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  1. The Teacher Bandwidth Problem: MOOCs, Connectivism, and Collaborative Knowledge.Spyridon Palermos & Ben Kotzee - unknown
    Massive Open Online Courses have, in recent years, become increasingly popular. An important challenge facing MOOCs is the ‘teacher bandwidth problem’: In the MOOC environment, where there are potentially hundreds of thousands of students, it is impossible for a few teachers to interact with individual students—there is not enough ‘teacher bandwidth’. According to Siemens and Downes’s theory of ‘connectivism’ one can make up for the lack of teacher bandwidth by relying on collaboration between students; philosophically speaking, however, this theory is (...)
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  • Spreading the Credit: Virtue Reliabilism and Weak Epistemic Anti-Individualism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):305-334.
    Mainstream epistemologists have recently made a few isolated attempts to demonstrate the particular ways, in which specific types of knowledge are partly social. Two promising cases in point are Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony and Goldberg’s process reliabilist treatment of testimonial and coverage-support justification. What seems to be missing from the literature, however, is a general approach to knowledge that could reveal the partly social nature of the latter anytime this may be the case. Indicatively, even though Lackey (...)
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  • Collaborative Knowledge: Where the Distributed and Commitment Models Merge.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-16.
    Within analytic philosophy, the existence of collective knowledge has been motivated by means of two apparently distinct, and in direct competition with one another, theoretical approaches: the commitment model and the distributed model. This paper agues, however, that to fully account for collaborative knowledge—i.e., a special kind of collective knowledge—both models are required. In other words, there is at least one kind of collective knowledge, the account of which requires treating the two models not as competitors but as complementary to (...)
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  • Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control.J. AdamCarter - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):283-304.
    An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa’s (2017) recent thinking is that enhanced performances (e.g., the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance-enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. In this paper, I explore in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa’s wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then highlighted, (...)
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  • Thinking with Others: A Radically Externalist Internalism.Benjamin W. McCraw - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (3):351-371.
    This paper is ambitious: it begins with mixing externalism in philosophy of mind with internalism in epistemology, and it ends with instructive insights from social and feminist thought. In the first stage, I argue that one can consistently combine two theses that appear, at first glance, incompatible: cognitive externalism—the thesis that one’s mental states/processing can extend past one’s biological boundaries—and mentalism in epistemology—i.e., that epistemic justification supervenes on one’s mental states. This yields the perhaps startling or strange view that the (...)
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  • Higher-Order Defeat in Collective Moral Epistemology.J. Adam Carter & Dario Mortini - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    This chapter discusses methodology in epistemology. It argues that settling the facts, even the epistemic facts, fails to settle the questions of intellectual policy at the centre of our epistemic lives. One upshot is that the standard methodology of analysing concepts like knowledge, justification, rationality, and so on is misconceived. More generally, any epistemic method that seeks to issue in intellectual policy by settling the facts, whether by way of abductive theorizing or empirical investigation, no matter how reliable, is inapt. (...)
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  • Review Socially Extended Epistemology: J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard : Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 336pp, £55.00 HB. [REVIEW]Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Metascience 1 (3):441-447.
  • Emerging Digital Technologies: Implications for Extended Conceptions of Cognition and Knowledge.Paul Smart - 2018 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 266–304.
  • Group Minds as Extended Minds.Keith Raymond Harris - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):1-17.
    Despite clear overlap between the study of extended minds and the study of group minds, these research programs have largely been carried out independently. Moreover, whereas proponents of the extended mind thesis straightforwardly advocate the view that there are, literally, extended mental states, proponents of the group mind thesis tend to be more circumspect. Even those who advocate for some version of the thesis that groups are the subjects of mental states often concede that this thesis is true only in (...)
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  • Mind Outside Brain: A Radically Non-Dualist Foundation for Distributed Cognition.Francis Heylighen & Shima Beigi - 2018 - In J. A. Carter, A. Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-86.
    We approach the problem of the extended mind from a radically non-dualist perspective. The separation between mind and matter is an artefact of the outdated mechanistic worldview, which leaves no room for mental phenomena such as agency, intentionality, or feeling. We propose to replace it by an action ontology, which conceives mind and matter as aspects of the same network of processes. By adopting the intentional stance, we interpret the catalysts of elementary reactions as agents exhibiting desires, intentions, and sensations. (...)
