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Liberty, equality, envy, and abstraction

In Justine Burley (ed.), Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. Philosophers and their Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 70-78 (2004)

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  1. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?Kristin Voigt - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):389-407.
    According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities are justified if and only if they arise from choices for which it is reasonable to hold agents responsible. This position has been criticised for its purported harshness in responding to the plight of individuals who, through their own choices, end up destitute. This paper aims to assess the Harshness Objection. I put forward a version of the objection that has been qualified to take into account some of the more subtle elements of the luck (...)
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  • Hypothetical markets: Educational application of Ronald Dworkin's sovereign virtue.Stephen Gough - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (3):287–299.
    The purpose of this paper is to consider, in principle and at the most general level, a particular possible approach to educational policy‐making. This approach involves an education‐specific application of the notion of hypothetical markets first developed in Ronald Dworkin's book Sovereign Virtue: The theory and practice of equality . The paper distinguishes the concept of the market from the operation of any actual market, and from the operation of ‘market forces’ in any generalised sense. It continues by arguing that (...)
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  • Freedom to Roam.Matthias Brinkmann - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2):209-233.
    Some European countries legally recognise a “right to roam”—a right to freely traverse across land, even if privately owned. Political philosophers have paid little attention to the right, and have often conceptualised property rights to include strong claim-rights to exclude others. I offer an account of the right to roam, and consider whether it can be philosophically justified on a left-liberal account of property. After finding a defence in terms of the interests served by the right lacking, I suggest that (...)
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