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  1. The problem of ontology for spontaneous collapse theories.Bradley Monton - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (3):407-421.
    The question of how to interpret spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics is an open one. One issue involves what link one should use to go from wave function talk to talk of ordinary macroscopic objects. Another issue involves whether that link should be taken ontologically seriously. In this paper, I ague that the link should be taken ontologically seriously; I argue against an ontology consisting solely of the wave function. I then consider three possible links: the fuzzy link, the (...)
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  • Interpreting spontaneous collapse theories.Peter J. Lewis - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36 (1):165-180.
    Spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics require an interpretation if their claim to solve the measurement problem is to be vindicated. The most straightforward interpretation rule, the fuzzy link, generates a violation of common sense known as the counting anomaly. Recently, a consensus has developed that the mass density link provides an appropriate interpretation of spontaneous collapse theories that avoids the counting anomaly. In this paper, I argue that the mass density link violates common sense in just as striking a (...)
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  • GRW: A case study in quantum ontology.Peter J. Lewis - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):224–244.
    This article provides an overview of the philosophical literature on the GRW theory of quantum mechanics, and argues for a particular position regarding that literature. Much of the literature is ontological; it attempts to defend a conception of what the world is like according to the GRW theory against perceived competitors. I argue that there is no real debate here, since these supposedly conflicting positions are better regarded as alternative and compatible ways of describing the world of the GRW theory.
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