A favoured argument of many of the eighteenth-century Deists was that the concept of miracle is inconsistent with the supposed perfection of God and thus the occurrence of miracles would constitute evidence against, rather than for, God. In the latter part of the twentieth century we meet very similar arguments in the writings of Christine Overall and James Keller who claim that the occurrence of miracles would imply an arbitrariness and caprice unworthy of a divine agent.

This paper is the latest in a debate with Robert Larmer as to whether the occurrence of a miracle would provide evidence for the existence of God or against the existence of God. Whereas Larmer’s view is categorical (miracles occur and are evidence for the existence of God), mine is hypothetical (if the events typically described as miracles were to occur -- although I do not believe they do -- they would be evidence against the existence of God). The reason (...) is that miracles, if they were to occur, would be ontic, epistemic, and moral evils. (shrink)

Dans cette réplique à l’article de Frank Jankunis, «Overall and Larmer on Miracles as Evidence for the Existence of God», je traite du concept de miracle comme violation de la loi naturelle. Je soutiens que, s’il advenait un miracle, ce serait un mal épistémique, ontique et moral, et, par conséquent, une preuve qu’il n’existe pas de Dieu parfait.

As this article is published, Robert Larmer and I have been engaged in a debate that is now eighteen years long, often with gaps of many years between ripostes, about the nature and significance of miracles. The Larmer/overall oeuvre now includes six works, including the two published here. I am grateful to the editors of Dialogue for giving me the opportunity to respond to Larmer’s most recent entry in the debate.

Christian Overall and I have been debating whether the occurrence of events traditionally viewed as miracles would constitute evidence for theism. In this article, I make some concluding comments regarding our exchanges. My goal in making these comments is twofold. First, I wish to sketch why I think miracles can function as evidence for God. Second, in the course of our discussion, Overall has ascribed to me claims that I do not make and criticized me on the basis of my (...) holding these views. I feel it is important to set the record straight on several issues. (shrink)

In "Miracles as Evidence Against the Existence of God," (’Southern Journal of Philosophy’, 1985) Christine Overall argued that the occurrence of miracles would constitute evidence against the existence of God, on the grounds that miracles are violations of natural law or permanently inexplicable events and, as such, would be inconsistent with the supposed purposes of God. In ’Water Into Wine?’ (MacGill-Queen’s, 1988), I argued that her argument fails once a more adequate definition of miracle is adopted. In "Miracles and God: (...) A Reply to Robert A.H. Larmer" (’Dialogue’ 1997), Overall attempted to reply to my specific criticisms and to attack central theses of ’Water Into Wine?’. I argue that she is successful in neither endeavor. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je réponds aux critiques formulées par Frank Jankunis à l'endroit de mes arguments concernant la force probante fournie au théisme par les événements perçus avantageusement comme des miracles.

Si un miracle se produisait, cela serait-il une preuve de l’existence de Dieu ou, au contraire, de son inexistence? Christine Overall et Robert Larmer débattent de cette question depuis plusieurs années. Dans cet article, je soutiens que leurs comptes rendus positifs des positions de l’autre ne sont pas tout à fait satisfaisants. Je soutiens également que certaines critiques importantes qu’ils formulent l’un contre l’autre ratent la cible. Je propose ensuite de faire avancer le débat en identifiant et en synthétisant ce (...) qui est correct dans leurs comptes rendus respectifs. (shrink)