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Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosphy

In Peter Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry. New York: Oxford University Press (2001)

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  1. Hume's Changing Views on the 'Durability' of Scepticism.Brian Ribeiro - 2009 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):215-236.
    While Hume is famous for his development and defence of various arguments for radical scepticism, Hume was bothered by the tension between his ‘abstruse’ philosophical reflections and ordinary life: If he often felt intensely sceptical in his study, he nonetheless felt genuinely unable to take these sceptical views seriously when he returned to the concerns and activities of everyday life. Hume's published work shows a deep and ongoing preoccupation with this tension, and I believe it also shows that Hume's view (...)
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  • Hume on knowledge, certainty and probability: Anticipating the disintegration of the analytic/synthetic divide?Kevin Meeker - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):226–242.
    This paper contends that the first argument of Hume's "Of scepticism with regard to reason" entails that humans have no knowledge as Hume understands knowledge. In defending this claim, we also see how Hume's argument anticipates an important aspect of an extremely influential 20th century development: the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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  • The Hume Literature, 2002.William Edward Morris - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (2):381-400.
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  • Knowledge and Sensory Knowledge in Hume's Treatise.Graham Clay - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 10:195-229.
    I argue that the Hume of the Treatise maintains an account of knowledge according to which (i) every instance of knowledge must be an immediately present perception (i.e., an impression or an idea); (ii) an object of this perception must be a token of a knowable relation; (iii) this token knowable relation must have parts of the instance of knowledge as relata (i.e., the same perception that has it as an object); and any perception that satisfies (i)-(iii) is an instance (...)
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  • What makes Hume an External World Skeptic?Graham Clay - manuscript
    What would it take for Hume to be an external world skeptic? Is Hume's position on knowledge sufficient to force him to deny that we can acquire knowledge of propositions about the external world? After all, Hume is extremely restrictive about what can be known because he requires knowledge to be immune to error. In this paper, I will argue that if Hume were a skeptic, then he must also deny a particular kind of view about what is immediately present (...)
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