouses of British citizens to demonstrate their proficiency in English when applying for British (...) citizenship. This paper provides an analysis of the racialization of language in political discourse which linked the violence on the streets of northern England with the argument for extended citizenship language testing. The paper concludes that this discourse is recontextualized and transformed in increasingly legitimate contexts, gaining authority as it travels, until it is enshrined in the least negotiable domain of all – the law. (shrink)

This paper investigates the philosophical tensions between secular-liberalism and Islam, and reviews Islamic conceptualisations of knowledge, personhood and education, in order to conceptualise shakhsiyah Islamiyah as an authentic and credible form of personal agency within an Islamic worldview. It begins by examining the liberal critique of Islamic education and explores notions of authority and autonomy in Islamic educational theory. It proposes that these tensions exist to varying degrees in all educational practice. Some theoretical work to develop an Islamic understanding of (...) personal autonomy as selfhood is presented and translated into a concept of shakhsiyah Islamiyah. Finally, the possibility of understanding shakhsiyah Islamiyah as a dialogical Muslim-self is explored. (shrink)

A citizen is a member of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership. This broad definition is discernible, with minor variations, in the works of contemporary authors as well as in the entry “citoyen” in Diderot's and d'Alembert's Encyclopédie..