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  1. Korsgaard’s Moral Theory ln the Light of Kant’s Architectonics.Vitaly Kiryushchenko - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1931-1944.
    In The Sources of Normativity Korsgaard introduces her conception of practical identities understood as the source of moral obligations. This conception forms a point of transition from Korsgaard’s theory of action to her solution to the problem of the authority of moral norms. In order to describe how universal categorical reasoning is compatible with the moral content of particular practical decisions, Korsgaard needs to show how our contingent practical identities can be reconciled with what she defines as the universally shared (...)
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  • Human Plight, Kantian as if, and Public Reasons in Korsgaard’s Moral Theory.Vitaly Kiryushchenko - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (56):99-119.
    The conception of two kinds of practical identities, which Korsgaard introduces in the Sources of Normativity, helps her explain how universal categorical reasoning is compatible with the moral content of individual practical decisions. Based on this conception, she devises an interpretation of the Kantian as if principle amended by her argument for the public shareability of reasons. I suggest that, in doing so, Korsgaard steps too far away from Kant’s architectonic approach to the question of why moral norms bind us, (...)
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  • Why One’s Practical Reasons Are Not Just One’s Own Private Affair.Stefano Bertea - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiry 41 (1):63-85.
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  • Constitutivism and normativity: a qualified defence.Stefano Bertea - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):81-95.
    In this article, I defend a meta-normative account of constitutivism by specifically addressing what I take to be a fundamental criticism of the constitutivist stance, namely, the objection that constitutive standards have conceptual, not normative, force, and so that no practical normativity can be extracted from them as constitutive of agency. In reply to this objection, I argue that the conceptual role of the standards constitutive of agency? their applying to us by virtue of our being the kinds of creatures (...)
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