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  1. Social Constraints on Sexual Consent.Tom Dougherty - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (4):393-414.
    Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 393-414, November 2022. Sometimes, people consent to sex because they face social constraints. For example, someone may agree to sex because they believe that it would be rude to refuse. I defend a consent-centric analysis of these encounters. This analysis connects constraints from social contexts with constraints imposed by persons e.g. coercion. It results in my endorsing what I call the “Constraint Principle.” According to this principle, someone's consent to a sexual (...)
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  • Promises as Proposals in Joint Practical Deliberation.Brendan Kenessey - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):204-232.
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  • What Makes Threats Wrong?Niko Kolodny - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (2):87-118.
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  • Coercion Without Incapacitation.William R. Tadros - forthcoming - Law and Philosophy:1-36.
    This essay examines why coerced conduct tends not to have the moral and legal consequences that non-coerced conduct often has. In it, I argue against the “incapacitation approach,” the view that coerced conduct tends not to result in the coercer acquiring a permission or an entitlement because the coercee is typically incapable of exercising her rights to change the coercer’s permissions or entitlements. After demonstrating that coercees retain the ability to exercise those rights, this article develops an alternative account: that (...)
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  • A Puzzle About Proportionality.David Alm - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (2):133-149.
    The paper addresses a puzzle about the proportionality requirement on self-defense due to L. Alexander. Indirectly the puzzle is also relevant to the proportionality requirement on punishment, insofar as the right to punish is derived from the right to self-defense. Alexander argues that there is no proportionality requirement on either self-defense or punishment, as long as the aggressor/offender has been forewarned of the risk of a disproportional response. To support his position Alexander appeals to some puzzle cases, challenging us to (...)
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  • Frontier Kantianism: Autonomy and Authority in Ralph Waldo Emerson and Joseph Smith.Ryan W. Davis - 2018 - Journal of Religious Ethics 46 (2):332-359.
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  • Law and Coercion: Some Clarification.Lucas Miotto - 2021 - Ratio Juris 34 (1):74-87.
    The relationship between law and coercion has been, and still is, a central topic in legal philosophy. Despite this, discussion about it is immersed in confusion. Some philosophers have noticed this, but hardly any work has been done to attempt to solve or even identify the confusions. This paper aims to fill this gap. Here I propose distinctions and qualifications that help us clarify the relationship between law and coercion and avoid confusion. Building on the clarificatory work, I then argue (...)
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  • Naturalizing Deontic Logic: Indeterminacy, Diagonalization, and Self‐Affirmation.Melissa Fusco - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):165-187.
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  • Promises as Proposals in Joint Practical Deliberation.Brendan de Kenessey - 2020 - Noûs.
    This paper argues that promises are proposals in joint practical deliberation, the activity of deciding together what to do. More precisely: to promise to ϕ is to propose (in a particular way) to decide together with your addressee(s) that you will ϕ. I defend this deliberative theory by showing that the activity of joint practical deliberation naturally gives rise to a speech act with exactly the same properties as promises. A certain kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding (...)
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  • Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence.Tom Dougherty - 2018 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (1):90-112.
  • The Morality of Blackmail.James R. Shaw - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):165-196.
    Blackmail raises a pair of parallel legal and moral problems, sometimes referred to as the "paradox of blackmail". It is sometimes legal and morally permissible to ask someone for money, or to threaten to release harmful information about them, while it is illegal and morally impermissible to do these actions jointly. I address the moral version of this paradox by bringing instances of blackmail under a general account of wrongful coercion. According to this account, and contrary to the appearances which (...)
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  • Why Does Duress Undermine Consent?Tom Dougherty - forthcoming - Noûs.
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  • Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future.Tom Dougherty - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):441-461.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 2, Page 441-461, September 2021.
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  • The Crime of Self‐Solicitation.Benjamin Sachs - 2015 - Ratio Juris 28 (2):180-203.
    I hold that we could justifiably criminalize some threats, on account of the fact that issuing them renders one more likely to commit a crime. But I also point out that if we criminalize some threat-issuing, we will de facto criminalize some warning-issuing, which is unjust. So we ought not to criminalize any threat-issuing. Instead, we should criminalize rendering oneself more likely to commit a crime. This would allow us to punish all the threat-issuers we should want to punish. It (...)
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  • Guilt and Child Soldiers.Krista K. Thomason - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):115-127.
    The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child (...)
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  • Are Health Nudges Coercive?Muireann Quigley - 2014 - Monash Bioethics Review 32 (1-2):141-158.
    Governments and policy-makers have of late displayed renewed attention to behavioural research in an attempt to achieve a range of policy goals, including health promotion. In particular, approaches which could be labelled as ‘nudges’ have gained traction with policy-makers. A range of objections to nudging have been raised in the literature. These include claims that nudges undermine autonomy and liberty, may lead to a decrease in responsibility in decision-making, lack transparency, involve deception, and involve manipulation, potentially occasioning coercion. In this (...)
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  • Claiming Responsibility for Action Under Duress.Carla Bagnoli - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):851-868.
    This paper argues that to understand the varieties of wrongs done in coercion, we should examine the dynamic normative relation that the coercer establishes with the coerced. The case rests on a critical examination of coercion by threat, which is proved irreducible to psychological inducement by overwhelming motives, obstruction of agency by impaired consent or deprivation of genuine choice. In contrast to physical coercion, coercion by threat requires the coercee’s participation in deliberation to succeed. For this kind of coercion to (...)