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  • Groups Can Know How.Chris Dragos - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):265-276.
    One can know how to ride a bicycle, play the cello, or collect experimental data. But who can know how to properly ride a tandem bicycle, perform a symphony, or run a high-energy physics experiment? Reductionist analyses fail to account for these cases strictly in terms of the individual know-how involved. Nevertheless, it doesn't follow from non-reductionism that groups possess this know-how. One must first show that epistemic extension cannot obtain. This is the idea that individuals can possess knowledge even (...)
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  • Minds Online: The Interface Between Web Science, Cognitive Science, and the Philosophy of Mind.Paul Smart, Robert William Clowes & Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Foundations and Trends in Web Science 6 (1-2):1-234.
    Alongside existing research into the social, political and economic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particularly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive significance of the Web because of the emphasis (...)
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  • Social Machines: A Philosophical Engineering.Spyridon Palermos - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):953-978.
    In Weaving the Web, Berners-Lee defines Social Machines as biotechnologically hybrid Web-processes on the basis of which, “high-level activities, which have occurred just within one human’s brain, will occur among even larger more interconnected groups of people acting as if the shared a larger intuitive brain”. The analysis and design of Social Machines has already started attracting considerable attention both within the industry and academia. Web science, however, is still missing a clear definition of what a Social Machine is, which (...)
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  • Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality.Barbara Trybulec - 2017 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 8 (1):183-207.
    In the paper, I distinguish the bottom-up strategy and the intentional stance strategy of analyzing group intentional states, and show that the thesis of distributed group subject of knowledge could be accommodated by either of them. Moreover, I argue that when combined with virtue reliabilism the thesis satisfactorily explains the phenomenon of group knowledge. To justify my argument, in the second part of the paper, I distinguish two accounts of justification pointing to conditions of group knowledge. The first, which I (...)
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  • Mandevillian Intelligence: From Individual Vice to Collective Virtue.Paul Smart - 2018 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially-Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 253–274.
    Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role in yielding various forms of collective cognitive success. When this idea is transposed to the epistemological domain, mandevillian intelligence emerges as the idea that individual forms of intellectual vice may, on occasion, support the epistemic performance of some form of multi-agent ensemble, such as a socio-epistemic system, a collective doxastic agent, or an epistemic group agent. As a specific (...)
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  • Googled Assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501.
    Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.
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  • Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action—eastern and western perspectives.J. Adam Carter, Chienkuo Mi, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2291-2294.
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  • Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement and Cheapened Achievement: A New Dilemma.Emma C. Gordon & Lucy Dunn - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):409-421.
    Recent discussions of cognitive enhancement often note that drugs and technologies that improve cognitive performance may do so at the risk of “cheapening” our resulting cognitive achievements Arguing about bioethics, Routledge, London, 2012; Harris in Bioethics 25:102–111, 2011). While there are several possible responses to this worry, we will highlight what we take to be one of the most promising—one which draws on a recent strand of thinking in social and virtue epistemology to construct an integrationist defence of cognitive enhancement.. (...)
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  • Collective Intellectual Humility and Arrogance.Keith Raymond Harris - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6967-6979.
    Philosophers and psychologists have devoted considerable attention to the study of intellectual humility and intellectual arrogance. To this point, theoretical and empirical studies of intellectual humility and arrogance have focused on these traits as possessed by individual reasoners. However, it is natural in some contexts to attribute intellectual humility or intellectual arrogance to collectives. This paper investigates the nature of collective intellectual humility and arrogance and, in particular, how these traits are related to the attitudes of individuals. I discuss three (...)
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  • The World Wide Web.Paul Smart - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 15–27.
  • Collaborative Memory Knowledge: A Distributed Reliabilist Perspective.Kourken Michaelian & Santiago Arango-Munoz - 2018 - In M. Meade, C. B. Harris, P. van Bergen, J. Sutton & A. J. Barnier (eds.), Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications. Oxford University Press. pp. 231-247.
    Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. Ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of remembering as a cognitive process unfolding within a single subject, as well as traditional understandings of memory knowledge as a justified memory belief held within the mind of a single subject. Collaborative memory has come to be a major area of research in psychology, but it has so far not been investigated in epistemology. In (...)
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  • Epistemic Presentism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):458-478.
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