The process of learning is analogous to the process of motion, as well as it resembles the progress from less to more perfect. Plato, combining two opposites, attempts at reconciliation of the theories of Heraclitus and Parmenides, providing us with his amazing theory of Forms. In light of this, he speaks of language as a means of cognizance of the Universe. In his own turn, and much later, Ludwig Wittgenstein, combining incompatible, speaks of language as the single subject which requires (...) explanation. As well as it can be seen from the history of the development of understanding, those who dared to combine two opposites have come up with amazing discoveries. New discoveries in the field of gravity are likely to throw some light on the solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes and, at the same time, reveal and explain to us the paradoxical nature of language acquisition. The article argues that the phenomenon of language possesses a paradoxical nature that seems not to be unambiguously explained by behavioristic theories. As a result, this view serves to the development and improvement of newer approaches to the learning of a second language, which is completely distinct from the process of primary language acquisition. (shrink)

Zeno’s arguments are generally regarded as ingenious but downright unsound paradoxes, worth of attention mainly to disclose why they go wrong or, alternatively, to recognise them as clever, even if crude, anticipations of modern views on the space, the infinite or the quantum view of matter. In either case, the arguments lose any connection with the scientific and philosophical problems of Zeno’s own time and environment. In the present paper, I argue that it is possible to make sense of Zeno’s (...) arguments if we recognise that Zeno was indeed a close follower of Parmenides, who wanted to show that, if the plurality of beings existed, then various absurd consequences would follow. He intended to highlight the compact and inarticulate nature of the being, and the human character of the system of world partitions producing the entities and the objects on which our knowledge is based. (shrink)

The inclusion of De astrologia in the Lucianic corpus has been disputed for centuries since it appears to defend astrological practices that Lucian elsewhere undercuts. This paper argues for Lucian’s authorship by illustrating its masterful subversion of a captatio benevolentiae and subtle rejection of Stoic astrological practices. The narrator begins the text by blaming phony astrologers and their erroneous predictions for inciting others to “denounce the stars and hate astrology” (ἄστρων τε κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ αὐτὴν ἀστρολογίην μισέουσιν, 2). The narrator assures (...) readers that he, the knowledgeable astrologer, will correct for the “stupidity and laziness” (ἀμαθίῃ καὶ ῥαθυμίῃ, ibid.) that bring about false predictions. The narrator’s credibility quickly decays when he attempts to recast Orpheus, Bellerophon, Icarus, Daedalus, and a host of other mythological figures as Greek astrologers. Lucian’s audience would expect such far-fetched interpretations of myth from the stereotypical Stoic philosopher, a character lampooned elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus. (shrink)

Après avoir présenté les règles de l’antilogique éléatique, je soutiens que Zénon pratiquait celle-ci et, à partir de l’étude de passages duParménidede Platon, que ses paradoxes sur la divisibilité et le mouvement ne sont pas des réfutations par l’absurde, mais plutôt de simples dérivations d’impossibilités employées pour ridiculiser les adversaires de Parménide. Zénon ne cherchait donc pas à prouver l’inexistence du mouvement, mais simplement à l’inférer des prémisses de ses adversaires. Je montre en outre que ces paradoxes sont conçus, conformément (...) à la tradition de l’antilogique éléatique, à partir d’hypothèses et de leurs contradictoires, où le sujet est traité par «rapport à lui-même» et «en relation avec les autres choses».After presenting the rules of Eleatic antilogic, i.e., dialectic, I argue that Zeno was a practitioner, and, on the basis of key passages from Plato’s Parmenides, that his paradoxes of divisibility and movement were notreductio ad absurdum, but simple derivation of impossibilities meant to ridicule Parmenides’ adversaries. Thus, Zeno did not try to prove that there is no motion, but simply derived this consequence from premises held by his opponents. I argue further that these paradoxes were devised, in accordance with Eleatic antilogic, following a scheme that included hypotheses and their contradictories, within which the subject is to be treated both “in relation to itself,” and “in relation to other things”. (shrink)