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  • Why Does Duress Undermine Consent? 1.Tom Dougherty - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):317-333.
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  • Coercion as a Pro Tanto Wrong: A Moderately Moralized Approach.Jackson Kushner - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):449-471.
    I defend one way of solving the Impermissibility Problem—that is, the problem that on moralized approaches to coercion, coerciveness and permissibility are mutually exclusive. This brings up intuitive difficulties for cases such as taxation, which seem to be both coercive and permissible. I gloss three popular theories of coercion—the moralized baseline, nonmoralized baseline, and enforcement approaches—and conclude that only the nonmoralized baseline approach clearly solves the problem. However, Robert Nozick’s famous “slave case” raises another serious issue for the nonmoralized baseline (...)
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  • Consent to Sexual Interactions.Japa Pallikkathayil - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (2):107-127.
    The way in which consent to sexual interactions is understood in the US is undergoing a transformation. Many universities, sometimes at the behest of lawmakers, are moving to adopt ‘affirmative consent’ policies, which define consent in terms of affirmative behavior that goes beyond mere silence or lack of resistance. Although these policies are a move in the right direction, I argue that their content has not been properly understood. In particular, the circumstances in which nonverbal behavior may communicate consent are (...)
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  • Moral Coercion.Saba Bazargan - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    The practices of using hostages to obtain concessions and using human shields to deter aggression share an important characteristic which warrants a univocal reference to both sorts of conduct: they both involve manipulating our commitment to morality, as a means to achieving wrongful ends. I call this type of conduct “moral coercion”. In this paper I (a) present an account of moral coercion by linking it to coercion more generally, (b) determine whether and to what degree the coerced agent is (...)
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  • Why Coercion is Wrong When It’s Wrong.Benjamin Sachs - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):63 - 82.
    It is usually thought that wrongful acts of threat-involving coercion are wrong because they involve a violation of the freedom or autonomy of the targets of those acts. I argue here that this cannot possibly be right, and that in fact the wrongness of wrongful coercion has nothing at all to do with the effect such actions have on their targets. This negative thesis is supported by pointing out that what we say about the ethics of threatening (and thus the (...)
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  • Sweatshop Regulation and Workers’ Choices.Jessica Flanigan - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 153 (1):79-94.
    The choice argument against sweatshop regulations states that public officials should not prohibit workers from accepting jobs that require long hours, low pay, and poor working conditions, because enforcing such regulations would be disrespectful to the workers who choose to work in sweatshops. Critics of the choice argument reply that these regulations can be justified when workers only choose to work in sweatshops because they lack acceptable alternatives and are unable to coordinate to achieve better conditions for all workers. My (...)
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  • A Defense of Compulsory Vaccination.Jessica Flanigan - 2014 - HEC Forum 26 (1):5-25.
    Vaccine refusal harms and risks harming innocent bystanders. People are not entitled to harm innocents or to impose deadly risks on others, so in these cases there is nothing to be said for the right to refuse vaccination. Compulsory vaccination is therefore justified because non-vaccination can rightly be prohibited, just as other kinds of harmful and risky conduct are rightly prohibited. I develop an analogy to random gunfire to illustrate this point. Vaccine refusal, I argue, is morally similar to firing (...)
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  • The Problem of Coercion in State Apologies.Jackson Kushner - unknown
    I argue that state apologies face a distinctive normative challenge. The reason for this is that when states apologize for their transgressions, they tend to implicate their citizens as morally responsible. However, because citizens are coerced into supporting state activities through taxation, I argue that their responsibility is mitigated. Citizens do not support state transgressions in the same way that private investors support corporate transgressions. Consequently, state apologies have a distinctive difficulty performing one of the core normative functions of apologies (...)
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  • Rethinking the Wrongness Constraint on Criminalisation.Andrew Cornford - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (6):615-649.
    Orthodox thought holds that criminalisation should be subject to a wrongness constraint: that is, that conduct may be criminalised only if it is wrongful. This article argues that this principle is false, at least as it is usually understood. On the one hand, the wrongness constraint seems to rest on solid foundations. To criminalise conduct is to facilitate its condemnation and punishment; to coerce citizens against it; and to portray it as wrongful. All of these actions are presumptively impermissible when (...)
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  • Childhood, Impairment, and Criminal Responsibility.Michael Joel Kessler - 2019 - Journal of Global Ethics 15 (3):306-324.
    ABSTRACTThe justice of criminal punishment depends in part on the possibility of holding people accountable for their choices. There is a wide variation between nations on the age at which juveniles can be prosecuted in adult criminal courts. This variation reflects disagreement about the underlying logic of responsibility. This paper examines the philosophical difference between adults and children as agents. The paper argues that the moral status of children is importantly distinct from adults, specifically with respect to how responsibility should (...)
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  • Assembling an Army: Considerations for Just War Theory.Nathan P. Stout - 2016 - Journal of Global Ethics 12 (2):204-221.
    ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to draw attention to an issue which has been largely overlooked in contemporary just war theory – namely the impact that the conditions under which an army is assembled are liable to have on the judgments that are made with respect to traditional principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I argue that the way in which an army is assembled can significantly alter judgments regarding the justice of a war. In doing (...)
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