There is a need to better understand how individuals in different religious groups construct and maintain their worldviews. This study explores how religious practices, beliefs, and relationships create and sustain the worldviews of five British Muslims. Semi-structured interviews were inductively analyzed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) to idiographically explore the participants’ lived experiences. This analysis developed multiple subordinate themes that formed two superordinate themes: “Submitting to Allah” and “Being a British Muslim.” The participants’ experiences of being raised in Muslim families (...) strongly shaped their beliefs and they each strongly identify themselves as both Muslim and British. These important relationships taught them to follow the teachings of the Qur’an and to live their lives in submission to God. The analysis suggests the belief that the Qur’an is the authoritative and enduring revelation of God to mankind provided the core of their worldview and that this belief had far-reaching implications for every aspect of their lives. Their social relationships and religious practices both continually affirmed this fundamental belief in their sacred text and created a social reality in which the participants experienced God and submitted to the will of Allah. The combination of many different religious practices, social relationships, and personal experiences imbued the Qur’an with the power and authority to shape the participants’ lives and sustained their religious community. The participants’ intratextually fundamentalist approach to the Qur’an helped them create coherent worldviews that were filled with meaning and purpose. (shrink)

Religious fundamentalism remains a significant force in global politics and religion. Despite a range of problems arising from fundamentalism, the beliefs fundamentalists hold can seem quite reasonable. This paper considers whether, in fact, fundamentalist beliefs are rational by drawing on recent ideas in contemporary epistemology. The paper presents a general theory of fundamentalist beliefs in terms of their propositional content and the high credence levels attributed to them. It then explores the way these beliefs are both acquired and retained by (...) applying ideas from the social epistemology of echo chambers and group belief. The paper then considers three accounts of the rationality of belief: evidentialist, reliabilist, and virtue-theoretic. It is argued that fundamentalist beliefs can be reasonable on evidentialist standards, but are nevertheless still problematic on reliabilist and virtue standards, since they are formed in environments that are not truth-conducive and which cultivate intellectual vice. (shrink)